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 Abstract 
 
Drawing on North’s New Institutional Economics (enhanced by Finley’s substantivist model), 
this thesis contributes to ancient economic theories by analyzing the role of the social institution 
of xenia in Classical Athenian economies. The significance of this ritualized interpersonal 
relationship has not yet been sufficiently appreciated, especially regarding its effects as a 
structural determinant on economic performance within specific trade mechanisms.  
The case study of two particular economic services, provided by the Athenian aristocrat 
Andocides through his xenia with Archelaus of Macedon and Evagoras of Cyprus (And. 2.11 and 
20-21) not only illustrates the significant effect of such ritualized personal relationships on the 
Athenian timber and grain trade but also allows us to gauge the quantitative impact of xenia on 
these two Athenian economies. The honorific decrees for Archelaus (proxenia: IG I3 117) and 
Evagoras (citizenship: IG I3 113) corroborate the importance of xenia-based trade services on 
Classical Athenian economies. 
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Introduction 
 
The scholarly debate on ancient Greek and Roman economies is long and extensive, 
beginning in the 1890s in Germany with the emergence of the concepts of primitivism and 
modernism, continuing in the 20th century with Finley’s substantivism following well through 
into the current era with Douglass North’s New Institutional Economic Theory.1 Today ancient 
Greek and Roman economic history and theory is a thriving field within the discipline of 
Classical Studies, as a quote from the introduction to The Cambridge Economic History of the 
Greco-Roman World demonstrates:  
“This emerging account of the Greco-Roman economy is an advance over twentieth-
century interpretations. It improves on substantivist approaches by providing crude 
statistics on economic performance, but it also goes beyond both sides in the old 
primitivist-modernist debate by developing general theoretical models of ancient 
economic behaviour and putting them in a global, comparative context.”2  
In recent scholarship, the effort to explain and understand both economic performance and 
structure in full, and to distinguish them from modern economies has grown significantly. This 
effort is still lacking in certain respects, though. The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-
Roman World focuses on the determinants of economic performance within the first part of the 
book, featuring chapters on ecology, demography, households, gender, law, economic 
institutions, and technology. Each of these determinants is of paramount importance and plays a 
vital role in the nature and function of ancient economies. Yet, this part of the companion does 
not account for the significant effect of social institutions (such as ritualized interpersonal 
relationships) on ancient economies. It is noteworthy, that even though the companion proclaims 
                                                 
1 See Scheidel et al. 2007,  1-12 for a full history of scholarly debates and theories on ancient Greek economies. See 
also Engen 2010,  3-36; Bresson 2016,  1-30; and the entirety of Jones 2014 for the application of economic theory 
to the ancient Mediterranean. Also, North 1981 and 1990 on New Institutional Economics specifically. 
2 Scheidel et al. 2007,  11-12.  
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to follow North’s New Institutional Economics’ injunction to study both structure and 
performance through time,3 it neglects one crucial determinant that North himself mentions 
explicitly in his seminal Structure and Change in Economic History, i.e. the role of social 
institutions. North views the task of writing economic history as an attempt to explain the 
structure (determinants of economic performance and other aspects which make-up economic 
systems) and performance (assessments of economic success and strength of different sectors) of 
economies through time, focusing on performance (in typical terms of performance such as 
production, distribution, and stability) as well as structure, which he defines as the characteristics 
of a society which account for the basic determinants of performance, including political and 
social institutions, as well as social ideology.4 
Of course, the relationship between social institutions and ancient economies has been 
studied extensively within the school of substantivism, which focuses specifically on economic 
sociology: defining production, distribution, and consumption within larger networks of cultural 
power.5 Yet, substantivism does not elaborate on the relationship between embedded economies 
and performance, causing an overall deficiency in the understanding of the mechanisms of 
ancient economies.6 While the exploration of social institutions is extensive within 
substantivism, it does not fully account for every single ancient Greek or Roman social 
institution, neglecting even those which appear significant and meaningful to the functioning of 
                                                 
3 Scheidel et al. 2007,  v-vii. The table of contents for this work is an enlightening resource regarding the focus of 
modern economic scholarship. See also  11-12 of the same work. 
4 See North 1981,  3, as well as the entirety of this work for a full understanding of his theoretical economic model.  
5 See Finley 1953 and 1973. 
6 This opinion began with Hopkins, Finley’s successor at Cambridge, who recognized that having a single economic 
model to cover the entirety of the Greco-Roman world had its faults and might appear too static over time. He 
proposed that Finley`s model of substantivism be elaborated to accommodate the possibility of economic growth 
and decline in the ancient world, associating economic growth with political change and the spread of technologies 
and social innovations. See Hopkins 1983,  xi-xiv.  
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ancient economies. Finley’s influential monograph The Ancient Economy makes no mention of 
guest-friendship, hospitality, reciprocity, or xenia in its index;7 The Cambridge Economic 
History of the Greco-Roman World only mentions reciprocity once (on page 370) and xenia once 
(on page 371). Both of these mentions appear within the chapter Classical Greece: Distribution, 
claiming that reciprocity and xenia were institutions developed specifically to reduce transaction 
costs and foster exchange between individuals. In this chapter, xenia and proxenia are considered 
means to guarantee peaceful exchange and offer protection to strangers through  established 
institutions,8 otherwise neither xenia nor proxenia make another appearance in the entire volume. 
It is in this respect that I believe ancient economic discourse is lacking. By examining the role of 
ritualized interpersonal relations in Athenian trade during the classical period, I make the case 
for viewing xenia as a vital structural component of ancient economies and a determinant of their 
performance.  
 In order to demonstrate the significant role of xenia on ancient Greek economies in 
general, and its effect on Classical Athenian trade mechanisms in particular, I conduct a case 
study on the Athenian aristocrat Andocides, analyzing two passages from his speech On the 
Return. Both of these passages recount services that Andocides undertook – thanks to his xenia 
with powerful foreign individuals – on behalf of the Athenian state. It is necessary to recognize 
that there is a certain level of bias within these passages, since Andocides attempted to use these 
services as a means to have his citizenship reinstated in Athens.9 Yet there must still be a certain 
                                                 
7 Finley 1973,  255-262.  
8 Möller 2007,  370-371. 
9 Andocides was expelled from Athens in 415 BCE due to his involvement in the mutilation of the herms and the 
profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. He saved himself (and members of his family) from being put to death by 
informing on other parties involved in these two incidents. As a result of his role as an informant, the Athenians felt 
he was no longer trustworthy and he was exiled. See MacDowell 1962, Edwards 1995, and Gagarin and MacDowell 
1998, for full accounts of the history and context of his speech On the Return as well as On the Mysteries. 
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level of truth in these passages, otherwise his rhetorical argument would have been entirely 
futile. Furthermore, there are two inscriptions which respectively correspond to the dates, 
individuals, geographical locations, actions, and events that Andocides recounts in this speech, 
wherein a foreign recipient is granted proxenia with Athens, most likely, for the services which 
Andocides procured. The first passage I explore relates to a service that Andocides procured 
from Archelaus of Macedon, with whom he claims inherited xenia.  
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτίκα μὲν τότε εἰσήγαγον εἰς στρατιὰν ὑμῶν οὖσαν ἐν Σάμῳ κωπέας, 
τῶν τετρακοσίων ἤδη τὰ πράγματα ἐνθάδε κατειληφότων, ὄντος μοι Ἀρχελάου 
ξένου πατρικοῦ καὶ διδόντος τέμνεσθαί τε καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι ὁπόσους ἐβουλόμην. 
τούτους τε εἰσήγαγον τοὺς κωπέας, καὶ παρόν μοι πέντε δραχμῶν τὴν τιμὴν 
αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐμοὶ κατέστησαν: 
εἰσήγαγον δὲ σῖτόν τε καὶ χαλκόν (And. 2.11).10 
Indeed, I at once supplied your forces in Samos with oar-spars at a time when 
the Four Hundred had already seized power here, since Archelaus was an 
inherited xenos of mine and allowed me to cut and export as many as I wished. 
I both supplied these spars and, although I could have received a price for them 
of five drachmas apiece, I did not want to charge more than they cost me; I 
also supplied corn and bronze. (And. 2.11).11 
Andocides provided an impressive service to Athens through his xenia with Archelaus. The 
provision of a  large amount of timber from Macedon was no small feat (as we will see further in 
Chapter 4). It is especially significant the he accomplished this because of a pre-existing xenia 
relationship This passage clearly indicates that there is some kind of relationship between xenia 
and economic activities and services. Furthermore, the Macedonian king Archelaus was awarded 
a decree of proxenia by the Athenian demos – i.e. Archelaus became the Athenians’ official 
guest-friend in Macedon – shortly after Andocides procured this service (IG I3 117). The 
Athenian proxenia decree for  Archelaus demonstrates the important relationship between xenia 
and the political and economic situations at Athens. The inscription also demonstrates that 
                                                 
10 Greek taken from: M. Edwards 1995, Greek Orators IV –Andocides. 
11The translations are my own, but they draw at times on standard published translations. 
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services such as the ones that Andocides provided to Athens were considered significant by the 
polis, and therefore likely had some kind of political or economic effect on it. Scholars argue that 
Andocides was the xenos in Athens through which Archelaus provided this service to the polis. It 
is likely that the provision of timber and shipment of grain that Andocides provided to the 
Athenians were of a similar sort.12 Such a service to the state must have had a significant 
economic effect for Athens, otherwise it (and similar such services) would not be formally 
recognized by the polis through a proxenia decree. But the question remains: what kind of effect 
did xenia have on Classical Athenian economies, in general, and on Athenian trade in particular, 
and to what extent? Furthermore, how do we interpret the effects of xenia as a social institution 
on the structure and performance of Classical Athenian economies?  
 The second passage that I explore is similar in nature. Andocides procured a large 
shipment of grain from Cyprus for Athens at a time when Athens was apparently not receiving 
any grain from the island. 
ἐπίστασθε γὰρ που ὡς ἠγγέλθη ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐ μέλλει ἐκ Κύπρου σῖτος ἥξειν 
ἐνταῦθα: ἐγὼ τοίνυν τοιοῦτός τε καὶ τοσοῦτος ἐγενόμην, ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας 
τοὺς ταῦτα βουλεύσαντας ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ πράξαντας ψευσθῆναι τῆς αὑτῶν 
γνώμης. καὶ ὡς μὲν ταῦτα διεπράχθη, οὐδὲν προὔργου ἀκοῦσαι ὑμῖν: τάδε δὲ 
νυνὶ βούλομαι ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι αἱ μέλλουσαι νῆες ἤδη σιταγωγοὶ καταπλεῖν 
εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ εἰσιν ὑμῖν τέτταρες καὶ δέκα, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐκ Κύπρου 
ἀναχθεισῶν ἥξουσιν ἁθρόαι οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον (And. 2.20-21). 
You know, I imagine, how it was announced to you that no corn was to come 
here from Cyprus. Now I acted so well and with such effect that the men who 
planned this against you and put it into operation were disappointed in their 
intention. It is of no importance for you to hear how this was accomplished, 
but now I do want you to know this, that the ships conveying corn and already 
about to put in to the Piraeus for you are fourteen in number, and the rest of 
those that sailed from Cyprus will arrive together not long afterwards. (And. 
2.20-21). 
                                                 
12 See Meiggs and Lewis 1988,  91 for a full analysis and discussion of this particular inscription and the argument 
for Andocides as Archelaus’ Athenian xenos.  
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Unfortunately, this passage does not explicitly indicate that Andocides used his ritualized 
interpersonal guest friendships (i.e. his xenia relationships) in Cyprus. Yet there is other evidence 
that strongly suggests that Andocides accomplished this grain shipment through xenia. 
Andocides spent a large portion of his exile in Salamis on Cyprus (And. 1.4, 132; Lys. 6.6; Plut. 
And. 834E-F).13 It is important to note that this whole service has not come fully to fruition: 14 
ships are about to put into the Piraeus, and more are following, expected to put into the port. 
Furthermore, Andocides claims in On the Mysteries that he has come together with many people, 
“from which ritualized guest-friendships and friendships with many kings and cities arose, and 
from which others have become personal guest-friends” (ἀφ᾽ ὧν μοὶ ξενίαι καὶ φιλότητες πρὸς 
πολλοὺς καὶ βασιλέας καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἄλλους ἰδίᾳ ξένους γεγένηνται), claiming that if Athens 
acquits him of these crimes they will have a share of these relationships and be able to make use 
of them on any occasion (And. 1.145). Lysias too makes mention of Andocides’ proclivities for 
foreign friendships, claiming that he is the accepted guest of kings and despots (cf. καὶ 
βασιλεῦσιν ἐξενωμένος καὶ τυράννοις; Lys. 6.48). Finally, just as in the first passage, the 
Athenian demos granted citizenship shortly after this event to Evagoras of Salamis for his 
provision of a large amount of grain to Athens (IG I3 113), which aids in demonstrating the 
overall importance of trade services (such as those Andocides’ provided) to Athens. This decree 
demonstrates the importance of economic benefactions to Athens, and shows that xenia-based 
economic exchanges were of significance to Athenian economies and political situations. 
I approach several questions in this project, and attempt to answer them through a 
representative case study of the xenia-based services rendered by the Athenian aristocrat 
Andocides. Can we determine that xenia was a significant factor in Classical Athenian 
                                                 
13 See Edwards 1995,  2, 191. The evidence for this will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapters 3 and 5 
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economies? What role did xenia play within Classical Athenian economies, in general, and what 
effect did it have on Classical Athenian trade in particular? Furthermore, can we gauge the 
effects of xenia as a structural determinant on the performance of Classical Athenian economies?  
 In a detailed analysis of the two Andocides passages cited above I seek to explain how 
xenia affected both the structure and performance of Classical Greek economies, and to 
illuminate the function of xenia within Athenian trade. It will become apparent that an important 
element is missing in scholarly analyses on ancient economies when social institutions (such as 
xenia) are not taken fully into account. To make this case, I explore the history of scholarly 
debates on ancient economies and the theoretical models that accompany them (Chapter 1). In 
Chapter 2 I examine xenia and its evolution throughout ancient Greek culture over time so that 
we are in a better position to situate the role of xenia within ancient economic discourse and 
theoretical models on Classical Athenian economies. In Chapter 3 I discuss the dating of 
Andocides’ speech On the Return, as well as his respective relationships with his xenoi 
Archelaus and Evagoras in order to document the nature and context of the services he provides 
Athens. In Chapters 4 and 5 I examine the timber and grain trade in Athens during the Classical 
period, in order to gauge the impact of Andocides’ xenia-based services on the Athenian timber 
and grain economies.Through this representative case study I seek to demonstrate that the social 
institution of xenia must indeed be considered a structural determinant of economic performance 
in Classical Athens, and that studying xenia can help us understand and explain the nature of 
Athenian economies in the Classical period.   
We are indeed fortunate to learn the details of Andocides’ procurements of timber and grain for 
Athens through his own speeches. It is important to stress, however, that Andocides’ xenia-based 
services for the Athenian state, which ultimately resulted in Athenian grants of proxenia and 
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citizenship for Andocides’ xenoi, were not exceptions, but a rather common phenomenon in 
Classical Athens, judging from the 84 proxenia decrees which have come down to us from fifth 
century Athens alone.14 For most of these proxenia decrees were granted in recognition of 
previous political or economic benefactions provided by foreign individuals to the Athenian 
state, many of which were surely the result of mediation by individual Athenians on the basis of 
their pre-existing relationship of xenia with these 84 grantees, just as in the case of Andocides 
and the Macedonian king Archelaus. Clearly, since we have such a significant amount of 
proxenia decrees from the early Classical period, the decrees to Archelaus and Evagoras are no 
exception. Using these exemplary decrees in conjunction with Andocides’ testimony allows us to 
contextualize xenia in relation to Classical Athenian economies, and extrapolate for other 
existing proxenia decrees. This case study on Andocides and his xenoi allows us to gauge both 
the role xenia plays as a component of economic structure and its effect on the performance of 
Classical Athenian economies and trade mechanisms. Andocides’ case illustrates in an 
exemplary way the roles of xenia and proxenia in Classical Athens, and serves as a paradigm for 
further study of these social institutions as structural determinants of economic performance in 
the Classical Athenian world.
                                                 
14 See Walbank 1978 for an in depth discussion of all the remaining 84 proxenia decrees from fifth century Athens. 
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Chapter 1: Ancient Economic Theory 
 
Ancient Economies: Introduction to the Debate 
 
The ancient economies of the Archaic and Classical Greek periods are a complicated and 
diverse area of discourse within Classical Studies. Until recently, questions concerning the 
ancient Greek and Roman economies were only of interest to  specialists in the history of ancient 
economics. There is yet to be any consensus on one particular theoretical paradigm to follow in 
the study and development of ancient economic models for the Greek and Roman worlds. Each 
theoretical approach proves difficult to situate within the broad scope of economic history.15 
Unlike some other economies, those of the ancient Greek world are difficult to classify and fully 
understand: the nature of ancient Greek politics, culture, and history do little to provide a clear 
paradigm of economic and financial functions within the full scope of ancient Greek society. 
Most discussions of ancient economies are purely theoretical, and any developed economic 
framework or paradigm is the long-laboured result of little more than inference and supposition. 
As such most theories result in discipline-wide disputes, pitting various theoretical conceptions 
against one another with no obvious solution. How is it possible to truly quantify an economy for 
which we have so little evidence? What remains to us from Archaic and Classical Greece 
regarding economics (in the modern sense) is mostly archaeological and epigraphical evidence. 
                                                 
15 For in depth development and discussion of various economic theoretical approaches and models in scholarship 
see Bresson 2016; Jones 2014; Engen 2010;  Scheidel et al. 2007; Cartledge et al. 2002; Finley 1973, and 1954; 
North 1994, 1990, and 1981; Hopkins 1983; Hopper 1979; Hasebroek 1965; and Polanyi 1944.  
10 
 
Furthermore, in  textual sources most evidence has to be inferred through laborious study and 
cross-reference.16 Nevertheless, it is essential to survey the scholarly debate on the various 
theoretical models of the ancient Greek economy in order to understand how such extensive 
scholarship and theories are lacking in regards to xenia as a social institution and structural 
determinant of Classical Athenian economies. By examining various theoretical models, I hope 
to properly position Andocides’ xenia-based services to Athens within the constraints of current 
and past discourse on Classical Athenian economies. I hope to discover where and why 
scholarship and theoretical models are inadequate in their consideration of xenia in relation to 
Classical Athenian economies. In doing so, my goal is to determine why a lack of focus on xenia 
is a problem for properly understanding the effects of xenia as a structural determinant of 
economic performance and trade mechanisms in Classical Athenian economies  This 
methodology allows me to situate Andocides’ xenia-based services to Athens within broader 
economic discourse and theoretical models, thus contributing to the overall understanding of 
Classical Athenian economies.  
What is the ancient Greek economy, and why is scholarship on the topic so widely 
divisive? It is difficult to say, but it is hardly surprising that the field of ancient Greek and 
Roman economies is much smaller relative to comparable aspects of the history of the Greco-
Roman world (such as political history, social history, or epigraphy). Unfortunately, most 
classicists rely largely on a body of literature written by and for an elite class of the ancient 
world, as well as mostly mute archaeological evidence, plus coinage, inscriptions, and papyri, 
leaving us largely with only our own modern economic conceptions as means of interpretation 
and application to the ancient Greek world. The ancient Greeks were hardly aware of their 
                                                 
16 Scheidel et al. 2007,  1. 
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economies, at least not in the same way that we are able to conceive of our economies. As 
elucidated by Finley, ancient Greeks participated in economic activities such as a trade, 
investments, production, loans, and etc., even writing about these and discussing them in various 
literary works. Yet, the Ancient Greeks did not conceptualize and amalgamate their economic 
activities and economies into defined sub-systems. On account of this lack of systematic 
definition there is little archived quantifiable economic information on which we can rely and 
interpret.17  
For instance, Xenophon’s Poroi discusses many Athenian economic activities in depth, 
such as silver mining, farming, fishing, commercial trade, and labour, but considers each activity 
individually from the others in regards to any possible financial benefit to an individual or to the 
state. Nor does Xenophon attempt to quantifiably measure or analyze an economic activity 
beyond its ability to generate revenue, and neither does he express any quantitative amount or 
analysis of the possible effects of  various activities as a whole on the state. He does urge 
Athenians to offer honours to people who provide trade-related services to the state in order to 
increase the states’ revenues through taxation, since Athens collects taxes on products both 
exported from and imported into the polis (Xen. Por. 2.1-7, 3.3-5).18 Xenophon’s Oeconomicus 
is similar in that it refers to oikonomia and economic activities, but defines the sphere as 
individual and household property and wealth management, and does not expand to state-
management of wealth and property within the realm of oikonomia as the science of household 
management. Both of these sources indicate an awareness of economic activity, but not an 
awareness of economic conceptualizations in the sense of an independent societal sub-system or 
                                                 
17 Finley 1973,  17-34. 
18 Engen 2010, 77-78; for the original argument see Burke 1992,  199-226. See Hakkarainen 1997, 1-32 for another 
argument on state revenue as a goal of Athenian trade policy. 
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overall economic institution. Inflation, market economics, embedded transactions, capital, 
appreciation, gross domestic product, etc., would all have been foreign concepts to an ancient 
Greek individual, and the terms ‘economy’ and ‘economics’ in their modern senses would be 
completely alien.19   
The modern words ‘economy’ and ‘economics’ derive from the ancient Greek 
oikonomia: oikonomia is literally translated from the Greek into English as ‘household 
management’, or ‘household law’. The definition evolved in its application and extension to any 
sort of large-scale manageable organization. In Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, the term oikonomia 
(1.1) is directly translated as “household-management” and “estate management”, and the text 
itself is primarily concerned with the household and personal property rather than the ‘economy’ 
at large of the entire state. Oikonomia, here, is the science of personal property, wealth and 
household management, and the discussion between Socrates and Critobolus focuses entirely on 
individual management of personal property as the science of oikonomia, not on the state.20 The 
metaphor of oikonomia as large-scale affair management did become prevalent in the Classical 
period, but it was never actually applied to the management of the economy (specifically) of the 
entire polis. Demosthenes was ridiculed for being “useless in the oikonomia (management) of the 
polis”, and a similar metaphor appears two hundred years later in the work of the Greek historian 
Polybius. The word continued to be used by ancient authors, including Quintillian, and would 
occasionally be used as an overall metaphor for the management of political and state affairs, in 
an overwhelmingly general sense.21 The use of oikonomia and its derivatives in this sense 
continued, and eventually evolved from referring primarily to politics, to acquiring its 
                                                 
19 Finley 1973,  21; Engen 2010,  3-19; Parsons and Smelser 1956; Bucher 1893,  114. 
20 Engen 2010,  4-5. 
21 Finley 1973,  20-21. 
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specialized sense regarding wealth. The French originally coined the term “l’économie 
politique”, yet it remained a solely political term until about 1750. By this time, a large amount 
of writing on trade, monies, national wealth and income, and economic policy had arisen, so that 
by the second half of the eighteenth century the specialized sense of ‘economy’ was fully 
developed.  
Economics in its modern sense, is a late nineteenth century innovation, to the credit of the 
first volume of Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics in 1890. 22 Although it is clear that 
ancient Greeks taxed, loaned, mined, coined, deposited, and accrued money, they did not 
combine these activities into a particular social, cultural, or ideological structure.23 Therefore 
Finley restricts the use of ‘economics’ as a term to capitalist systems: the language and concepts 
with which we are familiar on account of their predominance in modern society tend to lead to a 
“false version” when applied to ancient economies.24 While ancient societies had economies, 
with rules, regulations, and a certain level of predictability, they were not always conceptualized: 
for instance, both wage and interest rates in ancient Greece were fairly stable over long periods 
of time, so that discussing a “labour market” or a “money market” creates an anachronistic 
representation of ancient Greek society and changes the modern conceptions of ancient 
practices.25 Even though Finley was primarily concerned with “political economies”, he did not 
                                                 
22See Finley 1973,  21. 
23 Finley 1973,  21; Parsons and Smelser 1956: economics was not a “differentiated sub-system” of ancient Greek 
society. As such, modern complaints about the lack of ancient economic writings rely on a misunderstanding of 
what ancient economic literature was actually about. See also Engen 2010,  3-36. 
24 Finley 1973,  23; language is fundamental to methodology, although Finley classifies the distinction between 
modern and ancient economies as arbitrary, it actually proves quite useful in the separation of capitalist and non/pre-
capitalist societies. See also Engen 2010,  3-36 for a discussion of the nature of ancient Greek economies and the 
language used to define them. Cartledge et al. 2002,  xv-xvi, also provides a brief discussion on modern economic 
language and the problematic application of modern terminology to ancient economies, discussing specifically the 
absence of quantitative analysis and any demand for statistically significant results.  
25 Finley 1973,  23-27; Engen 2010,  3-36; Cartledge et al. 2002,  xv-6; see Bresson 2016,  xxi-xxiv for a discussion 
of the issues that accompany studying the growth of ancient economies, and the problematic nature of abstract 
conceptualizations in application to ancient Greek economies.  
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doubt the presence of economic determinants (market value, production costs, inflation, among 
others), or that basic data and figures could be presented on production, trade, finances, and 
profits. Yet he did not see the merit in these exercises since there was no economic logic inherent 
in this information by which to organize it.26 That is, there is little concern within substantivism 
for number and quantifiable data, as this particular type of information does not wield the 
structural evidence upon which substantivists are primarily focused. Numerical and quantifiable 
data are largely, through the substantivist lens, essays in futility, since we have so little empirical 
and quantifiable data and evidence remaining to us from the ancient Greek world. Substantivists 
hold that stretching and extrapolating what little quantifiable data we have to fit particular 
situations and contexts is problematic, in that it presents a skewed and inaccurate representation 
of the performance of ancient Greek economies. Substantivists prefer to focus primarily on 
economic structure and economic sociology, rather than concerning themselves with 
performance. I find this view largely problematic, as I believe the quantifiable evidence that 
remains to us can wield interesting results, and at least provides us with a paradigm in which to 
work and to construct theoretical models for economic performance. It is not possible for us to 
know the full extent of ancient Greek economic performance, nor to fully understand its 
structures. Yet, it is important to study as much of the available evidence as possible so as to 
have a well-rounded, detailed, and functional theoretical model of the ancient Greek economy.  
As Finley argues there is a widespread issue of number fetishism amongst both ancient 
and modern authors, yet I diverge from him in this respect. Finley is exceptionally preoccupied 
with the sociological aspect of ancient Greek economies, and does not lend any weight to the 
importance of attempting to analyze what little quantifiable evidence remains to us. It is 
                                                 
26 See Bresson 2016,  1-27, for a breakdown of ancient economic theories and debates in scholarship. 
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important, as mentioned in the introduction, to follow a theoretical model that considers both the 
sociological aspects of an economy as well as its performance in order to fully understand its 
nature and growth over time.27 The question remains: how much exactly could an ancient author 
know? Is it possible that Thucydides knew for sure the number of slaves that escaped Attica in 
the final ten years of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 7.27.5)? If so, how did he reach his final 
number? It is unlikely that someone was stationed at a border between Attica and Boeotia with 
the purpose of counting escaped slaves. It seems probable that such a number is no more than an 
estimation of an amount of slaves that would have been a substantial and harmful loss to Athens. 
Although, the numbers recorded by ancient authors are then repeated by modern scholars. The 
20,000 slaves Thucydides estimated is a number repeated religiously, applied in calculations and 
used to draw conclusions on the Attic slave populations. Yet, this number is no more than a 
general guess or estimation, an educated one, but by no means concrete.28 
 Ancient peoples did keep registrars and rosters of quantifiable measures: hoplites, 
cavalry men, cash, and ships (to name only a few), censuses were taken for tax purposes, and 
information was filed in the interest of public revenue. Furthermore, what distinguishes these 
quantifiable lists is the lack of reasoning between the figures and their relationships to political, 
social, and ideological trends: there was no applied time series available. Any information 
recorded was for immediate use and information, rather than for future applications, as such 
there could be no true statistical analysis in the ancient world (something on which modern 
economics greatly relies).29  Substantivist theoretical reasoning swings too far in the favour of a 
                                                 
27 See North 1981, This idea is the inherent notion behind his New Institutional Economic theory, in that it is 
necessary to study both structure and performance separately and together in order to understand the nature of any 
economy. 
28 See Finley 1973,  23-27 for a full discussion of this particular incident. See also Rubincam 2012, 2011, and 2010 
for the use of numbers in ancient Greek historians, especially Thucydides and Herodotus. 
29 Finley 1973,  25. 
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purely sociological perspective: the rationale between the figures and their relationships to 
social, political, and cultural institutions and factors is indispensable in the study of ancient 
Greek and Roman economies if there is any hope of reaching definitive understanding. The 
reconciliation of what little quantitative evidence we have with what we know about the 
sociological structure of ancient Greek economies allows us to situate economic determinants 
such as demography, technology, and social institutions within economic discourse in a positive 
and obliging manner that can be utilised to fully appreciate areas in discourse that are currently 
lacking, such as xenia. I follow Finley’s terminology, refraining from referring to ancient Greek 
economics (a field which did not exist as defined within modern economics) and rather focusing 
on the ancient Greek economies themselves.  
The plural “economies” will be used most often, as per the substantivist school of 
thought: since there were multiple cultural and social institutions which regulated and 
determined the structures and performances of any economic aspect of the society, we must 
consider that there were multiple economies embedded within these, rather than an independent, 
large entity as we typically conceive of economics.30 Such a differentiation can help us divorce 
ourselves from the preconceived notions of modern economies that have often been maintained 
and applied to ancient economies in scholarship Hopefully we can thus avoid any terminological 
or conceptual issues in attempting to define the role of xenia in ancient economies. By avoiding 
terminological, conceptual, and anachronistic issues, we can properly address the functional role 
of xenia within Classical Athenian economies as an aspect of structure and as a determinant of 
performance.  
                                                 
30 Finley 1973,  23-27. 
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In order to complete this project, I focus on North’s New Institutional Economic Theory 
primarily, because it takes all aspects of Classical Greek economies into account. North’s theory 
allows us to take performance and structure into account simultaneously. The resulting picture of 
Classical Athenian economies is much more complete than one which is based on the study of 
structure or performance alone. Even if we do not have the exact quantitative data, it is better to 
at least attempt to gauge how Classical Athenian economies performed. North’s theory builds on 
substantivism, while simultaneously expanding upon it in order to account for performance 
based aspects of economies that are under-explored in other theories.  
Ancient Economies: Scholarly Debate and Theoretical Models 
 
It is useful to provide a brief description of the five most influential theoretical 
frameworks for studying ancient economies: primitivism, modernism, formalism/neo-classical, 
substantivism, and New Institutional Economics. By understanding the nature of scholarly 
debate on the subject, we can begin to conceptualize where and how the prevalent theoretical 
models of ancient economies fail to take into account the function of xenia. Furthermore, a brief 
history of the theoretical debates permits me to situate my own notion about the Classical Greek 
economies within these schools of thought, as well as to argue for my preference for North’s 
New Institutional Economics concerning the study of xenia within ancient Athenian economies. I 
use North’s New Institutional Economics model because it provides the best foundation to study 
both the structure and performance of Classical Athenian economies in conjunction with one 
another. North’s model is the most in depth means to study both the sociological and quantitative 
aspects of economies and economic development in relation to economic structure and overall 
performance. I will elaborate on this choice further on in this section. 
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The evolution of scholarship on ancient economies took place over the course of a 
century and a half, and gives us the context for the emergence of New Institutional Economics. 
Incidents involving xenia, like Andocides’ procurements of grain and timber are discussed and 
analyzed by scholars within each respective theory. Although, none of them have yet taken it 
into account as economically effectual outside of the umbrella term “reciprocity”. There are 
several reasons for this: theoretical economic models tend to diverge between overwhelming 
focuses on either performance on or structure. The dichotomy between studying performance or 
studying structure, and the study of both of these separately, makes it difficult to approach and 
understand structural aspects of economies that are also determinants of economic.. By 
separating structure from performance in the study of Ancient economies, it becomes impossible 
to determine an actual functioning model for Ancient Greek economies. If a single economic 
model cannot be agreed upon, the debate will continue to center around the separate aspects of 
performance and structure within each model, which  result in problematic approaches to 
economies within scholarship In order to find a significant foothold for my argument regarding 
the importance of the role of xenia in ancient economies, it is necessary for me to first 
demonstrate the effectiveness of each theory and explain how they can aid in the endeavour to 
better understand the role of xenia within the model itself and the economy as a whole.  
The first model that will be discussed in this chapter is primitivism: the primitivist theory 
was developed by Karl Bücher in his 1893 monograph Industrial Evolution. It argues that the 
economy of ancient Greek and Rome fundamentally remained at an underdeveloped stage of 
expansion with an intense focus on performance.31 The primitivist theory characterizes the 
ancient Greek economy by domestic production that was only intended to meet the immediate 
                                                 
31 See Bresson 2016,  2; as well as Scheidel et al. 2007,  2; and also Engen 2010,  20-21. 
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needs of the familial unit, regardless of the type of production undertaken by the family. 
Mercantile trade and exchange played an extremely limited role, and the redistribution of 
products did not take place through traditional exchange but predominantly through gift-
exchange, rapine, and war. The limitations of primitivist economic theory also extend to trade 
specialization and personal exchanges, creating a system in which individuals could only 
specialize in certain fields so as to provide for their family, and would only exchange with 
people in their immediate social circles for necessity products, rather than for any type of 
“gain”.32 This model believes that significantly less trade, and entirely different kinds of trade, 
happen in the Ancient Greek world (in comparison with other theoretical models).The 
proponents of this theory take only those features of the ancient Greek economy that are useful 
for their goals (demonstrating the primitive nature of Ancient economies). This results in overall 
value judgements that are harmful to the understanding of the true nature of the ancient Greek 
economy.33 Furthermore, money has no tangible function within the primitivist theoretical 
model, outside of the realm of “insurance”, and was simply held in people’s homes without 
being used. This theory is primarily based on observations, rather than hypothetical-deductive 
reasoning, and attempts to demonstrate that ancient Greek economies were the product of an 
institutional arrangement that itself only resulted from a power-relationship among social groups:  
from this perspective economic institutions are purely social and rooted in the affirmation of the 
values peculiar to a given society.34 According to this theory, these small-scale economies only 
truly yielded to larger civic economies in the Middle Ages, and large-scale national trade only 
emerged in the 16th century.35 The primitivist theory has some merit in that it sparked large 
                                                 
32 See Bresson 2016,  2; Scheidel et al. 2007,  2; Engen 2010,  20-21. 
33Morley 2007,  4-5, and Bresson 2016,  3-4. 
34 Bresson 2016,  3-4. 
35 Scheidel at al. 2007,  2; Engen 2010,  20-21; Bresson 2010,  2; Morley 2007,  1-4. 
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debate in the late 19th century. Yet the theoretical paradigm developed through this model is 
oversimplified and largely normative in its characterizations of the ancient Greek economy as a 
whole without the consideration for variation as a result of geography, demography, technology, 
or other structural determinants. Overall, primitivism is overly concerned with placing ancient 
Greek economies in relation to our own modern capitalist or market economies: there are 
significant attempts within primitivism to discover to what level the ancient Greek economy 
resembles the modern market economy.36 
Secondly, the modernist model arose in response to the primitivist model, led by Eduard 
Meyer, essentially refuted Bücher’s views in his work Industrial Evolution.37 Modernism argues 
for the large-scale evolution of the economies of antiquity, demonstrating that ancient Greek 
economies had all the characteristics of early-modern and modern economies. Meyer was so 
confident in his views that he equated various periods of ancient Greek economic developments 
with the economic development of early Europe, from the early Middle Ages to the of the early 
20th century. Meyer aligned Bronze Age Greece with the early Middle Ages, Archaic Greece 
with the end of the Middle Ages, and Classical Greece with the end of the Middle Ages to the 
early 20th century.38 The association between ancient Greek and early modern economies arose 
from a belief that economies follow a universal path of development from primitive to modern 
over time. According tomodernist theory, the ancient Greek economy was defined by the 
Classical period and by its large scale attributes. Classical Greek economies were considered 
qualitatively similar in organization to modern market economies, characterized by 
specialization and impersonal exchanges at prices determined by aggregate supply and demand 
                                                 
36 Engen 2010,  20-21. 
37 Bresson 2016,  2. 
38 Bresson 2016,  2; Scheidel et al. 2007,  2. 
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for goods among interconnected markets.39 The core of this model consists of the belief that 
modern economic development differs from ancient economic development only in quantity, not 
quality (i.e. structure and exchange systems), whereas primitivism holds that the ancient 
economy was both qualitatively and quantitatively different from the modern economy.40 In 
order to place ancient Greek economies in relation in to modern economies,   it is necessary to 
gauge ancient Greek economies in the terms and context of modern economic structures. It is 
very problematic, however, to consider that the Western market economy is the only successful 
paradigm for economic development and to separate economies between modern and primitive 
stagnation.41 Furthermore, modernism (like primitivism) does not allow for a measure of 
independence from other eras and societies. Associating them with other cultural periods and 
systems (such as modern capitalism) is problematic and does not provide a proper understanding 
of ancient economies within their own contexts and in relation to their own societies.42  
Overall, the primitivist versus modernist debate is oversimplified. The debate between 
primitivism and modernism characterizes the ancient Greek economy as a whole without 
consideration for the effect of variation among structural determinants of economies, such as 
geography, economic sectors, agriculture, labour, trade, manufacturing, and others.43 Many 
scholars come down on the side of modernism in this debate, sparking numerous and important 
contributions to the overall discourse on ancient economies, including Rostovtzeff’s studies on 
ancient Greece and Rome as market economies. It has been made clear by scholars, such as 
Weber, Polanyi, and Finley, that a solely performance-based focus on the study of ancient 
                                                 
39 Engen 2010,  21. 
40 Morley 2007,  4. 
41 Morley 2007,  6-7. 
42 Bissa 2009,  2. 
43 Engen 2010, 5, 23. 
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economies is limited and problematic. Therefore it is widely agreed  that the primitivist-
modernist debate oversimplified the nature of ancient Greek economies, on account of the 
ultimate goal of whole economic model  characterization.44 Neither theory allows for the 
exploration and discussion of various cultural, geographic, or economic sectors. Agriculture, 
trade, labour, and manufacturing were all amalgamated into one large economic system, and 
were considered as a separate institution from the socio-cultural whole of ancient Greece. 
Max Weber suggested that the performance of an economy on a primitive to modern 
scale is less important than the overall understanding of the structure and function of an 
economy, as well as the significance of social class and social order on production, circulation, 
and consumption of goods and services within the ancient world.45 Weber’s criticisms of the 
primitive and modernist theories paved the way for later scholars to diverge from the traditional 
debate, and create new theoretical systems to organize and study ancient economies. For 
instance, Weber’s concepts were further developed by Karl Polanyi in his substantivist economic 
theory, the third major economic theory discussed in this chapter. He argues that only three 
mechanisms are available for exchange: reciprocity, redistribution, and market.46 Both reciprocal 
and redistributive economies are embedded in other social and cultural institutions; it is only 
within market economies that individual transactions are dis-embedded and focused solely on 
profit and gain.47 Reciprocity here indicates an equal and delayed exchange between partners 
who trade items of indeterminate value between each other with no formal market-based 
                                                 
44 Engen 2010,  21. 
45 See especially Weber 1891, and 1923 for an in depth discussion on this topic of economic thought and theoretic 
processes.  
46 Scheidel et al. 2007,  2; See especially Polanyi 1944 for the full theoretic discussion of the substantivist 
framework.  
47 Scheidel et al. 2007,  3; these type of economies emerged in the Medieval period with the revolutions against 
palatial-serf systems and the emergence of bourgeoisie and middle classes whose main focuses were mercantile and 
trade based as a means to make profit for themselves. 
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exchange or pre-determined market price.48 These reciprocal exchanges are not necessarily 
ritualised, as is xenia, but are often considered in the anthropological realm of gift exchanges, 
which includes xenia.49 The implication of xenia constituting a type of reciprocal exchange is 
that xenia clearly fits within the paradigms of substantivism, and yet it is rarely discussed on a 
prominent level. By holding to these three categories of exchange as developed by Polanyi, we 
are able to see where in the overall structures of exchange various structural determinants fit. If 
we follow these three categories, it is easier to determine the function of different types of 
exchange within Classical Athenian economies. Dis-embedded market exchange accounts for 
those aspects of economies that are not fully integrated into different cultural, political, or social 
systems. Market exchange is wholly economic in nature, and accounts for mercantile exchange, 
mercenaries, general labour, or any exchange where monetary payment is provided in direct 
exchange for a good/service. Embedded forms of exchange are more complicated. 
Redistributive, or administrative exchange accounts for types of exchange which require direct 
government intervention. Types of redistributive exchange include taxation and duties, as well as 
liturgies. The third type, i.e. reciprocal exchange, is the most important for this project, since 
xenia falls directly into this category. Reciprocal exchanges are embedded in nature, and are 
typically governed by a social or cultural institution. These exchanges include feasts, military 
assistance, and marriage, as well as xenia. Reciprocal exchanges take place on a basis of 
immediate or delayed reciprocity (not including the direct exchange of money for a good or 
service).50 Classical Athens included significantly more than just market exchange. To ignore 
                                                 
48 See Polanyi 1944,  49-50, 57-58, 64, 277-278. 
49 See Polanyi 1944; there are certain rituals which much be completed between two individuals before their 
relationship can fall into the specific realm of xenia, including a declaration of intent, the exchange of objects, 
feasting, and taking of oaths; see Herman 1987,  58-72 on the initiation ritual and continuity of xenia-based 
ritualized interpersonal relationships. 
50 See Bresson 2016, 1-30; See all Engen 2010, 3-36. 
24 
 
this fact was a mistake of modernism and primitivism. This will be further demonstrated over the 
course of this project, since I will establish that xenia as a structural determinant of economic 
performance effects and influences Classical Athenian economies outside of market exchanges. 
Xenia facilitates reciprocal exchange between two people, and so fits into the category of 
reciprocal exchange. Redistributive exchange is any kind of administrative or state-influenced 
exchange, such as the grain tax law of 374/373 BCE (RO 26). Reciprocity and redistribution are 
subject to particular social and political structural determinants, and do not function 
independently outside of their socio-cultural constraints, and are considered embedded 
economies.  
According to his model, Polanyi’s final category is market exchange, which is the only 
dis-embedded form of exchange present in the ancient world. Market exchange is considered dis-
embedded because it is constrained only by purely economic structural determinants, such as 
supply and demand, production cost, market price, inflation, and value. Market economies (much 
like our modern capitalist market economies) were separate from the overall structure and 
constraints of a culture or society. Polanyi’s work shifted the focus from performance to 
structure, especially influencing the work of Moses Finley, who consistently emphasized the 
function of class and social status as a determinant in the function and nature of an economy. 
Scholarly focus moved towards a sociological understanding of the economy: it became 
important to situate individual economic concepts (production, distribution, consumption, etc.) 
within larger power-based frameworks in order to establish a working structural framework for 
ancient economies. An economy’s self-sufficiency at its lowest level was its defining 
characteristic: however, some scholars still argue along the primitivist and modernist views. For 
instance Hopkins (a modernist) claims that Athens and Rome were outliers in the largely self-
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sufficient ancient Greek world.51 He argues firmly that large-scale maritime and land trade made 
up the smallest and least significant portion of trade in the ancient world, and he focuses on 
production costs, supply-and-demand, transport costs, and technological investments as a means 
for supporting his argument.52  
Although Hopkins’ arguments appear valid, it had already been clearly demonstrated 
(some ten years previously by Moses Finley) that ancient Greek peoples had no concept of their 
own economies. Any apparent facet of an economy in ancient Greece was embedded within 
larger, and much more substantial social institutions.53 Finley’s World of Odysseus is an 
exploration of Bronze Age Greece through a close reading of the Iliad and the Odyssey, and 
demonstrates that the social institutions apparent in these worlds form a coherent system.  
Building upon his own earlier study on Bronze Age Greece, Finley was able to determine a 
different theory on the function and nature of ancient economies. Drawing on Polanyi’s work, 
Finley further cultivated the substantivist theory and demonstrated the embedded nature of 
ancient economies. Similarly, Hasebroek builds on substantivism in this regard, and argues that 
there was no national trade in the ancient Mediterranean. For Hasebroek, as well as other 
scholars, economies were not conceived of as “Athenian commerce” or “Boeotian commerce”, 
nor was there any kind of national mercantile marine; national economies did not exist, instead 
economies were cosmopolitan and entirely divorced from any sense of “nationality”.54 For 
Hasebroek, ancient economies stand as an autonomous and separate cultural system, divorced 
from other socio-cultural institutions in ancient Greek society. Yet, it is much more likely that 
the economies were not divorced from their nationality, as Hasebroek argues, but rather 
                                                 
51 Scheidel et al. 2007,  4; Morley 2007,  2-3; See also Hopkins 1983. 
52 See Hopkins 1983. 
53 See Finley 1973. 
54 Hasebroek 1965,  101. 
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integrated into the concept of a nation as a whole: economies were embedded into society and so 
they were not conceived of as independent market structures such as our modern ones.55 
According to arguments such as Hasebroek’s, we can see that Hopkins’ (and other modernist 
scholars’) use of modern economic concepts and accompanying modern jargon as a means to 
provide evidence for his argument is  problematic. Production and transportation costs, supply 
and demand, and market function would not have influenced the nature of ancient Greek trade or 
their economies in the same way that they do modern economies as such concepts did not exist 
as they do in modern economies. That is, ancient Greeks did not measure their economies 
quantitatively as we do in modern economies. Ancient Greeks were absolutely concerned with 
cost and profit, supply and demand, and the like, but would not have considered these concepts 
through a modern economic lens.56 The anachronistic terminology and language appropriated by 
scholars and applied to ancient Greek economies suggest that ancient Greek people were 
quantitatively measuring the performance and outcomes of their economies. Such language 
makes it appear that ancient Greeks peoples understood their economies on similar (or the same) 
quantitative indicator scales that are currently used to measure and understand modern 
economies.  Ancient Greek, and especially Classical Greek, economies were a part of a larger 
structure that determined the overall organization of society and its functions. Unlike in the study 
of modern economies, we cannot wholly separate the function and performance of an ancient 
Greek economy from its structure, especially since ancient Greek people themselves did not 
consider their economies as a separate entity independent from the whole of their societal 
structure. 
                                                 
55 This is the nature of an embedded economy, as per Finley 1973,  17-34. 
56 Hasebroek 1965, 101-102. 
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Debate continues about the similarities and differences between ancient and modern 
economies, and the question remains as to how closely we are able to draw analogies between 
the two. Ancient economies were not conceived in the same way we conceive of our modern 
ones: the nature of an embedded economy would necessitate the focus instead on the possible 
political, social, or military gains of any particular transaction, rather than formal economic 
determinants such as we see in modern market economies. The concept of money and the 
emergence of coinage were still relatively new to the ancient Greeks until at least the Classical 
Period, wherein money and coinage became necessary to conduct proper transactions with other 
apolitical bodies or foreign powers.57 Newer still would be the concept of invisible wealth: 
investments, supply and demand ratios, production scales, and profit margins were not a 
significant reality, or even a necessity for the function of any ancient economy, even within a 
democracy. Governments and states in ancient Greece were influenced essentially by the elite 
alone, had little concern for any ‘economy’ per se, and had no real economic or trade policies in 
place to regulate trade or exchange. In essence, a polis’ only ‘economic’ interest was 
consumptive and political in nature: the obtainment of revenue came primarily through taxes and 
the main purpose of trade was to acquire any necessary goods or services through trade or 
exchange. Ancient Greek economies were not focused on developing their economies, nor was 
there any significant merit to this practice in the Ancient world. Economic development was not 
helpful in political or diplomatic development, nor did economies have the same effects on state 
policies as in the modern world. The modern state has its commercial policy developed from the 
old associations and unions of merchants, as merchants arose from the wealthiest and most 
influential families. It was only in this way that the state took over the care of commercial and 
                                                 
57 See Seaford 2004 for a full discussion of the emergence of money (as a concept) versus coinage (as an artefact) in 
Archaic and Classical Greece and its sociological and ideological effects.  
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economic organization.  Nothing like modern merchant unions existed in ancient Greece; there 
were no associations or unions for ancient Greek merchants, and it was uncommon for more than 
two or three merchants to work together to facilitate ventures in common.58 Based on the 
organization of the ancient Greek states, the self-centered preoccupation with trade that 
dominates economic thought after the Middle Ages did not exist: there was no reason for the 
promotion of the economic interests of particular merchants or traders.59 Greek agricultural 
production was the only exclusively ‘national’ form of production, since foreigners were unable 
to hold land. Yet, it is clear that the state was not protected against foreign imports of grain to 
Greece, and especially Athens. Greek poleis were not protected against foreign imports, and their 
economic and political policies were not determined by export interests of farmers at home. 
Furthermore they were not controlled by the desire to claim a foreign market for any given 
product, although resource acquisition did largely affect the colonisation patterns of the Ancient 
Greek world. Trade related policies were not meant to support state economic interests but 
instead ensured that domestic products were not being sold to foreign people when people at 
home were in need ( i.e. Solon’s export ban). The primary concern in large part when it comes to 
state intervention in trade in ancient Greece was to ensure that there would be sufficient supply 
of products to provide for their citizens at home before providing for people abroad. Trade was 
conducted as was seen fit, sometimes driven by demand (in the case of corn, especially); but 
mostly it was unorganized and was certainly not driven by any state incentives or national 
economic goals. Hopkins’ focus on the expansion of Finley’s theories to include economic 
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growth within self-sufficient economies has taken off largely within discourse on Roman 
economies, where the focus has returned largely again to performance.60  
The fourth major economic theory discussed in this chapter is formalism, or neo-classical 
economic, which is one of the first theories that focuses primarily on performance. Unlike 
substantivism, which focuses primarily on the structure of economies, formalism focuses on 
performance. Essentially, formalism believes that the value of a good is determined by the utility 
value of its last unit consumed or produced. That means that a product or service is only valuable 
if it is useful, and that its value is only proportionate to its usefulness in society or to a particular 
person. For formalists, economics is a science focused on the analysis of the quantitative aspects 
of economies. Formalist analytical models have nothing to do with historical categories, but 
rather reflect consequences of choices made by free individuals operating in a market where they 
can exercise their judgement. Individuals acting within this market will not fail to pursue their 
own interests. According to this model, a person is an Homo oeconomicus, functioning with 
rationality and making predictable choices. Therefore, formalism is based on the principle of 
predictability, fundamentally deductive and methodologically individualistic.61 This sort of neo-
classical/formalist analysis focuses solely on quantifiable evidence, which is of limited use 
within the larger realm of ancient Economic theory. In this model there is no focus on the 
structure, organization, or goals of trade, nor the statuses, interests, or methodologies of states 
within trade. Formalism is useful because it can demonstrate what was traded, how it was traded, 
and when it was traded, as well as quantify such evidence. This is useful because it indicates 
economic performance on both large and small scales. Hasebroek defined trade as a clearly 
                                                 
60 Bresson 2016, 5-6. 
61 Bresson 2016,  5-6. 
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demarked and distinct form of economic activity that was pursued only by a class of full-time 
professional traders. Impersonal exchanges of goods and services were undertaken over long 
distances at prices determined by the market forces of supply and demand. Yet, formalism theory 
overlooks other forms of trade and it implies that the trade policies of modern states are the only 
true trade policies: in other words, that the ancient Greek world had no actual, functional trade 
policies. According to Polanyi, formalist economic theory functions only through quantitative 
analysis, which only applies to a market economy.62 
Many Hellenists still find themselves primarily focused on either performance or 
structure, yet the emergence of Douglass North’s New Institutional Economic Theory has a 
balance between the concepts of “structure” and “performance” in economic discourse. New 
Institutional Economic Theory breaks the study of ancient economies down into three parts. 
Firstly, performance in the most typical senses of production, output, and income distribution. 
Secondly, structure in the sense that it accounts for the basic determinant of economic function 
and performance, such as politics, social institutions, technology, demography, and ideology. 
Thirdly, both performance and structure, when taken together, must be able to explain changes in 
performance or structure across time, resulting ultimately in an explanation as explicit theorizing 
with the potential for refutability.63 By using economic structure and performance in conjunction, 
we should be able to determine and predict how and why economic structure and economic 
performance can change, and determine why these changes happen. The measurement of 
performance is especially difficult, as Athenian trade and economic ‘policy’ were not concerned 
with economic growth or profit, since Athenian mentality seemed to lack the concept of growth 
                                                 
62 Engen 2010,  15, 22-23. 
63 See North 1981. 
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in relationship to economies:64 Athenians did not tangibly invest in the growth of their 
economies. State interests in trade were more political in nature than explicitly economic. The 
lack of focus on economic policies was most likely due to the embedded nature of ancient 
economies and the inability to separate and conceive of an economy as an institution independent 
of the nature of the state; trade and exchange were political tools which the state often employed 
in order to achieve political or military goals.65  
Within substantivism there is an issue with the limitations of the embedded/substantivist 
approach in that it is constrained only to the social concerns about status and is minimally 
effected by state interests in trade and exchange.66 Yet, there is no reason that the growth and 
performance of an ancient Greek economy must be defined by only social or only state concerns. 
It is more likely within an embedded economy that economic growth and structure are 
determined by both social and political concerns, since the two are ultimately and intimately 
intertwined in ancient Greek culture. It is necessary to combine substantivism and New 
Institutional Economics in order to clarify the role of xenia within Classical economies: since 
Classical economies are embedded in nature (as per substantivists such as Polanyi and Finley), 
xenia (as a cultural institution) makes up a part of the structure of classical society. Therefore, 
since xenia is part of the social structure of Classical Athens, it is also one of the many 
determinants of economic performance. Much like the substantivists, North also participates in 
and utilizes the discourse of embedded/dis-embedded economies, since he recognizes that social, 
political, and other cultural institutions can act as structural determinants of economic 
performance. Through the recognition that economies and economic performance are 
                                                 
64 Samuel 1983,  1-10. 
65 Engen 2010, 7. 
66 Engen 2010,  7. 
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constrained by non-economic factors, we can see that a functional paradigm for ancient Greek 
economies must be multi-faceted. Focus on performance or structure alone will not indicate a 
clear, or well-rounded model of ancient Greek economies and their functionality as an aspect of 
society, and North builds upon this by integrating performance into his theoretical model. Since 
economies are embedded within the social structure of ancient Greek society, it is not possible to 
distinguish the “structure” and the “performance” of an economy from one another. The two 
aspects function simultaneously and mutually, with structure defining and determining the 
essential aspects of economic performance, and performance also influencing the nature of 
structure. Understanding the nature of ancient economic theoretical models is essential to 
understanding the role of xenia within classical Greek economies. With structure and 
performance of economies so closely dependent on the social structure of society as well as the 
society’s cultural institutions, the relationship between xenia and economies is symbiotic: the 
reciprocal trade and exchange facilitated by xenia as a social institution continually contributes 
to the overall performance of the economies of the Classical world.  
The examples that I will discuss in the later chapters of this project demonstrate the 
interdependent nature of xenia (and other such social institutions) as a structural determinant of 
the performance of Classical Athenian economies. Andocides’ procurement of timber for the 
Athenian fleet at Samos from Archelaus of Macedon and grain for Athens from Evagoras of 
Salamis (respectively) indicate the effect xenia can have on economic performance and trade 
mechanisms in Classical Athens. These examples, as well as other such instances which I will 
discuss, demonstrate that xenia is a structural determinant with an effect on economic 
performance in both its informal (xenia) and formal (proxenia) forms. I shall demonstrate that 
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xenia (and ritualized interpersonal relationships) are important aspects of economic structure and 
should be studied more closely within theoretical models of ancient Greek economies.  
In order to properly demonstrate the importance of xenia within Classical Athenian 
economies I employ both substantivism and New Institutional Economics as theoretical models, 
and use them in conjunction with one another. Using both theories allows me to get beyond the 
realm of social institutions and determine what Andocides was able to contribute through his 
xenia in regards to both economic structure and performance. Furthermore, the use of both 
theories enables us to get an overall sense of the role of xenia as a structural determinant within 
an embedded economy, as well as its effect on the performance of Classical Athenian economies 
within the realm of reciprocal exchange-based embedded economies. In my opinion, there is no 
reason why ancient Greek economies must be defined by structure (such as the social and 
political determinants of economic structure) or performance alone, as many of the theoretical 
models previously discussed in this chapter have attempted. As North’s New Institutional 
Economics demonstrates, structure and performance must be taken in conjunction in order to 
gain a clear understanding of the function of ancient Greek and Classical Athenian economies. 
Both substantivism and New Institutional Economics make clear the importance of social 
institutions within their theories, but there is nevertheless a lack of discussion of specific social 
institutions (including xenia) and their effects on the performance and structure of ancient 
economies. Through the examples from Andocides’ speech On the Return, I aim to demonstrate 
the importance of considering social institutions such as xenia in the study of ancient Greek 
economies. The case-study I provide will demonstrate not only the role of xenia as a structural 
determinant of performance in Classical Athenian economies, but also illustrates aspects of 
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economic performance and trade mechanisms in Classical Athens that have thus far been 
overlooked in scholarship.   
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Chapter 2: Xenia and Proxenia 
Xenia: A Brief History 
 
The ancient Greek cultural institution of xenia is often translated into English as ‘guest-
friendship’ or ‘hospitality’, and carries connotations of trust, loyalty, friendship, and 
reciprocity.67 The English translations do little to encompass the socio-cultural phenomenon of 
ancient Greek xenia, and can lead to a misunderstanding of an important ancient Greek social 
institution and ideological concept.  Gabriel Herman argued that xenia can be placed within the 
anthropological category of ritualized interpersonal relationships. These relationships are defined 
as “a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between 
individuals originating from separate social units.”68 Xenia encompasses a broad range of social 
and cultural obligations between individuals, falling somewhere between kinship and friendship. 
Pitt-Rivers devised a classification system of various interpersonal relationships based on the key 
principle of ‘amity.’ He defines the term ‘amity’ as the “moral obligation to feel (or feign) 
sentiments which omit the individuals to the actions of altruism,” which separates these 
interpersonal relationships from non-amiable ones. Pitt-Rivers defines five categories: real 
kinship, adoptive kinship, ritual kinship, ritual friendship, and un-ritualized friendship.69 Herman 
                                                 
67 Bolkestein 1939, 87-88; Whitehead 1977, 10-11; and Herman 1987;  for the etymology, see Benveniste 1969,  87-
101; Frisk 1970, vol. 2; Gauthier 1973; as well as Taillardat 1982.  
68 Herman 1987,  7, 10; Engen 2010,  39; when studied in relation to other similar systems from other cultures, xenia 
clearly fits the same criteria, yet it appears that many individual aspects of xenia have been divorced from one 
another in the absence of a proper framework under which to study the phenomena, and that many of these divorced 
aspects are just different manifestations of xenia in various forms. Transactions and exchanges of ritual relationships 
were intended to be carried out in a non-mercantile manner, as a means for creating moral and social obligations. 
Some other forms of ritualized personal relationships include the relationship of blood brothers within the central 
African Azande tribes, as studied by Tegnaeus in 1952; as well as the relationship between god-parents and their 
god-children within Christianity and Catholicism. 
69 Pitt-Rivers 1973, 76. 
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argues that xenia falls between the ritual kinship and ritual friendship categories; the partners in 
each case are typically non-kin, and come from different social, or at least different familial 
units. The most crucial aspect of this is that both types of relationships are clearly non-kin, but 
are considered in terms of kinship, which ultimately supports the extension of kinship rituals to 
non-kin.70  
Other scholars have disagreed with Herman and Pitt-Rivers, arguing rather that xenia fits 
into the overall category of philia, which covers a disparate set of relationships ranging from 
kinship to friendship, holding reciprocity as the only common link between them.71 In discourse, 
the various manifestations of xenia have been separated from each other and so appear to be 
different phenomena; however, when explored in light of similar cultural systems,72 it is clear 
that xenia is a social institution with clear boundaries, well defined rules, and internal cohesion. 
Furthermore, these relationships encompass a sense of moral obligation, and a responsibility to 
reciprocate, and would most often take place between two partners of similar social status, 
although not necessarily. Ritualized friendship becomes a lot less common further down on the 
social ladder. Xenia was a mark of high social status and rank, and usually designated a person of 
particular wealth and nobility. It is extremely rare for women to be xenai, and non-free men are 
entirely absent from this cultural institution. It was only through an equal social standing that the 
ritual relationship was able to achieve ideal reciprocity.73  
The definition demonstrates the most distinct features of the social institution, and 
supplies further information to extrapolate its existence even when a xenia-relationship is not 
                                                 
70 Herman 1987,  32; Pitt-Rivers 1973,  76; Engen 2010,  37-41, 47-51.  
71 Mitchell 1997,  3-21. 
72 Xenia is often divided into different categories, such as proxenia, idioxenia, and doryxenia. 
73 Herman 1987,  7, 34-35; Engen 2010,  37-41, 47-51. 
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explicitly named in any sources. Some relationships are excluded from this categorization, 
although they appear to meet one or more of the above categorizations of friendship: any 
relationship that solely involves payment for goods and services, such as merchant-trader or 
mercenary-employer, do not meet the necessary ‘friendship’ criterion implicit in the social 
institution.74 The differentiation between friendship criteria as elucidated above is especially 
important for understanding the role of xenia within an economy, it is distinct from typical 
mercantile and trade-based exchanges. Unlike xenia, trade is not reciprocal, but an impersonal 
transaction which take place on (what is often) a solitary basis at a predetermined price. Due to 
the reciprocal nature of xenia, wherein a good or service is often exchanged at delayed reciprocal 
rate (the reciprocity did not necessarily occur immediately, but may have come at any point in 
time after the initial exchange) for another good or service, it is not quantifiable in the same 
manner as trade. We are unable to extrapolate price, value, interest, or tax on any xenia-based 
exchange, even if it was a large-scale ritual exchange. Of course, we can determine how much 
the goods themselves was worth, in terms of quantifiable value. We are unable, however, to 
determine what a xenia-based exchange is worth to the individuals themselves, since the value of 
the transaction exists within the development of delayed reciprocity and moral obligation to 
reciprocate between the two partners. The valuation of a xenia-exchange is dependent on the 
partners involved in the exchange and on the value each individual gave to the benefaction on 
personal terms.  
The above definition of xenia can be further broken down into specific criteria: firstly, it 
must encompass and agree with all the variants of the Archaic bond, secondly it must be 
separated from seemingly similar systems, and thirdly it must demonstrate controlled 
                                                 
74 See Engen 2010,  40; Humphreys 1978,  70, 160-161, 201; and Herman 1987,  10 and note 1 for exemplar.  
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comparisons with similar institutions in other cultures.75 It is also necessary that a xenos must 
have a distinct social identity from his partner, they must originate from different geographical or 
political groups: one xenos must always be an outsider to the other’s social group. In fact, within 
the evidence explored by Gabriel Herman, no two individuals within the same social unit are 
referred to as xenoi, as it seems to be a contradiction to call a friend from the same social circle a 
xenos. Xenos and the rarer derivatives idioxenos and doryxenos refer unequivocally to 
individuals originating from separate social units.76 The ‘outsider’ criterion is clearly 
demonstrated by the connotations carried by the words: among Athenians, friends who came 
from different demes, trittyes, or tribes would referred to each other as philoi, hetairoi, or 
epitedeioi, but not as xenoi.77 Other words that refer to forms of friendship and kinship (philos, 
hetairos, epitedeios, anankaios, oikeios, syngenes, and euergetes) are used of both insider and 
outsider relationships, with the semantic range having developed from differences in emphasis 
on types of relationships. The insider-outsider dichotomy is seemingly easy enough to navigate, 
however the civic ideologies and allegiances imposed by the Classical poleis and emerging 
democratic political systems greatly affected the function of xenia and its accompanying 
individual-oriented ideology which arose in Bronze Age Greece and was sustained well into the 
Archaic period.  
                                                 
75 Herman 1987,  8; Engen 2010,  37-41, 47-52; Humphreys 1978,  201. 
76 See Engen 2010,  119-139 for a discussion of different types of honourary language, as well as Herman 1987,  11-
2, and Appendix A for passages in which xenia partners are described as xenoi, idioxenoi, or doryxenoi with 
traceable social origin; his research indicates even fictitious accounts follow this same paradigm. Idioxenoi refers 
specifically to a friend in another state, while doryxenoi is translated literally as “spear-friend” or “war-friend”, and 
proxenoi is a “public-friend” as instituted by the state. The aspect of ‘strangeness’ or ‘stranger’ is implicit in the 
word xenos, as the term is commonly used to describe or address strangers and foreigners. Provenance appears to be 
inseparable from individuals as indicated by ancient writers’ predisposition to include it when discussing the 
participants in xenia-based relationships; group identity appears to be an important aspect of personal identity. See 
the Homeric formula for inquiring a stranger’s provenance: ξεῖνε φίλ᾽ … τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ 
τοκῆες; (Od. 1.158-170); provenance and personality are deeply intertwined, and a person is often defined and 
understood by their city or state. 
77 Herman 1987,  11-13 and note 6 for exemplar; See especially Engen 2010,  119-139 on honourific language.  
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The social, political, and cultural landscapes shifted dramatically during the transition 
between the Archaic and Classical periods, changing and influencing not only various social and 
cultural institutions, but also their accompanying ideologies. Herman demonstrates the stark 
difference between Archaic and Classical ideologies quite simply, using as an example the 
interaction of Diomedes and Glaucus in the Iliad and an encounter between the Spartan King 
Agesilaus and the Persian satrap Pharnabazus in Xenophon’s Hellenica. Diomedes and Glaucus 
meet on the battlefield, and discover that their grandfathers had been xenoi, and thanks to this 
fact they too are xenoi philoi to each other; on account of this relationship, the two heroes agree 
not to fight each other, and even trade armour in order to demonstrate to their peers their 
hereditary bond (Hom. Il. 6.224ff). The episode in the Hellenica cited by Herman comes from a 
much later period, roughly 394 B.C.E, wherein the Persian satrap Pharnabazus reproaches 
Agesilaus for destroying his private property, and claims that Agesilaus has breached the 
obligations of xenia. While his men are ashamed at the thought of this, Agesilaus argues that 
individuals are constrained by the nature of their civic duties and citizenship identities (Xen. 
Hell. 4.1.31-5). It is worth examining this scene in detail: the interaction begins with 
Pharnabazus and Agesilaus approaching each other in the customary way and then Pharnabazus 
speaks since he is the elder (Xen. Hell. 4.1.31). Addressing the Lacedaemonians, Pharnabazus 
says he had been a “φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος” when they had been at war with the Athenians, having 
provided money to their fleets and fighting alongside them (Xen. Hell. 4.1.32). Pharnabazus then 
reproaches the Lacedaemonians for ravaging and destroying his land, saying that Aegislaus must 
not understand what is righteous or just, or how these are the ways of men who repay favours 
(Xen. Hell. 4.1.33). At first the Lacadaemonians are filled with shame at his words, but 
Agesilaus responds quickly that even Pharnabazus should know that people in the Greek poleis 
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can become ξένοι of one another (Xen. Hell. 4.1.33). He continues by saying that when their 
poleis go to war, even ὁι ἐξενωμένοι must fight against one another (Xen. Hell. 4.1.33). Since 
the Lacedaemonians are at war with Pharnabazus’ king, they must regard all his land as hostile, 
although they hope to remain φίλοι of him regardless (Xen. Hell. 4.1.33). Within these two 
interactions we are able to see the initial formulations of proxenia, as well as xenia itself. The 
first interaction took place in the Bronze Age and the latter in the Classical period. Herman 
easily reveals the ideological shift that occurred with the rise of the polis: individuals in the 
Bronze Age were able to exercise the rights and duties of xenia freely and without concern, since 
individual ideology prevailed at this time. The obligations of guest-friendship for Diomedes and 
Glaucus supersede the obligations to their respective commanders and their military alliances. 
This appears to be the natural order of allegiances to the poet, as this assumption that enables 
him to create such an interaction at all. The adherence to the obligations of ritualized friendships 
is an exercise of the individual’s allegiance to himself. During Homer’s heroic age, the 
hero/individual was the pinnacle of his own social pyramid: he was not obligated to anyone other 
than himself, and his private affairs could take precedence over communal ones. This is the 
individualistic ideology that permeates and defines the Bronze Age and the Archaic Greek 
periods, and one of the primary processes in Bronze Age and Archaic Greek society. With the 
emergence of city-states, the dominating individualistic ideology was replaced by the civic-
citizenry ideology. Citizenship was an entirely new creation, utilized as a means to subject the 
individual to a set of compulsory rules and obligations, wherein communal needs and interests 
superseded the individual’s private affairs. Civic obligations did not rise out of a sense of 
morality in so much as their legal enforceability, and were often found to be conflicting in nature 
with the personal moral obligations which defined individual ideologies and xenia-based 
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relationships. Yet, those individuals in the Classical period could not do so, it was expected of 
them to value the polis and their civic identity and duties above their personal relationships.78 It 
is the dichotomy between moral and civic obligations that led to the development of proxenia, 
which arose in conjunction with the polis. 
When the concept of the city-state began emerging in the eighth and seventh centuries 
BCE, the ancient Greek world had already developed and functioned on an extensive network of 
personal alliances under the paradigm of ritualised personal relationships. These alliances linked 
together myriad apolitical bodies, and functioned primarily on the personal and private level on 
which they had been established. The polis framework was superimposed on top of this pre-
existing network, but did not dissolve it or replace it. Rather, when poleis became the official and 
dominant form of social organization, networks of ritual personal relationships existed beyond 
civic boundaries. Xenia continued to function and maintained powerful connections between 
various citizens and apolitical bodies. On account of the simultaneous existence and 
development of these two exceptionally different systems of social organization, xenia became 
an active agent in the shaping of civic and political value systems within the polis, developing 
some of the most integral ideologies and action patterns.79 Therefore,  the polis and its 
accompanying civic and political ideologies and frameworks also played a large role in the re-
shaping of xenia and redevelopment of its functions within ancient Greek society, proxenia being 
the prime example of the effect of civic ideologies on the functioning of xenia. Xenia and other 
ritual personal relationships did not cease to exist, but rather adapted to the constraints of 
                                                 
78 Herman 1987,  1-2; Hom. Il. 6.224ff and Xen. Hell. 4.1.31-5.  
79 Herman 1987,  6; Herman discusses the nature of and effects of the co-existence of contradicting ideologies and 
social systems, and explores the periods between Homeric times and the Roman conquest of Greece and focuses on 
the interactions between city-states and guest-friendships at the ideological level. 
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Classical Greek society, both used and functioned within and outside of the paradigm of poleis-
based culture and society. 
Luckily, xenia is copiously documented in both literary and epigraphic evidence of the 
Classical period. The evidence for xenia available to us is from a civic-political perspective: the 
perspective of the polis.80 The nature of the polis and its value systems greatly influenced the 
understanding and representation of Ancient Greek culture, and so xenia was reimagined through 
the framework of the civic paradigm of the polis. In the works of the Greek historians, many 
historical events are defined by ritualized interpersonal relationships: the Ionian revolt, the 
Persian revolt, and even Athenian Imperialism. Many accounts of ritual friendship were 
reinterpreted through and on account of such events, acquiring new meanings and appearing as 
larger overall links between historical incidents. The expectation of historical authors was that 
co-operation between powerful political men during this period could only have occurred 
through pre-existing relationships built on trust, and xenia was the only alternative to marriage 
for creating bonds between foreigners.81 It is difficult to determine whether xenia actually played 
a significant role in many of these events as foreign policy, or whether it was a rhetorical trope 
applied by an author to explain amicable relationships between people from different political 
communities for the sake of the audience’s understanding. It seems likely to me that it is some 
combination of the two; ritual interpersonal relationships were essential to the structure of 
society, but were only truly pertinent to the elites who were able to participate in the institution. 
The use of xenia as a rhetorical or plot device provided a framework through which an elite 
could understand a historical event through contemporaneous ideology. The civic-political 
                                                 
80 Most of our evidence for xenia comes from the Classical period, and therefore is accompanied with a civic bias. 
81 See Engen 2010,  47-50, 146-147, 152-154; Humphreys 1978,  201, 214; Herman 1987,  13-14; and also Walbank 
1978,  9-23. 
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perspective is common within evidence, but it causes some difficulties in the understanding and 
study of the function of xenia, but also in defining it as a value system.  
It is not possible to measure xenia on a quantitative scale, and in order to define it 
qualitatively, it is necessary to look beyond the general definitions and context provided above. 
Important qualitative features include the various elements shared with kinship and with 
friendship. The occupation of the space in-between kinship and friendship allows for a flexible 
and unique relationship. Most importantly, as with kin, xenia was maintained in perpetuity and 
could be passed down through a family regardless of the level of interaction between the xenoi at 
any given time. There was also a presumed bond and outward demonstration of mutual affection, 
although it was not necessary for an inward sentiment to exist.82 Other similar features include 
the ritual of naming: it was demonstrated that a xenos would often name his son after his own 
xenos.83 The bond of xenia functioned as kinship also in that it extended to the mutual protection 
of xenoi as well as their associates, including offspring and families. While ‘foster-parenting’ (an 
accurate enough neologism) was romanticised in mythology, it was recognized in reality as a 
manner of solidifying a relationship or alliance. Furthermore, much like kin, xenoi were expected 
to perform ritual duties for one another: including the provision of marriage dowries for the 
daughters of a deceased xenos, and the care and treatment of the earthly remains of a dead 
xenos84 Xenoi were expected to be responsible for the entirety of their xenoi estates, duties such 
                                                 
82 Herman 1987,  16-17; See also Engen 2010,  47-52; and Humphreys 1978,  70, 214. 
83 See Perlman 1958,  187 on Cimon naming his son Lakedaemonius after the geographical area of his xenos; 
Herman 1987,  19-22; this occurred in three variations: a man would name his son after the xenos himself, by the 
name of the geographic area of the xenos, or the naming of a son by compound names from the cultural institution 
itself; see Herman 1989,  86-87 on Nikias and Epimenides, who named several generations of sons after one 
another. See also Engen 2010,  41; as well as  
84 See Pouilloux and Salviat 1983; Cartledge 1984; and Herman 1987,  22-26; the responsibility of the foster-parent 
extended even if the child and foster-parent lived apart. Mythological examples include Strophios to Orestes in 
Euripides’ Electra and Orestes plays (Electra 83, Orestes 1015), as well as with Peleus and Chiron (Apollodorus 
3.13.3-6). In historical practice, Cleandrus of Mantinea took in the son of his xenos, Craugis of Megalopolis 
(Polybius 10.22). There are other instances of such relationships, including between Iphicrates, an Athenian general, 
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as money lending or practical daily advice are also typical aspects of xenia-based relationships. 
The similarities between xenia and kinship are strong. They differ significantly in that kinship 
involves a familial relationship, whereas xenia is an acquired relationship, somewhat similar to 
the level of kinship achieved through marriage. 
Moreover, xenia also shares many features and obligations with philia, many of which 
fall outside the realm of kinship obligations, which supplemented and fulfilled the potential of 
kinship-based relationships. Typically, in ancient Greek culture, friendship was achieved and 
maintained by individuals within the same social system or unit, and shared similar cultural and 
political value systems on which there was a basis for growth and confidence. Yet, one of the 
defining aspects of xenia is in fact the social and geographic separation of the partners, who 
originated from drastically dissimilar cultural systems.85 There was little to interrupt or affect 
xenia based relationships since the ritual personal relationship was often the only relationship 
tying two xenoi together into the bond of pseudo-kinship It was uncommon for xenoi to have a 
relationship outside of their xenia-based relationship Civic friendships existed on multiple levels 
and through various obligations by virtue of the participation in common cultural and social 
activities, political institutions, and other informal groups. On account of these, friction between 
civic friends was more likely: Aristotle even believed that xenia was the strongest form of 
friendship; the separation allowed for the avoidance of political, civic, and social strife (Arist. 
Magna Moralia 2.1211a 46). There was no formal or civic institution that held a person 
accountable if they did not fulfill their obligations as a xenos. Xenoi were bound only by their 
                                                 
and Amyntas, father of Philip of Macedon (Aeschines, On the Embassy 2.28), as well as Diogetnetos and Pausanias 
according to Lysias 18.10. Satyros of Athens provided dowries for the daughters of a dead partner, and Xenophon 
provided a votive offering in honour of the deceased proxenos. There is evidence of grave stele having been 
inscribed either by or for a xenos, including the inscription set up for Megistias by Simonides of Ceos after the battle 
of Thermopylae “for the sake of xenia” (Herodotus 7.228.1-4). 
85 Engen 2010,  39-41, 47-52; Herman 1987,  29; Humphreys 1978,  70. 
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moral responsibility and commitment to one another.  Xenia was actually quite different from 
philia, especially in regards to social separation, interpersonal obligation, and reciprocal 
enactment, as well as in terms of its function within a civic cultural system. Xenia did not fall 
subject to the civic machinery of the Classical period.86 Xenia is therefore considered a kind of 
friendship, due to the “bond of solidarity” it formed between two partners, but shows itself much 
closer in nature to kinship, although it is not considered so because it does not fit the proscribed 
kinship paradigm.  Xenia existed within a systematic limbo, neither quite kin nor friend, but still 
held to moral and social obligations to another individual as laid out by the nature of the cultural 
institution. 
Proxenia: A Brief History 
 
As noted above, the dominant polis system that emerged in the Classical period disrupted 
the function of xenia and the ability of ritualized personal partners to utilise it to the fullest of 
their and the institution’s potential. On account of this, it is clear that xenoi had to adapt their 
relationships and the nature of the ritual cultural institution in which they took part. 
Understanding the role of xenia within the polis is essential for understanding the role of xenia 
within Classical economies; it helps us conceptualize the role of xenia and its functions as an 
institution. Xenia itself is an informal institution, initiated and undertaken through an informal 
interpersonal system with no real regulations, rules, or boundaries of established formal political 
or civil institution.  
                                                 
86 Engen 2010,  40; Herman 1987,  30; xenoi could not bring direct social pressure to bear on their partners, and they 
operated largely outside the framework of civic social order on account of their separation.  
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One of the ways in which people adapted xenia was by developing sub-institutions, off-
shoot institutions of a similar nature following similar rules and patterns with some adjustments. 
The most important sub-classification of xenia is proxenia, an institution which emerged 
sometime at the end of the seventh century BCE.87 Proxenia emerged with the polis itself, and 
was a means for city states to utilise pre-existing relationships for their own political and 
diplomatic reasons. Poleis sought to utilise the powerful institution of xenia for their own 
purposes by appointing proxenoi in foreign cities, who like xenoi were supposed to further their 
guest-friends’ interests, i.e. in this case the interests of the entire polis. Hasebroek considers 
proxenoi “appointed representatives in a foreign city”, which suggests that proxenia is an 
impersonal, political institution, as opposed to the interpersonal, private counterpart. No citizen 
could become the proxenos of his own community, and the distinction between citizen and 
foreigner persisted even after proxenia was established. The notion that proxenia might function 
independently of its original institution is unlikely, as there is no true separation between their 
emergence in ancient Greek society, since they are variations of the same social institution: how 
could proxenia exist without its original xenia counterpart? Or how could it function separately 
from xenia when it used the original xenia relationships in order to form new proxenia 
relationships? 
The main difference between xenia and proxenia was the partnership and the nature of 
the reciprocal exchanges: a decree of proxeny was always granted by a community, and the 
proxenos was always initially the member of another community, although they were often 
granted citizenship with their proxenia decrees. The grantees of proxenia were obligated to 
further the interests of the granting community in the communities of the respective proxenoi, 
                                                 
87 See Walbank 1978, especially regarding proxeny decrees of 5th century Athens. See also Herman 1987,  130. 
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and abroad.88 Unlike xenia, proxenia is essentially a public institution, with a collective group of 
people taking up the role of an individual, fulfilling a similar relationship with another 
individual, governed by the same general rules as the original cultural institution. Cities and 
proxenoi performed various ritual services for each other, and the cities fulfilled many of the 
same roles as a xenos, proxenia is still an all-purpose relationship89 Unlike in the case of xenia, 
proxenia relationships was not fulfilled by the ritual initiation and sealed with the act of feasting, 
but rather someone come into proxenia by their own actions, or be recommended for it by an 
individual, or even due to the political intentions of a community. The theory is that the 
emerging poleis, did not devise their own impersonal systems, but simply utilized the pre-
existing system to their advantages. Therefore, in order to expand their power abroad, civic and 
political communities would utilise an individual citizen with pre-existing xenia ties of their 
citizens as intermediaries, and then brought a foreign xenos into a relationship of mutual 
reciprocity and dependence with the city itself, as we will see in the case of Andocides.90 
Mitchell supports this, arguing that the Athenian polis system exploited the pre-existing xenia 
between great men, and appropriated it to aid in her own diplomatic affairs.91 
Many scholars argue that exchanges facilitated by xenia and proxenia were more about 
forming relationships and signifying shared elite status rather than creating wealth or obtaining 
goods or revenue.92 Xenia-based transactions are portrayed in elite sources as being carried out in 
                                                 
88 Hasebroek 1965,  130; Herman 1987,  130-131; Engen 2010,  52, 106, 122, especially  146-155.  
89 See Engen 2010,  146-155 especially for the functions and roles of proxenoi; as well as Hopper 1979,  116-117; 
Herman 1987,  132, 135. 
90 Herman 1987,  137-139; Engen 2010,  49, 52; Hopper 1979,  58, 109. 
91 Mitchell 1997,  50-51. 
92 Engen 2010,  40; Finley 1978,  66-67, 98; Herman 1987,  10, 61, 80, 121-122, 128-129, 136; xenia-based 
transactions are portrayed in elite sources as being carried out in an altruistic manner, with friendship and mutual aid 
being of utmost importance. It is clear, however, that goods and services exchanged through xenia were often 
necessary, and usually contained some level of self-interest.  
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an altruistic manner, with friendship and mutual aid being of utmost importance.93 It is clear, 
however, that goods and services exchanged through xenia were often necessary, and usually 
contained some level of self-interest. Furthermore, such relationships were fundamental to the 
function of the polis, affecting the conduct of economic, political, and diplomatic policies within 
states. The polis appropriated xenia-based relationships and harnessed them for diplomatic use 
between states. Poleis used people with these relationships as diplomats to target states with 
whom they shared other relationships.94 According to Polanyi’s substantivist theory, xenia 
constituted a form of trade, and was included in the trade policy of the late Classical period.95 
Other scholars argue similarly; Hasebroek, for instance, argues that ancient Greek economies 
were reliant almost entirely on foreigners, aliens, and metics: Athenian policy especially was 
directed towards encouraging and attracting them, which clearly demonstrates the “inability of 
Athenians to run their industries for themselves”.96  He deems proxenia merely a form of 
protection for a foreigner which had evolved from the more primitive xenia, for which the state 
received some form of service in return. Hasebroek argues that a proxenos was a private 
representative who acted as a middle man between a foreign state and the city which appointed 
him: unlike a consul, he was not formally recognized by his own state to be in a position of 
power. Proxenia was not a formal institution, and it was not voted on or developed by the 
Athenian government: the position of proxenos was essentially unofficial, and was dependent on 
a person’s behaviour towards a polis.  There were also no official relations or agreements 
between the two cities with whom a proxenos was working.97 It was up to the proxenos to watch 
                                                 
93 Engen 2010,  40. 
94 Mitchell 1997,  41-72. 
95 Engen 2010,  40. 
96 Hasebroek 1965,  128-129; Finley 1957,  64. 
97 Hasebroek 1965,  129. 
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over all the buying, selling, and exchange of commodities, goods, and services between 
individuals from each city.98 The concept of the proxenos as the middle man has its importance, 
as many trades and exchanges are facilitated for a polis or state through proxenos; often, the 
proxenos of any particular city was facilitating the exchange on behalf of an original xenos, who 
has asked for a favour on behalf of their pre-existing xenia relationship99 There are also instances 
where an individual was awarded proxenia by a state for conducting their business, trading, and 
exchanging with their state instead of another one.100 Outside of proxenia, Athenian citizens 
were never directly involved in any foreign mercantilism or trade, besides the act of money 
lending:101 if an Athenian wished to involve himself in foreign trade, he did so in as much of a 
“behind the scenes” manner as possible. The honourand system involved a variety of 
socioeconomic and legal statuses, as well as trading services, which are not often accounted for 
by modernist models which focus on production, revenue and performance.102 
On account of shifting ideologies and the superimposition of the polis on the pre-existing 
xenia network, civic allegiance became a priority, and xenia could no longer be used in its 
original form. Therefore, the polis became the third member of xenia relationships, transforming 
the institution of xenia (or relationship) into one of proxenia, while still utilising the original 
relationship ties between the two original individuals. Furthermore, other institutions (such as 
                                                 
98 Hasebroek 1965,  129; Aesch, 3.258-9, cf. Fornara 69 on Arthmius; Isocr. 15.165-166 Fornara 52 on Pindar; 
Thuc. 2.29.3-7, 2.67.1-4, 2.85.3-6; Fornara 65B, 134.20, 136 n.13, 144.20 on Nicias; IG I3 118, Fornara 155 on 
Apollodorus; IG I3 117, Fornara 161 on Archelaus; IG I3 113 on Evagoras; Fornara 106.26 on Coroebus; Fornara 
134.18, 144.6, 15, n. 3 on Demosthenes of Athens. We see this especially with Andocides and Archelaus in chapter 
3. 
99 Hasebroek 1965,  129; a similar “middle-man” is found in the Middle Ages: often a foreign business trader would 
conduct his business under the control of a local personage (the turcimanus, or dragoman). This was not intended as 
a restriction, but an advance on the (so-called) primitive “silent trading” which originated out of mistrust and 
language barriers.  
100 Hopper 1979,  58; this was especially granted in instances where a product was provided for free, or at a lower 
cost than usual. 
101 Hopper 1979,  109.8ygu 
102 Engen 2010,  77. 
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asulia and legal redress) worked with proxenia to form a sort of cultural framework for 
international trade.103 On account of this we can begin to ask how exactly xenia (in its role as a 
cultural institution) effected the economies with which it worked in conjunction. 
 
  
                                                 
103 Hasebroek 1965,  130; this is an excellent point, Hasebroek, however does not expand on it beyond this.  
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Chapter 3: Andocides and his Xenoi 
 
Andocides: A Brief Historical Background 
 
A prime example to illustrate the relational dynamic of xenia and the relationship 
between xenia and economies in Classical Athens is the case of Andocides, an aristocratic orator 
born around 440 BCE to a wealthy family of supporters of the democracy. Andocides’ great-
great grandfather had been a treasurer of Athena, a position which could only be held by the 
wealthiest of Athenians. His other great-great grandfather had the option to marry into the family 
of the Peisistratides, but instead went into exile with the Alcmaeonids and other democratic 
supporters (And. 2.26). Andocides’ family helped expel the Peisistratides from Athens in 510 
BCE, and expelled the Spartans and Alcmaeonids (And. 1.106). Moreover his grandfather had 
been a supporter of Pericles, and invaded the Megarid with him in 431 BCE, and was a general 
alongside him at Samos in 441-440 BCE. Furthermore, Andocides’ grandfather had been one of 
ten Athenian envoys who made the Thirty-Years Peace with Sparta in 446/445 BCE (And. 3.6). 
His grandfather had also been a xenos with the king of Macedon (And. 2.11), and was to him 
from Athens in an embassy in 426 BCE Andocides’ father Leogoras had married a sister-in-law 
of Pericles’ son Xanthippus.  
Andocides was exiled in 415 BCE on account of his participation in the mutilation of the 
herms and profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries (And. 1.11-69), a particularly heinous and 
anti-democratic crime. The Athenians feared the retribution of the gods, and believed these 
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crimes were an attempt at the subversion of democracy.104 It has been suggested that the 
mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries had been an attempt to 
deter an Athenian expedition against Syracuse to be led by Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus 
(Thuc. 6.8). Of course, it was in Andocides’ best interest to portray himself and his family as 
supporters of the democracy in order to win the sympathy of his Athenian audience: the speech 
On the Return which references Andocides’ xenoi, was a ploy to have himself reinstated as an 
Athenian citizen. There Andocides’ actions were biased in favour of what won him the most 
sympathy. Whether or not Andocides or his family were actually supporters of the democracy to 
the degree that he claimed is difficult to tell. Nevertheless it is important to be aware of 
Andocides’ and his family’s background and political history.  
Andocides, his father, and other members of his family were denunciated as involved in 
these crimes against Athens, and were only saved from prosecution by betraying their friends 
and providing evidence against them (And. 1.48-53, 61-64). Andocides’ account of the crimes 
and betrayal of his fellow criminals was viewed as an admission of guilt by the Athenian 
citizens. As a result he became exceptionally unpopular. Soon afterwards, a decree of Isotimedes 
was passed which forbade anyone guilty of impiety from entering any temples or the Athenian 
Agora (And. 1.70; Lys. Against Andocides 9, 24). Andocides was forced into self-exile. 
Andocides spent his time away from Athens primarily in Cyprus. According to Lysias 6,105 
Andocides had fallen on such hard times that he had to become a trader and merchant ship owner 
in order to survive (Lys. 6. 19, 49).106 Hasebroek argues that Andocides made his living as a 
merchant trader for a considerable length of time, since he was compelled by circumstance. Yet 
                                                 
104 Gagarin and MacDowell 1998,  95-96. 
105 Of course this is another instance of biased information, since Lysias is arguing against Andocides’ return to 
Athens, he will attempt to portray him in the worst possible (and least democratic) manner. 
106 Edwards 1995,  1-2; Missiou 1992,  15-25; MacDowell 1962,  1-6. 
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the revenue from trading was not substantial, and so Andocides tried to have his citizenship 
reinstated on multiple occasions, since he had fallen on great poverty and hardship (And. 2.11-
14). I contend this point: Andocides sold the timber back to the Athenians only at what it cost to 
fell and export, less than 5 drachmae an oar (And. 2.11). If Andocides was truly as impoverished 
as Hasebroek claims, he would not have been able to absorb so much loss of revenue, and would 
have tried to gain some financial profit from the transaction. Furthermore, Andocides claims he 
also supplied bronze and grain (And. 2.11-12), but does not state that it also came from 
Archelaus of Macedon, which suggests that these were gifts of good-will to the Athenian fleet at 
Samos from Andocides himself. It is unlikely then that Andocides was actually as poor as he 
himself, Lysias, and Hasebroek claim.107  
Andocides’ background demonstrates the deep connection of his family to the democracy 
and their important relationship with the city-state. As a result, Andocides’ crime was especially 
dishonourable and insulting, considering his ancestors had fought for the democracy and 
democratic rights countless times, despite their aristocratic heritage.  Considering his 
background, Andocides’ decision to become a merchant was uncommon. It was more common 
for a wealthy elite to commission a professional trader or finance a merchant ship than actually 
to participate in the trade himself,108  but since Andocides was exiled it would have been 
especially difficult for him to have organized such an arrangement. It was also much more 
financially responsible of him to handle the trade himself than to outsource it to someone else, 
since it would have cost him additionally to commission and pay a professional merchant.  It was 
been easier to participate in and facilitate the exchange himself rather than to pay someone else 
                                                 
107 Hasebroek 1965,  9-10. 
108 Hasebroek 1965,  9-10. 
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to do it. He attempted to return to Athens twice, both times having facilitated large scale 
transactions by means of the xenia he held with foreign kings to gain the favour of the Athenians 
so as to be reinstated as a citizen. Transactions such as these were typical of both xenia and 
proxenia in the Classical period, and Andocides’ attempt to use them to facilitate his 
reinstatement as a citizen demonstrated the level of self-interest that remained from the original 
institution of xenia and pervaded the ‘public’ proxenia. In this instance, by using his pre-existing 
xenia with Archelaus, Andocides established Archelaus as a proxenos of Athens, and facilitated 
a transaction between Archelaus and Athens that fit the paradigm of proxenia. Through his 
private xenia connections and subsequent actions, Andocides ensured that the Athenians 
perceived Archelaus as their benefactor and make him their proxenos, something which is 
supported by a honourary inscription to Archelaus in Athens.  
As demonstrated above, xenia and proxenia were acceptable means through which 
someone might attempt to generate some kind of benefit for himself (the benefit for Archelaus 
being the honourary decree, and for Andocides his reinstatement as an Athenian citizen). Yet, it 
was not the intention of either social institution to further the interests of professional, private, or 
public traders.109 Regardless, relationships of xenia and proxenia no doubt facilitated trading, 
especially between elite individuals, as well as between elites and poleis. With the emergence of 
commerce and mercantile trade, these institutions became inadequate,. In all likelihood xenia 
still existed as a means for trade between men of equal or similar rank.110 Andocides presents 
these acts under the guise of benefitting Athens, rather than focusing on the benefit he was doing 
                                                 
109 Hasebroek 1965,  117. 
110 Migeotte 2009,  138, 152-153. 
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himself, since it must have been clear to him considering civic ideology that a self-interest 
strategy would be unsuccessful in front of the assembly.  
Andocides: Services and Xenoi  
 
The exchanges which are of most importance to us appear in his speech to the council 
titled On the Return. In this speech Andocides discusses the procurement of a large shipment of 
timber, corn, and bronze for an Athenian fleet at Samos, which he facilitated through to his pre-
existing xenia with the king of Macedon.111 By analyzing these services and their contexts, we 
are able to gauge the role of xenia within Ancient Greek economies, and establish the effect of 
xenia on trade mechanisms in Classical Athens.  
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτίκα μὲν τότε εἰσήγαγον εἰς στρατιὰν ὑμῶν οὖσαν ἐν Σάμῳ κωπέας, 
τῶν τετρακοσίων ἤδη τὰ πράγματα ἐνθάδε κατειληφότων, ὄντος μοι Ἀρχελάου 
ξένου πατρικοῦ καὶ διδόντος τέμνεσθαί τε καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι ὁπόσους ἐβουλόμην. 
τούτους τε εἰσήγαγον τοὺς κωπέας, καὶ παρόν μοι πέντε δραχμῶν τὴν τιμὴν 
αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐμοὶ κατέστησαν: 
εἰσήγαγον δὲ σῖτόν τε καὶ χαλκόν. (And. 2.11) 
Indeed, I at once supplied your forces in Samos with oar-spars at a time when 
the Four Hundred had already seized power here, since Archelaus was an 
inherited xenos of mine and allowed me to cut and export as many as I wished. 
I both supplied these spars and, although I could have received a price for them 
of five drachmas apiece, I did not want to charge more than they cost me; I 
also supplied corn and bronze.  
According to this excerpt, Andocides supplied a substantial amount of timber at a fraction of the 
usual cost, charging the Athenians only what it cost him to fell it. Andocides made no profit on 
this particular transaction (And. 2.11-12). Bissa concentrates specifically on the exploitation 
rights rather than the exportation rights. No scholar seems to believe that Andocides had to pay 
                                                 
111 The date of this speech is sometimes contested in scholarship, but most scholars date On the Return to around 
411-410 BCE. 
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for the timber itself,  and rather paid just for the right to fell the timber.112 It seems as if the cost 
of the timber was absorbed by Archelaus as part of the xenia held between them. Though the 
exact number is impossible to calculate, using Thucydides we can extrapolate that Andocides 
furnished enough oars to outfit roughly 82 Athenian triremes stationed at Samos, which would 
have needed roughly 16,400 (Thuc. 8.79.2). The benefit to Athens must have extended beyond 
just the procurement of timber itself, and probably included political and trade benefits for the 
state. It is likely that Athens had other sources through which they could procure timber,113 corn, 
and bronze to furnish their triremes. Following New Institutional Economic Theory, the 
reduction of transaction costs was regularly sought in Classical economies.114 Andocides’ use of 
xenia provided exactly that, and allowed channels of trade and exchange to open between the 
Macedonian king and the Athenian polis. Furthermore, by providing the timber to Athens at a 
lower cost than market price, Andocides successfully reduced typical transaction costs for the 
Athenians in this particular instance. This may have opened up further channels for trade deals 
between Athens and Macedon that could have reduced the cost of further transactions between 
the two states. 
The shipment of timber to the Athenian fleet at Samos was not the only service that 
Andocides provided the Athenian state. Later on in his speech On the Return, he also references 
a large shipment of grain which he procured for Athens from Cyprus, again through his pre-
existing xenia with some important Cyprian (And. 2.19-21): 
τάδε δὲ νυνὶ βούλομαι ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι αἱ μέλλουσαι νῆες ἤδη σιταγωγοὶ 
καταπλεῖν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ εἰσιν ὑμῖν τέτταρες καὶ δέκα, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐκ 
Κύπρου ἀναχθεισῶν ἥξουσιν ἁθρόαι οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον. (And 2.21) 
                                                 
112 Bissa 2009, 112-115. 
113 Likely southern Italy, especially before 413 BCE, according to Engen 2010,  76-78. 
114 On North’s New Institutional Economic Theory, see North 1981 and 1990. 
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But I now do want you to know this, that the ships conveying corn which are 
already about to put in to the Piraeus for you are fourteen in number, and the 
rest of those that sailed from Cyprus will arrive altogether not long afterwards.  
Again, Andocides’ xenia opens channels of diplomacy between Athens and a foreign body. He 
claimed emphatically that he managed to provide fourteen ships of grain from Cyprus to Athens, 
with more on the way (And. 2.20-21).  Due to the revolt of several allies in the Hellespont region 
in 411 B.C.E, Athens was in the midst of a grain shortage until the middle of 410 BCE. The 
danger of a grain shortage disappeared after the Athenian victory at the battle of Cyzicus in the 
spring of 410 BCE. The victory at Cyzicus reopened the Black Sea to the Athenians after it was 
blockaded by the Peloponnesians. It seems natural that Andocides would take the first 
opportunity available to return under democracy at Athens, and having succeeded in obtaining 
such a large amount of corn from Cyprus would have likely headed to Athens with (or at the 
same time of) the shipment of grain.115  
The blockade at Cyzicus began in September 411 BCE when Abydos and Byzantium 
revolted against Athens, and Athens lost control of the Bosporus and the Hellespont. Cyzicus and 
Chalcedon followed suit. When the Spartan naval forces were concentrated in the north-eastern 
Aegean in September, the grain route to Athens was seriously endangered. Athens briefly 
managed to regain the Hellespont after the battle of Cynossema during the same month of 
September, and was successful off the coast of Abydos shortly afterwards. Yet, the Spartans 
recovered Cyzicus in early 410 BCE, and held it until they were defeated in the Battle of Cyzicus 
in the spring of 410 BCE. It was after the battle of Cyzicus in 410 BCE that Athens managed to 
regain control of the Propontus, and her grain supply was once again secure.116 Ignoring the 
context of Andocides’ speech, Mitchell dates Evagoras’ shipment of grain to Athens at 407 BCE. 
                                                 
115 Rhodes 2006,  65-67; Edwards 1995,  89; Missiou 1992,  25-27. 
116 See Rhodes 2006,  65-67; Maidment 1941,  454-455. 
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He makes this decision based on Evagoras’ associations with Conon.117 I disagree with this, 
considering the context of Andocides’ speech taken in conjunction with the political situation at 
Athens at the time of delivery of On the Return. It does not make sense that the grain delivery he 
discussed would come through some 3 years after he mentioned it to the Athenian people. 
 
Andocides: Dating On the Return and Andocides’ Services to Athens 
 
 
Before we are able to determine the significance of either of these exchanges, we must 
establish the date around which they occurred. This task is particularly difficult, as there are 
many aspects to take into consideration, scholarly debate regarding the date of the speech itself 
as well as the services described by Andocides. Firstly, the dating of Andocides’ speech is 
essential in order to put the dates of the services he has undertaken in context. Furthermore, it is 
of the utmost importance to demonstrate that services such as the ones Andocides procured for 
Athens were indispensable to the Athenian polis. We can infer the importance of timber trade 
services and grain trade services to Athens by looking at two inscriptions that correspond well 
with the services Andocides procured, and with the locations and persons involved. Whether or 
not these inscriptions account for, or are direct reference to the services that Andocides procured 
specifically is extremely difficult to determine. Yet even if the services in the inscriptions are not 
the ones provided by Andocides, analyzing the inscriptions is still essential, since they provide 
context for the services such as those that Andocides facilitated, and also demonstrate the 
                                                 
117 Mitchell 1997,  68. 
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interrelationship of xenia, proxenia, and trade within Classical Athenian economies, during the 
period under discussion.  
Dating on the Return is difficult, but not impossible. Andocides attempted to regain his 
full citizenship rights three different times. He made his first attempt in 411 BCE under the 
oligarchy of the Four Hundred that was unsuccessful and resulted in his imprisonment (And. 
2.13-16). Andocides’ second attempt was at the time when he delivered On the Return, which 
scholars agree cannot have been delivered later than 405 BCE. This speech was seemingly 
delivered before the Athenian Assembly, or at least to a democratic audience. Scholars have 
proposed different dates for this speech. Jebb originally suggested that it was delivered in 410 
BCE immediately after the democracy was restored, roughly April of 410 BCE. Some scholars 
argue for a date in late 409 or early 408, and others even date the speech as late as 407 BCE 
since this would coincide with the recall of Alcibiades.118 I agree that this speech was delivered 
immediately after the democracy was reinstated, and follow Jebb and others in dating this speech 
to April of 410 BCE. Most scholars agree that the speech must be dated after the collapse of the 
oligarchic regime in September 411 BCE and likely at the restoration of the democracy in April 
410 BCE (And. 10-16, 26-8). It seems unlikely that Andocides would have attempted to return 
during the period between September 411 BCE and April 410 BCE, since the Five Thousand 
were in control, and Andocides was already aware of what kind of reception he would receive 
from an oligarchy based on his initial attempt to return to Athens. Moreover, Andocides claims 
that he provided the Athenian fleet at Samos with oar-spars after the Four Hundred had taken 
over at Athens, Andocides could not have delivered the speech before the oligarchic coup at 
Athens in 411 BCE. Furthermore, Andocides claims that there had been an estrangement 
                                                 
118 Meiggs and Lewis 1978, p. 278-280. 
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between the men on service at Samos and the Four Hundred by the time of his trial, which would 
indicate a full restoration of the democracy (And. 2.14). Most importantly, Andocides argues that 
this service contributed to a defeat of the Peloponnesians at sea, which most scholars agree is a 
reference to the battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE (And 2.12).119  
 The first inscription that I analyze is IG I3 117 (ML 91), which is important to this study 
because it indicates a clear relationship between trade based services, economies, and xenia in 
the Classical Athenian world. In this inscription Athens honours Archelaus of Macedon for 
various services to Athens, including the provision of timber for oars. This decree is extremely 
difficult to interpret, because a large part of the decree is missing. Nevertheless, scholars have 
attempted to restore the decree in order to date and understand it. The decree in question was 
found on the Athenian acropolis. It has been studied intensely, resulting in argument within 
scholarly discourse. The decree runs as follows: 
[ἔδοχσεν τε͂ι βολε͂ι καὶ το͂]ι δέμοι· Ἀκα[μα]- 1 
[ντὶς ἐπρυτάνευε, Φελ]λεὺς [ἐγρ]αμ[μ]άτ[ευ]- 
[ε, Ἀντιγένες ε ͂ρχε, Σιβ]ύρτιο[ς ἐ]πεστά[τε], 
[Ἀλκιβιάδες εἶπε· ἐς τ]ὲν πο[ίε]σιν το͂ν [νε]- 
 
(…) 
 
… … [ἔδ]- 
[οχσεν το͂ι δέμοι· ἐπειδὲ δὲ Ἀρχέλας καὶ] 
[νῦν καὶ ἐν το͂ι πρόσθεν χρ]ό̣[ν̣]οι ἐσ[τὶν ἀν]- 25 
[ὲρ ἀγαθὸς περὶ Ἀθεναί]ος τός τε ἐκπ[λεύ]- 
[σαντας ναυπεγòς ἀνέλ]α̣βεν καὶ ἐς τὸ [..]- 
[…. 18 ….] ἀ̣πέπεμφσεν κα[ὶ] 
[…. 18 ….]o στρατόπεδον κ- 
[αὶ ἔδοκεν αὐτοῖς χσύλ]α καὶ κοπέας καὶ 30 
[ἄλλα ℎ όσον ̕εδέοντο παρ’] αὐτο͂ ἀγαθά, ἐπα- 
[ινέσαι Ἀρχέλαι ℎ ος ὄν]τι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθο͂ι 
[καὶ προθύμοι ποιε͂ν ℎ ό τ]ι δύναται ἀγαθ- 
                                                 
119 See Edwards 1995,  89; Missiou 1992,  25-27; MacDowell 1962,  5-6; Maidment 1941,  455-457. 
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[όν, καὶ ἀνθ’ ο ͂ν εὐεργέτεκ]εν τέν τε πόλιν 
[καὶ τὸν δε͂μον τὸν Ἀθεναί]ον ἀναγράφσα- 35 
[ι αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας προχσένο]ς καὶ ε[ὐερ]- 
[γέτας ἐμ πόλει ἐστέλει λιθίνει] …  
 
[Resolved by the Boule and] the people, Aka[ma]- 1 
[ntis held the prytany, Phel]leus was secretar- 
y [Antigenes was archon, Sib]yrtio[s] presided 
[Alcibiades made the motion. For the construction of] 
 
(…) 
 
… … [what has been decreed] 
[by the people. Since Archelaus is] 
[now and in former] times has been   25 
[a good man to the Atheni]ans, for the 
[shipwrights who sailed out he has rec]eived and to the [..] 
[….18….] has sent (them?) off, and  
[….18….] encampment, 
[and he has given them timber] and oars and  30 
[and all other things they required of] him, of good quality,  
[Archelaus shall be commended being] a good man 
[and zealous to do] whatever good he is able, 
[and in return for his benefactions] to the city 
[and the people of the Athenians],    35 
[he and his sons] shall be inscribed 
[as proxeno]i and e[uergetai] 
[on the Akropolis on a stone stele] …  
The debate surrounding this decree is especially concerned with the dating of the decree and the 
services discussed within it. Due to the mentions of oars at line 30, and Macedon at line 15, the 
restoration of Archelaus at line 32 as the recipient of the decree is not contested. Archelaus did 
not ascend to the Macedonian throne until the period of 414-410 BCE when King Perdiccas died. 
Scholars agree on much, but there is debate surrounding the content of the decree and its effect 
on the dating of the services mentioned. The two proposed dates of this decree are 411/410 BCE 
and 407/406 BCE. The dating of 411-410 BCE was largely accepted in IG I2 on account of 
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Wilhelm’s restoration of Theopompus as the archon in line 3. This restoration is entirely 
dependent on the hypothetical restoration of Pydna at line 28, which associates the decree with 
the operations of Theramenes in 411-410 BCE. In response, certain scholars have argued for a 
date of 407/406 BCE on the basis of: the full restoration of democracy at Athens by the time of 
this decree,120 and because Akamantis (mentioned in line 1) was not the Prytanis at the end of 
411/410 BCE, when the democracy was have been restored. Meiggs and Lewis chose to follow 
Merritt in his restoration of Antigenes as archon in line 3, rather than Theopompus, which puts 
the dating of the decree to 407/406 BCE.  
Regardless, the most important element of the decree for my purposes is the fact that 
Athens honoured Archelaus for these services with proxenia.121 Many services are mentioned in 
this decree, and the specific discussion of the provision of oars demonstrates that services such as 
the ones Andocides’ provided Athens on account of his xenia with the Macedonian king were 
clearly appreciated and were often rewarded by Athens with similar decrees of benefaction. 
There are 34 decrees in which Athens honoured men for trade-related services down to 307 BCE, 
and 11 of those 34 are grants of proxenia. Out of the remaining 23 decrees, 10 are too 
fragmentary to determine whether or not proxenia is among the honours listed. 12 of the 
remaining 13 decrees received grants such as citizenship, or had already received a grant of 
proxenia. The remaining decree is the only one of which we know that did not grant either 
proxenia or mention euergesia, and is therefore problematic.122 IG I3 117 demonstrates the 
formal role of xenia within the official institutional position of proxenia, and allows for the 
establishment of a formal relationship between not only xenia and trade, in its informal context, 
                                                 
120 The phrase [ἔδοχσεν τε͂ι βολε͂ι καὶ το͂]ι δέμοι at line 1 indicates the full restoration of the democracy. See Meiggs 
and Lewis 1988,  278-280. 
121 Meiggs and Lewis 1988,  278-280 for a full description and analysis of IG I3 117. 
122 Engen 2010,  149. 
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but also between proxenia and trade in a formal, politically institutionalized context. Such 
decrees demonstrate that large scale trade services occurred for Athens through foreign 
benefactions which were rewarded with the recognition and establishment of an official proxenia 
relationship  
 This interpretation is corroborated by the existence of a similar decree for Evagoras of 
Salamis, from whom Andocides most likely procured the large shipment of grain for Athens 
from Cyprus mentioned in Andocides’ speech On the Return (2.11). Much like the previous 
decree discussed, IG I3 113 is difficult to interpret, since much of it is missing: 
[Εὐαγόρα ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 26․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  Σα]λαμινίο 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 33․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]ο ἄγγελοι v 
[ἔδοχσεν τε͂ι βολε͂ι καὶ το͂ι δέμοι· ․ ․ ․ εὶς ἐπ]ρυτάνευε, 
[— — — ἐγραμμάτευε, — — — ἐπεστάτε, Φρ]ασιδεμ[̣․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 36․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ][․ ․ .] 
    5 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 35․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ][․ ․ 5․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 35․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]αυτ[․ ․ ․
․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 33․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]σγραφσα[․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 33․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]εν ℎ έντινα 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 29․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  εὐερ]γέτεν Ἀθεν-
   10 
[αίον ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 24․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  τὸν ἀφ]ικνόμενον 
[․ ․ ․ ․ 9․ ․ ․ ․  ἐπιμέλεσθαι δὲ αὐτο͂ τέν τε βο]λὲν τὲν αἰε- 
[ὶ βολεύοσαν καὶ τὸς πρυτάνες καὶ τὸς στρ]ατεγὸς ℎ όπ- 
[ος ἂν μὲ ἀδικε͂ται ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 14․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  μεδὲ] ℎ υφ’ ἑνός. περ- 
[ὶ δὲ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 29․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ] ἄλλο δέεται 
  15 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 30․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  κ]αὶ βασιλεῖ ℎ ο 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 30․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  ε]ὐ̣νοίας καὶ πι- 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 32․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ] δο͂ναι αγενα 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 32․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ] δὲ Σαλαμινι 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 32․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ] ἐνθένδε λει-
   20 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 34․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]ς ℎ όπος ἂν 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 35․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]ι τὰς δίκ- 
[ας ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 32․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  χ]συ̣μβολα 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 36․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]α̣ρχοσε 
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[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 38․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]σ̣[․ ]
    25 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 34․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]ε̣[․ ․ ․ 7․ ․
․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 14․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  τὸν γραμματέα τε͂ς] βο[λ]ες͂ ἐν σ[̣τέλει] 
[λιθίνει καταθε͂ναι ἐμ πόλει ․ ․ 6․ ․ ․ ]ον̣[․ ․ ]ετο[․ ] ℎ ε[․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 28․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  ε]ὖ π̣ο̣[ι]ε̣͂ν Ε[ὐ]αγόρ[α]- 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  π]ερὶ π[ο]λλο͂ ποιε͂τ̣[α]-
  30 
[ι ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]ο μεχρὶ ἀνδρο͂ν [․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  ἐ]ς ℎ αύριον. Κλεο̣[․ ․ ]- 
[․  εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τε͂ι βολε͂]ι, ἐπειδὲ δέ ἐστ̣[ιν] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 20․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  Εὐαγόρα]ς ̣ℎ ο Σαλα[μ]ίνιο[ς ․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 24․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  ℎ ό τ]ι δύναται ἀγαθὸ[ν τ]-
  35 
[ὸν δε͂μον τὸν Ἀθεναίον καὶ βασι]λέα καὶ τὸς ἄλλ[ος χ]- 
[συμμάχος ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 14․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  ℎ όπος] ἂν πλεῖστοι φ[․ ․ ․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ 5․ ․  το͂ι δέμοι το͂ι Ἀθεναίον κ]αὶ βασιλεῖ κα[ὶ τοῖ]- 
[ς ἄλλοις χσυμμάχοις ․ ․ ․ 7․ ․ ․  Τισ]σαφρένεν ℎ ο[․ ․ 5․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 24․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  Εὐα]γόραι καθάπ[ερ ․ ․ ․ ]
   40 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 26․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  ℎ ]ο δεμ͂ος περι[․ ․ 5․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ] πρᾶχσαι ℎ αλ[․ ․ 5․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]ς καὶ τὸς στρ[ατεγὸ]- 
[ς ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ] ἂν ταῦτα γε[․ ․ 5․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 28․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ] λοιπὸν τομ̣[․ ․ 5․ ․ ]
   45 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  κ]αὶ περὶ ℎ ο͂[ν ․ ․ 5․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 28․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]α̣ς Χίας 
[․ ․ ․ 8․ ․ ․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 29․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ]ο καθά[περ ․ ․ 5․ ․ ] 
[․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 27․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  πρ]υτανε̣[․ ․ ․ 8․ ․ ․ ․ ] 
(IG I3 113) 
It is impossible to provide a proper translation for this decree,since so little of the decree is 
preserved. It is typically dated to 410/409 BCE, and is thought by most scholars to contain the 
grant of citizenship to Evagoras by Athens (inter alia).123 Such grants of citizenship are rarer 
versions of Athenian honourary decrees and were usually granted to people who had previously 
received other honours and it has been suggested that Evagoras may have already been a 
                                                 
123 Engen 2010,  149. 
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proxenos at the time Athens’ granted him this decree.124 He is honoured here for the services he 
provided to ‘Athens, the king, and other allies’ (lines 35-37). If we take this in conjunction with 
the mention of Tissaphernes at line 39, it seems likely that Evagoras was granted this decree on 
account of (unnamed) services that he provided to the Athenian state. Unfortunately we do not 
know exactly the nature of these services. Both Isocrates and Demosthenes attest even before 
Evagoras regained his kingship in Salamis that he had been a friend and benefactor to the 
Athenian state (Isoc. 9.54; Dem. 12.10). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated by Engen that 
foreigners who received Athenian citizenship were (in most cases) already proxenoi before they 
were granted their citizenship. There are 34 decrees similar to the previous inscription (IG I3 
117). 12 of these 34 decrees for trade related services from the Classical period grant citizenship, 
and Engen counts this decree for Evagoras (IG I3 113) as one of these 34 trade-related decrees.125 
Unfortunately, we do not know exactly what services Evagoras provided to Athens that resulted 
in this decree, but line 9 clearly indicates that Evagoras provided something to Athens. The 
decree states “Evagoras treated the Athenians well” (ε]ὖ π̣ο̣[ι]ε̣͂ν Ε[ὐ]αγόρ[α]) at line 29, and “did 
well with respect to Athens, the king, and other allies” 
([․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ 24․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․ ․  ℎ ό τ]ι δύναται ἀγαθὸ[ν τ]-[ὸν δε͂μον τὸν 
Ἀθεναίον καὶ βασι]λέα καὶ τὸς ἄλλ[ος χ]-[συμμάχος) at lines 35-37, which is the basis for being 
an euergetes to Athens. Thanks to extensive work done by Osborne, Walbank, as well as 
Engen,126 it is possible that the services provided were in some part trade related. The most likely 
trade-related service provided was related to the grain trade, since Salamis was an entre-pot for 
                                                 
124 Engen 2010,  149; Rhodes and Osborne 2003,  50-53; Walbank 2007,  137. 
125 Engen 2010,  120, 149. 
126 See Osborne 1972, and Engen 2010 for larger discussion on the nature of honourary decrees. See especially work 
by Walbank on Athenian proxenia decrees, including Walbank 1978 and 1985. 
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Egyptian grain, serving as a port for the export of grain from Egypt throughout Greece.127 A 
grain related trade service can be demonstrated by Andocides’ speech. He discusses Athenian 
concerns over hearing that they would not be receiving any grain from Cyprus (And. 2.21). Once 
again, there is no evidence that allows us to determine for what services Evagoras received his 
initial honorific decree and grant of citizenship outside of the general realm of trade related 
services. The argument for grain-trade related services can be made through the study of 
historical context and circumstance. We are able to learn the importance from this inscription 
that Athens placed on trade related services, especially during the Peloponnesian War. 
Citizenship was granted least of all honours at Athens, only being granted  for  particularly 
significant services to the states, and only given out (regarding trade-related services) for pure 
benefactions. Athens did not grant citizenship lightly, and did not honour individuals with 
citizenship for providing trade related services at lower prices than usual. A grant of citizenship 
required pre-existing proxenia ties.128 Once again, this inscription illustrates the connection 
between proxenia (and similar institutions) and trade mechanisms in Athenian economies. 
 In relation to the passage in question from Andocides’ speech (2.19-21), we are able to 
see a multi-faceted relationship between xenia, proxenia, and Athenian trade within Classical 
economies. Andocides is able to procure a substantial service through his xenia with Evagoras. 
Unfortunately, the secrecy of this procurement of grain from Cyprus, Andocides does not 
directly mention Evagoras by name in the same manner that he mentions Archelaus, nor does he 
mention any kind of xenia in this situation, since it would disrupt the secretive nature of the 
service he has undertaken (And. 2.19-21). Yet, there is sufficient evidence for a xenia-based 
                                                 
127 Moreno 2007,  254-256. 
128 Engen 2010,  149. 
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relationship between Andocides and Evagoras from both Andocides and Lysias, who claim 
Andocides had several xenia-based relationships with kings and tyrants in multiple foreign 
locations (And. 1.145; Lys. 6.48). Furthermore, Andocides spent a large portion of his exile in 
Cyprus, and was eventually granted a plot of land near Salamis (Plut. And. 834E-F).129 It is likely 
that Andocides had important or influential xenoi in Cyprus, since he spent so much of his exile 
there, and was able to procure such a large shipment of grain for Athens from Cyprus. 
The date of Andocides’ grain deliveries and the date of his speech, On the Return, are 
difficult to determine, but neither could have happened after the summer of 410 BCE.130 The 
Athenian victory at Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE was the catalyst for the reopening of the 
Hellespont in the summer of 410 BCE. So if the import happened after this, it would not have 
been as beneficial as Andocides makes it appear. The main grain route from the Black Sea had 
been blocked off, and Athens was desperate for grain. Andocides was able to procure grain from 
an alternative source and import it into Athens (And. 2.11). If the Hellespont had been open at 
the time that Andocides procured the grain from Cyprus, his actions would not have been nearly 
as beneficial to Athens as they would have been with the Hellespont still inaccessible. 
MacDowell argues that it cannot be the case that the Hellespont was still inaccessible, since 
Andocides returned during the democracy: the opening of the Hellespont and the reinstitution of 
the democracy happened after the battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE, i.e. at the same 
time.131 Even if this is the case, and the Hellespont was open, such context does not diminish the 
significance of Andocides’ procurement of such a large shipment of grain for the Athenian polis. 
                                                 
129 “from which ritualized guest-friendships and friendships with many kings and cities arouse, and from which 
others have become personal guest-friends,” (And. 1.145). “But with all his wealth, and the power of his 
possessions, the accepted guest of kings and despots,” (Lys. 6.48). Edwards 1995,  1-2; Missiou 1992,  15-25; 
MacDowell 1962,  1-6. 
130 MacDowell 1962,  5, note 9. 
131 MacDowell 1962,  5-6. 
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Grain was in high demand in Athens at all times, and especially during the Classical period (the 
Classical period will be further discussed in chapter 4). These inscriptions (IG I3 113 and 117) 
demonstrate the close relationship between honorific decrees, especially proxenia, and their roles 
within Athenian trade services and Classical economies. In order to understand the function of 
xenia within Classical economies, it is necessary to understand the various facets of xenia as a 
social institution in both its informal and formal forms in Athenian society. In understanding 
how both forms of xenia (xenia and proxenia) function in conjunction as well as separately, we 
can formulate a paradigm for the role of xenia and proxenia within Classical Athenians 
economies and trade mechanisms. Full explorations of both the grain trade at Athens and the 
timber trade at Athens will follow, specifically focusing on the services that Andocides procured 
through his xenia with Archelaus and Evagoras, in relation to the specific mechanisms of the 
grain trade and the timber trade in Classical Athenian economies.  
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Chapter 4: The Athenian Grain Trade 
  
Athenian Grain Trade: The Significance of Grain at Athens 
 
To better understand the role of xenia in Classical Athenian economies, I will first try to 
gauge the significance of Andocides’ contribution to the grain trade by looking at Athenian grain 
trade as a whole. The organization of the grain trade at Athens is complicated, and demonstrated 
the enormous importance of grain for Athens. According to Aristotle, Athens had ten 
agoranomoi (magistrates in charge of supervision of the markets) who were elected by lot. Five 
of these presided over the polis itself, and five presided over the Piraeus, and were charged with 
supervising the goods that came into Athens, and ensured that the goods were pure and 
unadulterated. Furthermore, there were ten metronomoi, five for the polis itself and five for the 
Piraeus, who were the inspectors of weights and measures. Most important for the Athenian 
grain trade were the sitophylakes. These were the commissioners in charge of the grain supply at 
Athens, and of a number of things directly related to grain at Athens. The sitophylakes ensured 
there was no malpractice in the selling of grain on the market, as well as ensured that milled 
barley and un-milled barley were sold at prices proportionate to one another. There were 
originally ten sitophylakes, five for the polis and five for the Piraeus, but these numbers grew to 
twenty and fifteen respectively. Furthermore, they ensured that baked bread was sold at a price 
proportionate to wheat, and that it contained the full measure of wheat required by law. Finally, 
they were in charge of ensuring that two-thirds of corn imported into Athens was brought into 
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the polis-proper (Arist. Ath. Pol. 51). The grain trade at Athens was further regulated, which was 
expressed in both Archaic and Classical period legislation. Some Athenian grain trade laws 
include the ban on grain exportation (Plut. Sol. 24) and the imposed purchase limitation of 50 
phormoi (baskets) of grain at a time (Lys. 22.6). Furthermore, it was a capital offence for 
Athenian residents to export, import, or ship grain to any harbour besides the Piraeus (Dem. 
34.37, 35.50; Lycurgus 1.27), or to provide maritime loans on any shipments of grain unless the 
ship was under contract to return to the Piraeus (Dem. 35.51, 56.6, 56.11).132  
Grain could come into Athens in myriad ways; typically through importation from 
colonies, or from other states. Areas such as the Black Sea and Egypt were large exporters of 
grain to Athens. Other sources of grain included taxes that were payable in grain, specifically the 
Athenian grain tax on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros in 374/373 BCE which dictated an 8 and 1/3 
tax on grain production on the islands to be paid to Athens in grain. Otherwise, Athens offered 
incentives to traders to bring their shipments of grain into the Piraeus. Such incentives included 
the reduction of taxes, and the extension of rights to traders who remained in Athens for 
extended periods of time. Once the grain made it into Athens, it was typically held in the Deigma 
for local merchants to inspect and purchase from the importers or farmers, and eventually made 
its way into the agora for sale to the public. When Athens found herself in a grain shortage or 
food crisis, money could be pulled from the sitonia, which was a fund set up for the purchase of 
public grain, and used to purchase grain from allies or colonies.133  
 Andocides mentioned the procurement of a large shipment of grain for Athens from 
Cyprus. This particular service is significant, because it demonstrates the effect of xenia on trade 
                                                 
132 Bissa 2009,  177. 
133 See Bissa 2009,  155-167, 177-183; Hopper 1979,  52-53, 71; See Moreno 2007 on grain at Athens in general. 
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mechanisms at Athens, and indicates that xenia does have an effect on Classical Athenian 
economies.  
 
τάδε δὲ νυνὶ βούλομαι ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι αἱ μέλλουσαι νῆες ἤδη σιταγωγοὶ 
καταπλεῖν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ εἰσιν ὑμῖν τέτταρες καὶ δέκα, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐκ 
Κύπρου ἀναχθεισῶν ἥξουσιν ἁθρόαι οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον. (And 2.21) 
But I now do want you to know this, that the ships conveying corn which are 
already about to put in to the Piraeus for you are fourteen in number, and the 
rest of those that sailed from Cyprus will arrive altogether not long afterwards. 
134 
 
This particular passage from Andocides demonstrates that large-scale trade ventures was easily 
undertaken through personal channels. But what does this mean for the role of xenia in Classical 
economies and Athenian trade? Taking this in conjunction with the previous discussion in 
Chapter 3 about Andocides’ relationship with Evagoras of Cyprus, we can begin to visualize a 
paradigm for the functionality of xenia within the realms of Classical Athenian economies and 
the mechanisms of Athenian trade. In order to determine the extent and effect of Andocides’ 
xenia with leading men in Cyprus and gift of grain to Athens, it is necessary to explore and 
understand the nature of the Athenian grain trade and its role in Athens’ overall economies. 
Fundamentally, the questions that we must consider are what are the mechanisms of the 
Athenian grain trade, and how do we consider these in conjunction with Andocides’ gift and the 
nature of Athenian economies?  The Athenian grain trade is a complicated, multifaceted system 
involving internal and external grain supplies.135 It was often a primary concern of Athenian 
politics and diplomacy, in the Classical period and especially during the Peloponnesian War. 
                                                 
134 It is clear from this passage that the date of delivery of this speech coincides with Andocides’ delivery of grain 
from Cyprus. Both events occurred most likely in April 410 BCE. See also Chapter 3.4 above.  
135 Internal and external meaning produced inside of Attica and outside of Attica, respectively. 
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Athens was not capable of feeding her population on internally grown grain, and was dependant 
on external sources for maintaining her citizens. Politically and diplomatically Athens was 
focused on ensuring a substantial and consistent flow of grain into the polis through significant 
treaties and trade arrangements with merchants and foreign states. She had civil servants devoted 
to maintaining the honesty and success of her grain trade, and managed public grain resources in 
case of any blockades or grain shortages. Many of our primary sources demonstrate Athens’ 
overwhelming political focus on grain, and its overall importance to the political and economic 
functions of the polis. There are many extant political speeches regarding grain trade and foreign 
relations between Athens and her grain suppliers, and many honorific inscriptions dedicated to 
suppliers, benefactors, and political proxenoi who have provided Athens with gifts of grain, or 
provided it at distinctly lower than market price.136 It is necessary to explore the grain trade as a 
whole, as well as the political climate of Athens in the Classical period to understand the 
economic ramifications of Andocides’ xenia with Evagoras of Cyprus, and to see the effect of 
xenia on ancient Greek economies in general. 
 The grain production in Athens was complicated, and was highly influenced by both rural 
and urban areas, as well as consumption. In the late seventh century BCE Greece was rapidly 
expanding, both politically and economically. Greece was still provincial compared to Assyria 
and Egypt, but there were now new opportunities for people to sell and purchase goods at both 
internal and external markets. There was plenty of trade happening between Greek poleis and 
countries to both the East and West, as well as within Greece, although the economic advantage 
of one Greek region over another Greek region was much smaller: amphora distribution indicates 
that Athens had an advantage in oil and wine, and Corinth was the dominant power in ceramics, 
                                                 
136 Bissa 2009, p. 155-167, 177-183; Hopper 1979, p. 52-53, 71; See Moreno 2007 on grain at Athens in general. 
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and there were always open markets within Greece for grain. There was only a small quantity of 
goods being mobilized in this way, since at least 80% of all production was consumed by the 
primary producer, and no more than 2% of all product was transported more than a few dozen 
miles. The generalizations in our primary sources indicate that trade was dangerous and was only 
pursued by men who were ready to take risks: Hesiod presents the various dangers of sailing to 
his brother Persse, and argues that a rational man would only pursue credos (“gain”) overseas out 
of desperation, hunger, or debt (Hes. O 618-94, especially 628-9, 646-7), and it is quite likely 
that most Greeks remained at home.137  
The four property classes put in place by Solon in 594 BCE indicate that the most 
profitable means to satisfy a desire for gain was to market agricultural produce, specifically 
barley or wheat.138 Agricultural goods accounted for the bulk of trade until other industries 
further developed in the late Archaic and early Classical periods during certain points in a family 
life-cycle, farmers might have produced beyond their actual needs, allowing them to market their 
surplus with little risk. There is evidence, however, it was less common, because it would have 
risked survival in many cases to grow specialized crops for the market and depend on barter or 
trade for survival staples. An Athenian needed to be quite wealthy in order to produce grain on a 
scale larger than the average family farm was capable of producing, and to afford the risks of 
large scale trade endeavours. The prosperity of a farmer or landholder was dependant on his 
circumstance: his skill, the skill of his labourers, weather, and market prices. Furthermore, 
farming was a difficult enterprise to break into, especially in the Classical period.  During the 
                                                 
137 Morris 2002,  31-32 
138 Morris 2002,  33; See Moreno 2003 on the specificity of Solon’s 500-measure-men (pentecontio medimnoi) as 
reference to measures of grain; Solon’s language, as well as the language of the Grain Tax Law from 374/373 BCE 
indicates that the measure men were distinguished specifically by the amount of grain measures they produced, not 
measures of oil or wine. 
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early 6th century, as Aristotle notes, all the land was in the hands of the few, who experienced 
serious labour constraints that made fully utilising their land difficult.139 Xenophon makes a 
similar point in his Oeconomicus, he illustrated that not all arable land was used for cultivation, 
or was cultivated properly when it was in use, since both Ischomachus and his father had made a 
profit from the purchase of and improvement of misused and improperly cultivated arable land 
(Xen. Oec. 1.20.22-26).  
Labour in the Archaic period was problematic on account of the nature of free rural 
labour as non-homogenous. Farmers who have enough land to sustain themselves and their 
families will work it themselves, rather than sell their own labour power on the market for a 
living. Maintaining independence was a key concern for any farmer, especially on economic 
foundations after Solon abolished debt-bondage in the Archaic period. A family farm provided a 
measure of security against poverty, starvation, unemployment, and even old-age, and also 
provided inherited security for descendants. While family owned farms allowed for a certain 
level of security, families could rarely afford to hire and pay labourers, outside of the cost of 
upkeep for slaves (for some families), or offer enough to tempt desirable workers. A family farm 
was likely a subsistence only farm, and some wealthier properties would have been as well. 
Others wealthy properties were cash-crop-producers in their entirety, with profit as the primary 
concern.140 The “few” landowners that Aristotle referred to would often invest in some form of 
coercion in order to compel others to work for them at a much lower price than the ‘free market’ 
would allow: such coercion appeared in the Archaic period in the forms of debt-bondage, 
wherein a citizen (and sometimes his family) was enslaved to another citizen as a form of debt 
                                                 
139 Morris 2002,  33; Hopper 1979,  153; Gallant 1991,  72-101. 
140 Hopper 1979,  153-155; Morris 2002,  33-35 for a brief discussion of the relationship between free and paid 
labour in relation to farming. 
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repayment, as well as in the form of pelatai and hektemoroi, who would live on the land of a 
wealthy citizen and pay rent in labour and a 1/6 portion of any harvest.141  
Of the grain produced on a given plot of land, whether by a family owned farm, or a 
larger plot of land owned by a wealthier citizen, a portion would be used to feed the family, 
landowners, slaves, and also any chattel animals. The grain was also divided if the farmer was 
expected to contribute a 1/6th portion as rent to the land owner, or if they had to provide their 
produce as a form of security for any form of debt-bondage. Whatever was left after these 
commitments was surplus that a farmer or landowner was be able to sell in the market, directly to 
grain dealers.  
Alternately, farmers might even have maintained their own shops to sell any excess 
produce. There is an example of a property marker (horos) that indicates it was set up on a 
property that included a house, a garden, and a shop. This suggests that the owner grew product 
in his garden and sold it in his shop, but this seems to be an unusual arrangement (horoi 92A).142 
It has been suggested that retailers remained in the agora every day, and that farmers were much 
more content to sell to them directly rather than go to the market and remain away from their 
fields for extended periods of time (Pl. Res 371 c-d).143 There is not much known about farmers 
and agricultural development, or about organizations that were proxies between the producer and 
the exporter. Yet temple dedications to Athena on the Acropolis indicate that some farmers and 
land-owners fared well, even if there are only a few dedications that named farming as a trade. It 
is unlikely that there were fewer farmers than craftsmen or artisans (as the dedications seem to 
                                                 
141 Morris 2002,  35; hektomorage is an important concept  but it is not essential for our discussion here. See Morris 
2002,  35-41 on the function of debt-bondage and hektoromoi and their relationship to Athenian economics and 
agricultural production in the Archaic period. 
142 I use the horoi numbers assigned by Finley 1985. 
143 Harris 2002,  69. 
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suggest), but rather that more people were named these as their trades since farming was a 
common employment. A few of these dedications refer to a tithe of land, i.e. a dedication of 10% 
of land or profit to a god or goddess, which could in some cases account for a type of war tax, or 
as a means to keep a landowner under the total capital liable to liturgies.144 
The farming process itself is described by Xenophon in his Oeconomicus, where 
Ischomachus is teaching Socrates how to cultivate the greatest quantity of barley and wheat; 
Hopper uses this point to demonstrate that the emphasis of farming and production was on 
cereals. The process starts with preparation of the fallow, ploughing the fields in the spring only, 
and using any weeds before they seed as ‘green manure’; this is followed by turning the soil to 
bake in the high summer in order to kill the weed roots. Afterwards, the fields are sowed during 
the autumn rain season, based on the type of soil and type of seeds, and what type of hoeing 
takes place in the winter season. Finally, Xenophon finishes with advice on reaping, threshing, 
and winnowing, which are followed by the burning of the standing straw to enrich the soil (Xen. 
Oec. 9.8ff).145 After farming, a farmer or landowner would likely divvy up his produce based on 
their needs for consumption at home, for a portion of rent or taxes on their land or product, or for 
sale in the market or abroad. The largest portion of grain produced in Athens was consumed in 
Athens, typically by the grain producers themselves, but was nevertheless occasionally sold in 
the market for consumption by other Athenians. 
Athens was so dependent on grain that they could not export it. This is indicated by the 
Solonic export ban from the 594 BCE, Athenians were only legally allowed to export olive oil 
(Plut. Sol. 24.2). Grain was an important commodity all over ancient Greece, as demonstrated by 
a passage from Herodotus in which Xerxes was at Abydus and saw boats sailing down the 
                                                 
144 Hopper 1979,  153-154. 
145 Hopper 1979,  153-156 
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Hellespont with cargoes of food from the Black sea for Aegina and the Peloponnese (Hdt. 
7.147.2). The nobles with Xerxes learned that they were enemy vessels, and prepared to seize 
them; however Xerxes learned where the ships were headed and that they were filled with grain, 
and decided to let them sail on to their ultimate destination (Hdt. 7. 147.2). He claimed there was 
no harm in allowing the ships to carry the grain for them, since they themselves were heading to 
the same destination and would be in need of grain upon their arrival (Hdt. 7.147.2).146 Grain 
was an important resource for smaller cities as well, including Teos, where a law was instituted 
between 475-470 BCE that forbade people from preventing grain imports or from re-exporting 
previously imported grain by the death penalty (Tod II.30).147 Thucydides as well is an important 
source regarding the large scale of grain trade throughout the ancient Mediterranean: he 
discusses an embassy of ships sent from Athens to Sicily on account of a war that had broken out 
between Syracuse and Leontini.148 It was on behalf of an inherited alliance with their fellow 
Ionians that Leontini sent an ambassador to Athens in 427 BCE requesting they send ships to 
help them. Athens did sent ships under this pretense, however Thucydides comments that the real 
reason that Athens sent ships was to the prevent grain from reaching the Peloponnese from 
Sicily, and to attempt to take control of the Sicilian region (Thuc. 3.86.4).149 Clearly grain was an 
extremely important resource for the whole Mediterranean. Yet we must focus our 
considerations on Athens alone in order to determine the significance of Andocides’ xenia-based 
gift of grain to Athens from his connections in Cyprus. 
 
                                                 
146 Reed 2007,  16 fn. 6. 
147 Meijer and van Nijf 1992,  97 
148 Reed 2007,  16-17 
149 Reed 2007,  16-17 
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Athenian Grain Trade: Grain Production vs. Consumption 
 
The grain trade was extremely prominent throughout the Classical Greek world, and 
Athens demonstrated a particularly unique large-scale dependence on grain imports that was not 
seen anywhere else in the Classical Mediterranean. Demosthenes calculated how much grain was 
imported to Athens from the Bosporus over a one year period in order to emphasize the 
importance of the Bosporan king Leucon’s role in the Athenian trade. According to his 
calculations roughly 400,000 bushels of grain were exported from the Bosporus to Athens with 
exemption from the typical toll of 1/30th for the exporters.150 On account of this toll, Leucon was 
able to make a gift to Athens of 10,000 bushels of grain for every 300,000 exported to Athens, 
and a present of roughly 3,000 for the remaining 100,000. By exempting Athens from the 1/30th 
toll, Athens was able to purchase 1/30th more grain than they would have otherwise. As such, 
Leucon was making a small (but nevertheless significant) benefaction to Athens, essentially 
allowing the Athenians to pay less for more grain. Furthermore, Leucon opened up a second port 
at Theudosia, granting Athenian exporters the same exemption to the typical export toll. 
Demosthenes also notes that Leucon provided enough grain during a shortage that Callisthenes 
had a surplus of 15 talents of silver to dispose of (Dem. 20.31-33).151  
In another speech, Demosthenes quotes a law that forbids any Athenian to transport grain 
to any harbour that was not Athenian. It was unlawful for any Athenian, metic resident of 
Athens, or anyone over whom either of them had control, to contribute or provide any size of 
                                                 
150 A tax of 1/30th of the value of the total export load. If a tradesman is exporting 300,000 bushels of grain, their toll 
is the value of 10,000 bushels, 1/30th of the whole load.  
151 Callisthenes was a sitonos, or food controller, who was able to use Leucon’s supply to not only meet the 
Athenian consumption needs, but also had enough left over in order to sell the surplus and make a profit of 15 
talents of silver for the treasury, i.e. more money to purchase public grain. 
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maritime loan on any vessel that was not going to bring their load back to Athens. If a man were 
to lend out money on a maritime trade venture contrary to this law, information and an account 
of the money would be laid before the harbour masters, as well as in regard to the ship and the 
product. If anyone lent money on a maritime trade venture that was not set to return to Athens, 
he would not be able to bring any action or suit to trial for the money lent on the voyage, if it was 
not returned to him (Dem. 35.51).152  
There is evidence in the speeches of other orators as well regarding the importance of 
grain to Athens and grain shortages. Lysias’ speech, Against the Grain Dealers, was against the 
grain sellers in the market, accusing them of stockpiling grain and overcharging the population 
for their stores. This type of speculation was not technically illegal, but there was a law in place 
which forbade retailers to purchase more than fifty baskets of grain at a time, and it was under 
this law that Lysias was bringing forth charges. Lysias demonstrated that the grain sellers were 
lying about their reasons for purchasing large amounts of grain: they claimed to have done so for 
the benefit of the city (i.e. to sell it at a reasonable price). Yet, Lysias claims that they were 
selling the grain at a profit of a drachma several times in the same day, as if they were buying up 
the grain a medimnos at a time. The grain sellers bought up such significant amounts of grain that 
they were able to overcharge for it in the market, since it seemed to the public that there was less 
grain for sale than they believed. By buying up such large quantities of grain, the grain sellers 
were attempting to create a grain shortage themselves, as a means of increasing personal profit. 
Since less grain was available to purchase in the market, they were able to overcharge for their 
stores, even though there were still sufficient amounts of grain. This way they made several 
drachma more than usual in a day (Lys. 22.11-17). 
                                                 
152 Meijer and van Nijf 1992,  95. 
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Other primary sources, especially inscriptions, indicate similar findings. Athens is 
extremely dependant on grain imports in order to sustain her population. These appear often as 
decrees set up to honour foreign merchants for providing grain as a gift, or even charging for 
grain at a price lower than current market value. There are instances of these all across the 
Mediterranean in the Classical period. An inscription at Ephesus, for instance, praises a Rhodian 
merchant for selling grain at a low price and rewarded him with Athenian citizenship: 
Agathocles of Rhodes was importing roughly 14,000 hekteis of grain to Athens, and discovered 
that grain was being sold in the agora for more than six drachmae. Persuaded by the 
agoranomos153 Agathocles sold all of his grain more cheaply than it was being sold in the agora, 
since he knew that he would likely be rewarded for doing this favour to the Athenian people 
(SIG3 354).154 Heraclides of Salamis also sold a shipment of grain at a reduced price during a 
particularly severe food crisis in Athens during 330-329 BCE, as noted in the inscription of a 
proxenia proposal that was initiated by Demosthenes. Heraclides sold Athens 3,000 medimnoi of 
wheat at a price of 5 drachmae per measure, and also gave 3,000 drachmae as a gift to the 
Athenian sitonia.155 On account of these benefactions, Heraclides was granted the titles proxenos 
and euergetes to Athens, which allowed him and his descendants to own land and houses in 
Athens; it also subjected them to the limits of the law, and granted them the right to perform 
military services and pay the eisphora (mandatory citizen taxes): essentially, this decree granted 
Heraclides and his descendants citizenship at Athens (SIG3 304).156 Other inscriptions provide 
even more quantitative numbers that help us contextualize the degree to which Athens relied on 
                                                 
153 The agoranomos was a magistrate charged with supervision of the agora, including handling imports and exports 
and ensuring everything met Athenian standards; see Meijer and van Nijf 1992,  97. 
154 Meijer and van Nijf 1992,  96-97. 
155 The sitonia was a treasury at Athens used specifically for the purchase of grain in times of shortage. 
156 Reed 2003,  84, 128; Meijer and van Nijf 1992,  42. 
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grain imports from other cities: one list from Cyrene that dates between 331-324 BCE shows 
how much grain it gave to various Greek cities during a particular grain-shortage across the 
ancient Mediterranean. Athens is listed at the very beginning of this inscription, with 100,000 
measures of grain having been given to Athens by Cyrene. This is the largest amount of grain 
listed on this inscription, accounting for roughly 1/8 of the 775,000 measures that Cyrene 
provided to a total of 53 different poleis and areas in Greece (Tod II.196).157 
Such sources demonstrate not only the dependence of Athens on imported grain, but also 
the quantity of grain necessary to import in order to properly support the Athenian population. 
Athens did still produce a portion of their own grain supply, however it was clearly an 
insufficient amount for their population. The quintessential source for evidence on Athenian 
grain production in the fourth century is an inscription from 329-328 BCE which identifies the 
offerings of first fruits made at the sanctuary of Eleusis in honour of Demeter and Kore (IG II2 
1672). The inscription lists the various offerings made by Athenian tribes, as well as the offers 
by all the territories which were controlled by Athens. This list includes Drymos, Oropos, 
Salamis, Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros. Alain Bresson utilises this information to calculate the 
amounts of domestic and foreign Athenian grain and barley production. In determining the 
production amounts for Athens and its controlled territories, Bresson is able to extrapolate how 
much grain Athens needed to import from foreign territories. Building on Garnsey and other 
sources,158 Bresson determines that, since the aparchai represents only a small fraction of the 
harvest, the fruits of barley were based on a rate of 1/600, and the fruits of wheat were based on a 
                                                 
157 Meijer and van Nijf 1992,  97. 
158 Garnsey 1988,  88, table 5. 
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rate of 1/1200.159 The following table illustrates Bresson’s calculations of internal and external 
grain production for Attica, as per the inscription IG II2 1672 found at Eleusis:160 
Table 1: Internal and External Grain Production Totals 161 
Area 
Barley 
Product in 
Medimn-
oi 
Percent of 
Barley 
Product 
Wheat 
Product in 
Medimnoi 
Percent of 
Wheat 
Product 
Total Grain 
Product in 
Medimnoi 
Total 
Grain 
Product in 
Quintals 
Percent 
of Total 
Grain 
Product 
Total 
Attica 
339,925 50% 27,062.5 18% 366,987.5 
100,1699.
125 
44% 
Total 
External 
340,475 50% 120,375 82% 460,850 129,244 56% 
Total 
General 
680,400 100% 147,437.5 100% 827,837.5 229,413 100% 
 
These figures are exceptionally precise for both Greek and Roman antiquity, and are essentially 
unique. Therefore we have no means of comparison to determine whether this harvest was good, 
average, or poor; Bresson uses some statistics from a harvest in 1911 as a means of comparison 
in order to help determine the nature of the harvest. The area of cultivation in Attica in 1911 
measured roughly 49,500 hectares (roughly 500 km2), a little more than 1/5th of the whole 
territory of ancient Attica (21% of 24,000 km2). In 1911, the region of ancient Attica produced 
124,129 quintals of grain, the 16,000 hectares of land devoted to grain cultivation (13,000 
hectares for wheat, and 3,000 hectares for barley), which averages out to roughly 7.75 quintals of 
                                                 
159 Bresson 2016,  406; Garnsey 1988,  98-106, and 1998,  201-213. 
160 Bresson 2016,  405-409; There is some question regarding the accuracy of the numbers provided, since peasants 
tend to under-declare their harvests, and administrators and political officials tend to inflate their figures, Bresson 
argues that this is, nevertheless, an accurate depiction of grain production in Attica and its territories. Moreno 
includes similar calculations in his 2007 monograph, Feeding the Democracy. He does not consider the decree at 
Eleusis significant. 
161 Bresson 2016,  406-407, Table 14.1, 14.2.;  I have chosen to follow Bresson’s units of measurments, with a 
quintal measuring 100 kilograms; the weight of a medimnos varies depending on the item in question: Bresson lists a 
medimnos of barley at 27 kilograms, and a medimnos of wheat at 31 kilograms. See also Stroud 1998,  55. 
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grain per hectare.162 Although the number appears low, we must be aware of differing units of 
weight for grain measurement, as a modern hectoliter of wheat is heavier than its ancient counter 
part by 17-22 kg: a modern hectoliter of wheat weighs between 80-85 kg, and an ancient 
hectoliter weighed closer to 63 kg, as the grain law of Athens indicated.163  These measures, and 
cross comparison with figures from 1914 and 1921, Bresson concludes that the harvest of grain 
in 1911 is average, since figures from 1911-1920 reflect similar numbers, only declining after 
1918 due to the war between Greece and Turkey.164 On this basis, Bresson argues that the 
harvest of 329-328 BCE is in fact a decent harvest, probably not exceptional, but not catastrophic 
either, which allows him to extrapolate Attica’s dependency on foreign sources of imported 
grain.165  
 Hansen proposes a population estimate of 250,000 inhabitants of Athens after 350 BCE. 
These may have been as high as 330,000 in the fifth century.166 Following the estimation of 
roughly 250,000 inhabitants between 340-330 BCE, and Garnsey’s speculation of 400,000 
medimnoi of grain feeding 80,000 persons for an entire year based on the carrying capacity of 
Attica’s soil being 33 persons/km2 (that is 5 medimnoi a person per year), the grain consumption 
during that period would have been roughly 1,250,000 medimnoi per year.167 Therefore, based on 
                                                 
162 Bresson 2016,  407-408; this number appears low by our present criteria, but is realistic given the nature of 
Mediterranean agriculture before mechanization, furthermore, the proportions of wheat a barley are reversed in 1911 
compared to their 329-328 BCE counterparts. 
163 Bresson 2016,  407; Stroud 1998,  55.  
164 Bresson 2016,  407-408 
165 Other scholars calculate entirely different numbers, yet after much research, Bresson’s calculations seem to me to 
be most accurate. The amount of grain produced by Athens can change drastically depending on what information is 
used and which sources are consulted. I had originally planned to include far more information on Athenian grain 
production, however it seems pertinent to only use what is necessary to prove that Athens was absolutely dependant 
on external grain sources for population sustenance. For more on Athenian grain production, see: Jarde 1925; 
Garnsey 1988; Moreno 2007; Osborne 1987, 2004; and Sallares 1991. 
166 Hansen 1988,  12; 2006,  56. 
167 Bresson 2016,  409; Moreno 2007,  4; Garnsey 1988,  91-97; See also Auguste Jardé 1925,  43; that is 5 
medimnoi of grain per person, at 250,000 people, making a total consumption of 1,250,000 medimnoi over the 
period of a year.  
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the (roughly) 370,000 medimnoi of grain produced by Attica and its external possessions in 329-
328 BCE, Attica was capable of feeding roughly 30% of its population during that harvest 
year.168 
 Moreno argues differently in his 2007 monograph Feeding the Democracy, wherein he 
states that no figures exist to help us determine how much grain was cultivated, consumed and 
imported into Athens, since there is no census nor calculations regarding arable land in Attic 
territory. He suggests that the use of the First-Fruits inscriptions (IG II2 1672) is a fragile 
premise, because the receipts on the inscription cannot be converted into actual production 
figures without adopting proportions of 1/600th for barley and 1/1200th for wheat, which comes 
from a separate Eleusinian inscription dating to 416-415 BCE (IG I3 78). The issue, of course, is 
that it is impossible for us to know if the proportions decreed in 416-415 BCE were still in use as 
late as 329-328 BCE, and since IG II2 1672 was superseded before 353-352 BCE by the lost 
First-Fruits law of Chairemonides it is likely that the proportions of taxation had been adjusted 
over that near hundred year period. The absence of contextual information for the IG II2 1672 
inscription makes it likely that the receipts do not represent normal production for any given 
year, and therefore the use of these figures to determine production rates will likely produce 
incorrect numbers. Moreno simply averages the previous calculations done by Jardé, Garnsey, 
Sallares, and Osborne, accepting an estimate of roughly 700,000 medimnoi of grain produced in 
Attic territory in a year.169 Bresson finds this number to be far too high, as it doubles the figures 
                                                 
168 Bresson 2016,  409; Bresson uses 340,000 medimnoi for his calculation, rather than the total 370,000, therefore 
he calculates 27% of Attica’s population could be fed by their own grain supply in 329-328 BCE, however, I am 
unsure of why he uses this number instead of the total amount of wheat and barley produced by Attica during this 
period. I have adjusted my calculation accordingly in order to reflect the total number of medimnoi in grain (both 
wheat and barley) that Attica produced in order to determine what percentage of the population it was capable of 
feeding.  
169 Moreno 2007,  3, 10, 13-14. 
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that can be derived from the inscription at Eleusis (IG II2 1672), and convincingly argues that this 
figure does not fully reflect the extent to which Attica was dependent on grain imports.170  
  A summation of these calculations can be found in nearly every study on the grain 
trade,171 but there is little agreement among scholars about which ones are correct. Many 
scholars find the use of such calculations a pointless venture; even Garnsey, to whom these 
figures have been essential, has stated that “inquiring into yields is like chasing a phantom”. 
Even if these calculations are an exercise in futility, since it is unlikely that we will ever discover 
actual quantitative amounts of Athenian grain yields, they nevertheless are a useful exercise 
which aids in understanding the extent to which Athens was actually dependant on grain imports.  
There are, of course, other variables that determine Athenian dependence on grain 
imports and affect yield quantities. The issue of urbanism was raised by Garnsey,172 but he left 
the question unanswered: Whitby argues that Athenian farmers were largely too concerned with 
self-sufficiency to truly consider this concept.173 The lack of concern with conurbation is 
demonstrated by Pericles’ strategy during the Peloponnesian war to move the population of 
Attica inside the Long Walls. He was able to convince the people of Athens to abandon their 
rural property and any arable agricultural land in favour of the protection of the citadel (Thuc. 
2.14). This alone indicates that Athens did not depend on internal grain production, since the 
farmers would not be able to simply abandon their land if the population was wholly dependent 
on internal production for survival. As long as the Athenians had access to the Piraeus, they had 
                                                 
170 Bresson 2016,  406, fn. 101. 
171 See especially Moreno 2007 for an in depth summary of scholarship on the quantitative aspects of Athenian grain 
trade. 
172 Conurbation is the urbanization of rural areas, or the amalgamation of suburbs and the whole city. 
173 Whitby 1998,  104-105. 
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access to their grain supply. As our sources have indicated so far, Athens was more than capable 
of sustaining its population on externally produced and imported grain.  
It seems that Athenians deliberately used their land for growing other (more profitable) 
products than grain. Sometimes farmers would sell their own crops for economic purposes, and 
simply repurchase whatever products they would need over the course of the year, and there is a 
high probability that they would have devoted a decent portion of their arable land to crops with 
the highest economic return. Such a system would be easily maintainable since Athens was 
importing a large amount of grain to the state and ensured decent, affordable prices by means of 
governmental intervention in trade. Furthermore, there is some evidence for gardens on arable 
land with irrigation access in competition with grain for cultivatable land, which further supports 
the limited use of arable land for grain cultivation. A passage from Xenonphon’s Oeconomicus 
corroborates that not all arable land was used for cultivation, or cultivated properly, since both 
Ischomachus and his father had made money from the purchase of and improvement of misused 
and mal-cultivated arable land (Xen. Oec. 1.20.22-26). It is likely then that there were significant 
portions of land that were being misused, improperly cultivated, or were entirely out of use 
during various harvest seasons, that have the potential to drastically affect the amount of arable 
land available for cultivation. Additionally, a large portion of land owners with significant 
holdings would likely own oxen, or even horses, and would need to dedicate a portion of their 
arable land to growing food products for their animals. Flocks of goats and sheep could be 
sustained on non-arable grasslands and hillsides, and would not require any excess consumable 
grains or legumes. Yet both oxen and horses require a substantial amount of cultivated grain for 
sustenance. The amount of arable land used for animal consumables would vary depending on 
the number of horses or oxen owned, and would increase significantly higher if the land-owner 
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also practiced animal husbandry in breeding horses and oxen for sale, or cows and bulls for 
sacrificial purposes.174 Whitby argues that this alone would take us from a possible 50% of 
arable land use per harvest year down to a more likely 30% of arable land use in a given harvest 
year, which considering biennial fallow trends, would actually leave us with 15% of arable land 
used in a given year for the production of grain for human consumption. This is at the lowest end 
of Garnsey’s variables for percentage of arable land cultivated in a year, since he prefers between 
20-25%, but is higher than Jardé’s preferred 10% figure. Garnsey’s figures are of course based 
on the use of a 2/3 fallow system, rather than the traditional biennial fallow, and also on the 
assumption that olives and vines were grown primarily on less arable land, such as hillsides. 
Furthermore, he advocates for both spring and summer sowings, on top of the typical winter one. 
These considerations are dubious: Sallares has discussed and proven that the olive is not 
naturally suited to the dry Mediterranean climate, and performs much better on arable land with a 
good water supply (of rain or irrigation). Furthermore, Gallant demonstrates that spring and 
summer planting was only an option if the farmer had an excess of wealth, and extensive seed 
and labour resources.175 The scholarly debate concerning when exactly supply and demand for 
grain in Athens became imbalanced demonstrates the political nature of grain trade in Attica; 
some scholars are willing to date it as far back as the 7th c. BCE.176 Yet the 6th c. BCE is a more 
typical estimation since scholars take Solon’s export ban as the first indication for Athens’ 
failing agricultural productivity, and also the Peisistratid interest in the Hellespont as an early 
concern for the Pontic grain route to Athens.177 The psychology of the Athenian economy is 
                                                 
174 Whitby 1998,  104-106; See also Van Wees 2006 for more on animal husbandry, especially arable land ownings 
and use by the equestrian social class. 
175 Whitby 1998,  106-107. 
176 Hopper 1979,  53. 
177 Whitby 1998,  102. 
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especially difficult to understand in light of our modern economies. It is essential to explore 
various economic spheres in relationship to their political and historical contexts within the 
Athenian world. 
 
Athenian Grain Trade: Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy 
 
 Grain trade happened on a large scale, and the network of grain trade relationships 
encompassed a large portion of the ancient Mediterranean. Clearly, this scale could change, 
becoming smaller in a poorer harvest and larger during a significantly more successful one. But 
this still leaves Attica needing to import roughly 70% of their grain from either their externally 
controlled sources, or separate political entities. Clearly then, Attica’s dependence on imported 
grain dictated a large portion of their politics and foreign policies; Pericles, for instance, was able 
to convince the population of rural Attica to take shelter behind the long walls of the polis and 
the Piraeus and to abandon their cultivatable territory since the largest portion of grain-
sustenance was imported from external sources.178 Even Solon’s measures from the sixth century 
BCE demonstrate the tensions between available grain supply and the demand on account of the 
population size, since he made it illegal to export any agricultural product except oil from the 
region of Attica (Plut. Sol. 24.1). The grain law of Athens from the fourth century BCE (RO 26) 
also demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining grain sustenance for Attica’s large population, 
since it provides evidence for the 8 and 1/3 grain tax on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, either 
newly instituting these regulations or enforcing legislative changes to the collection and 
                                                 
178 Bresson 2016,  410. 
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distribution of these taxes.179 Either way, the law regulates the grain-tax of the islands controlled 
by Attica, and enforces direct state intervention in the collection of the tax, its storage, and 
redistribution. Typically the transportation, import, and sale of grain rests in the hands of private, 
independent ship owners and merchants. This grain law and the Athenian regulations that 
accompany it are examples of the aforementioned embedded redistributive exchange that Polanyi 
marks out as one of 3 categories of exchange in the Ancient Greek world. This law is the only 
evidence that remains to us of an 8 and 1/3% tax, as most Athenian tax denominations appear in 
amounts of 1/5%, 1%, 2%, 2 and 1/2%, 5%, and 10%. This is the only instance of a tax to be 
collected fully in grain, whereas most taxes were collected in various forms of money.180 It also 
demonstrates state intervention in the distribution and sale of grain, clearly outlining the elected 
officials (originally totalling thirty, but growing to 65) referenced by Aristotle (Tod II 26; Arist. 
Ath. Pol. 51),181 as well as the large amount of grain that was necessary for Attica to import on a 
yearly basis in order to provide the demos with sustenance.  
 Athens made a point of colonizing and gaining control over territories with distinctly 
agrarian dimensions throughout the Classical period, starting by seizing the territory of Oropos 
after the Athenian defeat of the Boeotians in 506 BCE, and their settlements in the Thracian 
Chersonese, and especially with the conquests of Lemnos and Imbros (IG II2 1672). The 
inscription at Eleusis, Lemnos and Imbros alone produced 274,525 medimnoi of barley and 
72,850 medimnoi of wheat for a total of 347,375 medimnoi of grain; the production of grain on 
                                                 
179 Stroud 1988,  16; it appears that this inscription is enforcing legislative changes to a previously existing law, 
since Agyrrhius was especially active in the late 5th century BCE, as he is mentioned in Andocides’ On the 
Mysteries as the leader of a group of men who farmed the 2% grain tax (And. 1.133-134). Evidence suggests 
Agyrrhius died in the early to mid 4th century BCE since there is no evidence of his activities after 374-373 BCE. 
This grain-tax law was a general tax on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, but it is the only evidence we have for a tax 
that was to be paid in grain, rather than a form of money. 
180 Stroud 1988,  26-27; this is with the exception of the eichoste of the Peisistratidai, which appears to be in kind.  
181 Meijer and van Nifj 1992,  38. 
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these islands was well above what was necessary to sustain their relatively modest populations, 
and so the surplus was sent to the Attic market in addition to the 8 and 1/3 tax levied by Athens 
on the islands as shown by the grain law of 374-373 BCE Bresson proposes that 150,000 
medimnoi came from Lemnos and Skyros to Attica, 400,000 from the Pontus region, slightly less 
than 100,000 medimnoi from the region of Cyrene, roughly the same from Egypt, and also from 
the West, with anything additional coming to Attica from other minor grain producers.182 From 
these numbers, Bresson derives the following figures as supplemental to Athens’ own grain 
production in order to sustain the population of Attica: 
 
 
 
Table 2: Source and Percentage of Grain at Athens 183 
Grain Source Amount in Medimnoi 
Percentage of Total Grain at 
Attica 
Attica 340,000184 27.2 
Lemnos and Imbros 150,000 12.0 
Pontus 400,000 32.0 
Cyrene 90,000 7.2 
Egypt 90,000 7.2 
West 90,000 7.2 
Various 90,000 7.2 
Total 1,250,000 100.0 
 
Based on the figures as presented by Bresson, Attica’s dependency on the import of grain from 
external sources, either their own external territories or various imports from other countries, is 
                                                 
182 Bresson 2016,  410; Pazdera 2006,  101-172; Stroud 1998. 
183 Bresson 2016,  411, Table 14.4. 
184 Bresson calculates 340,000 medimnoi of grain being produced at Athens, however the numbers provided in fig. 1 
differ by roughly 30,000 medimnoi, totaling closer to 370,000 medimnoi of grain total being produced internally at 
Attica. This changes the provided totals and percentages slightly, since 370,000 medimnoi of grain account of 30% 
of the necessary 100% in order to maintain the internal population of Attica, rather than the given 27.2% attached to 
the number of 340,000 medimnoi that Bresson provides. 
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evident. Furthermore, the primary source evidence provided supports the notion that Athens was 
exceptionally, and possibly uniquely, dependent on external sources for grain in as much as this 
dependence dictated their political organization at home and their foreign policy abroad. Our 
primary sources indicate that this, in fact, was the situation since so many of Athens’ political 
and foreign policies were primarily concerned with the regulation, taxation, sale, and import of 
grain. This is contradicted by Thucydides. Pericles is able to convince even the rural population 
of Athens to take protection behind the long wall (Thuc. 2.14). This would not have been a 
possibility if the sustenance of Athens was almost wholly dependent on its own rural population. 
 While all of the secondary sources discussed provide interesting speculation regarding 
the exact figures for Athenian grain production over the Classical period, there are far too many 
variables to consider to get an accurate quantitative representation of Athenian grain production 
and import. The primary literary and epigraphic sources should constitute enough evidence for 
the scale, importance, and necessity of grain import to Athens, and therefore lend themselves as 
evidence for Attica’s inability to sustain itself on internal grain production. Athens’ intense 
dependency on imported grain to feed its population accounts for a substantial portion of their 
political behaviour, which will help demonstrate the inseparable nature of politics and 
economies, and support Morris’ substantivist interpretation for the embedded nature of ancient 
Greek economies.185 
 The political and historical circumstances were extremely significant in two aspects of 
Athenian grain trade policies: grain-trade routes for import and grain shortages at Athens were 
the most effected by the socio-political context of the Classical world. It is essential to 
                                                 
185 For Morris’ particular interpretations on substantivism see especially Morris 1994. 
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understand that not all trade passed through the Piraeus and the deigma into Athens.186 Yet they 
were likely the most important ports of the Classical world. Of course, transportation by sea was 
easier than transportation by land, but Thucydides demonstrates that commodities were 
transported north-east overland from Oropos instead of going around Cape Sunium before the 
occupation of Decelea by the Peloponnesians in 413 BCE (Thuc. 7.28.1), although it was more 
expensive (Athen. Deipn. 15. 700b). Some trade from Megara could come into Athens through 
Eleusis, and trade from Boeotia by sea likely used one of Attica’s eastern trading ports. The 
Piraeus was of course the most commonly used port, however we cannot quantify the extent of 
the trade that passed through it, as we only have one indication for the sum of the 1% import and 
export taxes in the Piraeus.187 
 On account of the various trade routes and ports available for imports to Athens, a certain 
level of state intervention was necessary to maintain and control grain trade (as well as the trade 
of other commodities) in order to ensure that the Athenian populace would not be subject to 
grain shortages or other complications. One of the most common ways in which Athens 
intervened directly in the grain trade was through her use of honourary decrees as a means to 
entice traders and foreigners to not only import their grain to Athens, but to also provide her with 
acts of benefaction. We have seen some previous examples of these decrees.188 When a foreign 
merchant, king, or aristocrat was willing to charge less than the market price for a shipment of 
grain, Athens would reciprocate with an honorary inscription for the foreign merchant. 
Furthermore, grain trade was of such importance that in each assembled prytany, that is ten times 
                                                 
186 The Deigma is the grain-holding area on the Makra Stoa. It was an area in which Merchants could inspect 
samples of product that were set up on small reed-stalls. 
187 Hopper 1979,  52-53, 71. 
188 SIG3 304, Heraclides of Salamis sold 3,000 medimnoi of grain at 5 drachma per measure and was honoured as a 
proxenos and euergetes of Athens; SIG3 354, Agathocles of Rhodes and all his descendants are  granted citizenship 
at Athens because Agathocles sold 14,000 hekteis of grain at a price less than 6 drachma a measure. 
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a year, there was a plenary session devoted specifically to grain supply, (Arist. Ath. Pol. 43-4):189 
it was necessary that any man with political interests be well-versed in the context and nature of 
Athens’ grain supply and her current agricultural circumstances. 
Furthermore, it was necessary for the Athenians to elect ten agoranomoi, five for the 
Piraeus and five for the polis itself, in order to supervise goods for sale and ensure that 
merchandise was pure and unadulterated (Arist. Ath. Cons. 51). Similarly, they elected ten 
metronomoi, five for the Piraeus and five for the polis, in order to ensure that honest weights and 
measures were being used by the sellers (Arist. Ath. Cons. 51). They also elected ten 
sitophylakes, five to both the Piraeus and the polis. Those numbers grew to twenty for the city 
and fifteen for the Piraeus. Their responsibilities included ensuring there was no illegal practice 
in the selling of unprepared corn in the market, ensuring millers were selling their barley flour at 
a price proportionate to un-milled barley, and that bakers were selling their loaves corresponding 
to the price of wheat and containing the full weight which had been laid down by the 
commissioners (Arist. Ath. Pol. 51). There were also ten commissioners of trade elected to 
supervise trade and to ensure that at least two-thirds of the corn imported to Athens is brought 
into the city itself (Arist. Ath. Pol. 51).190  
We are better informed about grain imports specifically since they were of public and 
political importance, and were the primary matter of Athens’ diplomatic relationships with the 
rulers of grain-producing regions: grain imports were of special interest not only to feed the 
Athenian population, but also to control and dictate political and foreign policy, particularly 
during wartime. During the Peloponnesian War, Athens was concerned with keeping her armies 
fed and in the field, and also with ensuring that any enemy grain imports were being intercepted 
                                                 
189 Hopper 1979,  52-53, 71. 
190 Meijer and van Nijf 1992,  38. 
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and not reaching their final destinations.  Athens was interested in regions like the island of 
Cythera, which was a trade stop on the route from Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete to the Peloponnese. 
Athens was also interested in Sicily because it was a fertile region and avid grain exporter. Other 
areas of importance were Thessaly, which is demonstrated by Xenophon regarding their high 
level of exports to Athens’ high level of corn imports (Xen. Hell. 5.4.56, 6.1.2; Dem. Olyn. 1.22; 
Dem. 1.22; Arist. Oec. 2.27). Other regions mentioned are of course, Lemnos, Thasos, and 
Sciathos, with no discussion of their importance or use (Dem. 1.32); Euboea was also important, 
and was kept exclusively for Athens, by Athens (And. De Pace 9).191 
 During the revolt in Lesbos in 428-427 BCE, there was no close control of imports of 
corn from the Pontus by Athenian allies. Under Pericles, however, Athens developed a strong 
relationship with the Euxine, and therefore controlled the Black Sea, or at the least approaches to 
it and the coast of Thrace. These areas were far more accessible and easily controlled than Sicily, 
Cape Malea, or even Egypt. It was not until the mid-fifth century that Athens demonstrated 
increased interest in the West and Egypt, since there were disturbances in the Pontus region and 
in Thrace. It appears that this interest was more likely political and imperial than it was about 
grain trade, although we cannot fully exclude this concern; as soon as the North-East area settled, 
Athens’ attention turned back there quickly, even though Egyptian rebels against Persia were 
tempting the Athenians with free gifts of grain. Later in the Peloponnesian War, Athens 
exercised even stricter control over the import of timber and grain supplies, and their movement 
around Hellas. After the Sicilian expedition in 413 BCE failed, and with renewed hostilities from 
Sparta, and interventions by Persia, Athens began to fight a naval war to defend their most vital 
trade route to the North Aegean and the Black Sea. After the Athenian defeat at the Hellespont in 
                                                 
191 Hopper 19797,  53-54, 71. 
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405 BCE, Sparta gained control over this trade route and was able to impose a blockade and 
starved the Athenians into submission.192 
 The North-Eastern trade route continued to play an important role in Athenian politics 
and diplomatic activities in the fourth century BCE: it was at the heart of Athenian interests in 
renewing a maritime league, and was considered justification enough for maintaining Athenian 
naval strength. It is apparent that at home in Athens, the price of corn was the measure of 
Athenian political and diplomatic influence abroad: thus any hostile relations with Sparta, 
Boeotia, and Macedon also involved the corn trade. The fourth century also brought new 
challenges to the Athenian corn trade: the dependence of all city-states on domestic corn 
production increased, and more markets were open to grain traders, which led to significantly 
more competition between ports and cities.193 Many poleis on the Aegean coast were faced with 
grain shortages, and often focused their political efforts on protecting their maritime grain trades, 
and the grain trade would often dictate the nature of political relationships. 
 Speeches such as Isocrates’ speech Trapeziticus, and Demosthenes’ Against Leptines 
show concern for foreign entities and the privileges Athens accorded them. Even well into the 
fourth century Greek merchants returning to Athens with cargo were accorded priority over 
others and were well treated in any court proceedings, and due to previously existing 
relationships Athens often received corn at an extremely cheap rate or as benefaction from other 
states.194 Athens’ political behaviour in the fourth century was similar to that in the fifth. Yet, her 
concern shifted to the disruption of trade by Alexander the Great, rather than Spartan hostilities, 
while still searching for new and foreign sources of grain. Of course, the nature and dimensions 
                                                 
192 Hopper 1979,  54-55, 71. 
193 Hopper 1979,  55-56. 
194 Hopper 1979,  55-57. 
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of any trade or imports into Athens were determined by her population and economic situation. It 
is likely that, as with modern states, exports paid for imports; and that these imports were many 
and various,195 and came from many different sources.196  
 
 
Athenian Grain Trade: Grain and Andocides 
 
 As demonstrated thus far, grain was an extremely important asset for Athens. The 
livelihood of her population depended on external procurement of grain, and so grain trade 
dictated many of her political and diplomatic policies. This was well known throughout the 
ancient Mediterranean, and Athenian grain imports were also the subject of the political and 
diplomatic strategies of other states and poleis. For instance, the Spartan blockade of the 
Hellespont at the end of the Peloponnesian War essentially halted grain imports into Athens from 
the Black Sea region, its most important provider of grain.197 In addition, Lysander instituted a 
naval blockade of Athens after his victory at Aigospotami in the fall of 405 BCE. It lasted until 
peace negotiations were completed in the spring of 404 BCE. As I previously mentioned,198 the 
Athenian grain supply from the Black sea region had been cut off when the Spartans controlled 
the Hellespont before the Athenian victory at Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE. During this 
period Andocides managed to procure 14 triremes of grain because of his xenia with Evagoras in 
Salamis (And. 2.20-21). This blockade that made Andocides’ xenia-based service particularly 
                                                 
195 Hopper 1979,  55-57, 71. 
196 Hopper 1979,  71. 
197 Hopper 1979,  71. 
198 See the section above “Dating On the Return and Andocides’ Services to Athens” in Chapter 3, 58-59, for 
discussion of the date of On the Return and Andocides’ grain delivery from Cyprus. 
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outstanding, since supplying Athens with grain came at great political risk for Salamis.199 By 
exporting grain to Athens while the Peloponnesians were in charge of the Hellespont could have 
turned Spartan attention to Cyprus, which would have caused significant issues for the island.  
We must also consider the dimensions and weight bearing capabilities of a ship, as this 
information allows us to gauge how much grain Andocides imported to Athens from Cyprus. If 
we consider more conservative weight bearing capabilities of a typical mercantile ship, around 
250 tons, and the total of 14 ships that Andocides is able to bring to port, we can see that he 
provided to Athens a shipment of 3,500 tons of grain. At the more generous side of the spectrum, 
with each ship being able to carry as much as 400 tons, Andocides may have provided as much 
as 5,600 tons of grain to Athens. Unfortunately for us, we will never know exactly how much 
grain Andocides imported to Athens from Cyprus through his xenia, since there is no numerical 
evidence that remains on Andocides’ grain shipment to Athens. I have converted these numbers 
to medimnoi: 129,629 medimnoi of wheat (at 27kg per medimnos) if the ships could carry 250 
tons, or 207,407 medimnoi of wheat (at 27kg per medimnos) if the ships could carry 400 tons. 
According to Bresson’s calculations from table 2 above,200 Andocides provided somewhere 
between 10%-16% of the annual amount of grain that Athens had to import to sustain her 
population.201 The importance of this benefaction cannot be understated. Only in 405 BCE did 
Lysander realize the effectiveness of blockading the Hellespont in order to effectively starve out 
and subdue the Athenians, as it seems to have been coincidental in 411/410 BCE. While 
Andocides himself received no honour or benefit from this action (he was not allowed to return 
                                                 
199 By supplying grain to Athens through the Spartan blockade, Salamis easily could have incurred the wrath of 
Sparta and may have found themselves further embroiled in the conflict of the Peloponnesian War. 
200 Chapter 4.3: “Athenian Grain Trade: Grain Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy. 
201 If Andocides imported barley instead of wheat, the numbers would be slightly different. Barley weighs 
31kg/medimnos, so Andocides would have transported 112,903 medimnoi if the ships carried 250 tons each, or 
180,645 medimnoi if the ships carried 400 tons each, totally 9%-12% of Athens’ total necessary amount of grain for 
population sustenance. 
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to Athens, and he was not recognized by any kind of honorific decree), Evagoras was granted 
proxeny with Athens.202 
 This fits the system developed by Athens in which those people who did favours to her 
would receive recognition and reward in return. The specific grant of proxenia demonstrates the 
importance of xenia within the Classical Athenian world, as well as the close relationship 
between the activities of her economies and xenia as a social construct and cultural institution. 
Had it not been for Andocides’ xenia based relationship with Evagoras of Salamis, Athens would 
not have received such a large shipment of grain during such a trying time. This benefaction 
saved Athens a substantial amount of money: they had their sitonia available for the purchase of 
grain for the public during shortages. It would have been fiscally more responsible to encourage 
trade on an individual level between naukleroi, emporoi, merchants, and sellers than to spend 
large portions of the treasury. Grain was typically sold at a price of 5 drachmae a medimnos 
(SIG3 304).203 According to Bresson, a medimnos of wheat is roughly 27kg, and a medimnos of 
barley weighs roughly 31kg.204  If Andocides shipped only wheat at 27kg/measure filling the 
total weight of all fourteen 250 tonne vessels, wheat shipped to Athens would have been 
129,629.63 medimnoi; at the higher end of the spectrum with fourteen 400 tonne vessels carrying 
the shipment, it would have accounted for 207,407.41 medimnoi of wheat. With barley at 31kg a 
measure, fourteen 250 tonne vessels would have accounted for 112,903.26 measures; fourteen 
400 tonne vessels would have carried 180,645.16 medimnoi of barley. We do not know exactly 
what kind of grain Andocides was able to bring in, since he does not specify (And. 2.21): for 
                                                 
202 See my above argument in Chapter 3, “Andocides: Dating on the Return and Andocides’ Services to Athens”. 
203 This is the price indicated by Demosthenes that Heraclides sold his grain to Athens for, as such, this price is 
likely lower than what Athens would spend on a measure of grain, since this benefaction resulted in Heraclides 
being honoured with citizenship at Athens. 
204 Bresson 2010,  439. 
99 
 
purposes of speculation, I average out the shipment of grain from the above four totals to be 
125,271 medimnoi of grain. This amount of grain, based on Bresson’s calculated 5 medimnoi of 
grain per person per year, would feed roughly 25,055 members of the Athenian populace. 
Typically this amount of grain would cost the Athenians a total of 626,355 drachmae (or 104 
talents) from the sitonia for public grain, or from the grain-buyers, at a price of 5 drachmae a 
measure.  
It is unlikely that Andocides (or Evagoras) would have been able to afford to make such a 
substantial gift to Athens. It is more probable that Andocides procured the grain to be sold in the 
agora as usual, but at a lower cost. There is evidence for similar benefactions made to Athens by 
Agathocles of Rhodes, and Heraclides of Salamis. As previously discussed, Agathocles of 
Rhodes sold 14,000 hekteis of grain at a price lower than market value at which it was being sold 
in the Athenian agora, since it was probable that he would be rewarded for this benefaction to the 
Athenian people (SIG3 354). Furthermore, during the food crisis in Athens in 330-329 BCE, 
Heraclides of Salamis sold 3,000 medimnoi of wheat to Athens at a price of 5 drachmae per 
measure, and gave a gift of 3,000 drachmae to the Athenian sitonia. On account of this service, 
Heraclides of Salamis was granted the titles proxenos and euergetes to Athens, among other 
honours, essentially making him and his descendants Athenian citizens (SIG3 304).205  
The battle of Cyzicus reopened the Hellespont in the spring of 410 BCE, coinciding with 
Andocides’ speech On the Return and his delivery of grain from Cyprus, Athens would still have 
been in the midst of a grain shortage. Typically, during food shortages, the price of grain 
skyrocketed in the agora, making it difficult for Athenian citizens to afford. The price of grain 
during the food shortage of 330-329 BCE was higher than 5 drachmae per measure, since the 
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Athenians considered the price of 5 drachmae per measure of grain charged by Heraclides of 
Salamis to be a benefaction to the polis (SIG3 304). Even 6 drachmae a measure of grain was 
viewed as expensive in comparison to the typical prices in 300 BCE (SIG3 354). If Andocides 
provided 125,271 medimnoi of grain to Athens from Cyprus at a price of 5 drachmae a measure, 
the total delivery from the 14 known ships would have a value of 104 talents worth of grain. 
Based on the examples of Agathocles of Rhodes and the Athenian food crisis of 330-329 BCE, 
we can estimate that grain was being sold for (at least) 6 drachmae a measure in Athens during 
the food crisis of 411-410 BCE. At the price of 6 drachmae per measure of grain, the shipment of 
125,271 medimnoi of grain would have cost the Athenians 751,626 drachmae (or 125 talents). At 
the price of 5 drachmae per measure (only one drachma less than market price) Andocides saved 
the Athenians a total of 125,271 drachmae (or 21 talents). This situation is not improbable:  both 
Agathocles of Rhodes and Heraclides of Salamis received a grant of citizenship for a similar 
benefactions, i.e. the selling of grain at Athens at lower than market price. The first decree to 
Evagoras discussed in Chapter 3 (IG I3 113) is also a citizenship decree, likely granted to him on 
the grounds of a similar benefaction to the Athenians.  
It is unlikely, though, that Andocides was able to pay for this entire shipment of grain on 
his own, even as a wealthy aristocrat. Andocides was able to provide this shipment of grain to 
Athens on account of his xenia-based relationship with Evagoras, probably by convincing the 
king to send a shipment through the blockaded Hellespont, regardless of political risk. Or that 
Evagoras provided Andocides with a loan to be re-payed on the delivery of grain to Athens and 
its purchase by Athens and its citizens. Either of these situations are possible: I believe the 
second scenario is most likely, especially since Andocides found himself in a large amount of 
trouble in Cyprus shortly after his failed attempt to return to Athens. Andocides was imprisoned 
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in Cyprus, but none of our sources indicate the reason for his imprisonment. The fact that 
Andocides was able to provide this shipment to Athens in the spring of 410 BCE, but was 
imprisoned shortly afterwards, indicates that he was most likely imprisoned on account of an 
issue with this shipment of grain to Athens. I theorize that Andocides reneged on the repayment 
of his loan to Evagoras of Salamis, and was therefore imprisoned..  
The extent of this benefaction is clear, and it is possible for us to see the exceptional 
significance of the relationship between Athenian economies and cultural institutions and social 
constructs as xenia. Through her political and diplomatic policies, as well as her foreign strategy, 
Athens carefully placed herself in the ideal position to receive these sorts of benefactions. 
Andocides would have known that by facilitating such a large benefaction through his xenia 
within Cyprus, Athens would likely reward the benefactors (as she was accustomed to do). Of 
course, Andocides wished to recoup some of this gain for himself, as he hoped that facilitating a 
significant benefaction for the polis   would lead Athens to reinstate him as a citizen. 
Unfortunately for Andocides, his efforts did not pay off for himself on this occasion, but it did 
pay off significantly for Athenian economies as a whole. There are plenty of other inscriptions 
and decrees that honour foreign persons for their benefactions to Athens, mentioning either gifts 
of grain or other goods, or the sale of products at a reduced price. If we compiled these and 
estimated totals based on what little circumstantial evidence we have, we would be able to 
develop a quantitative model for benefactions to Athens, and cross-reference this information 
with our evidence for Athenian economic expenditure as a means to develop a quantitative and 
qualitative model for the role of xenia and other benefactions within Athenian economies as a 
whole. While this information is, to a considerable extent, speculative, it is nevertheless useful, 
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as it demonstrates the embedded nature of the Athenian economy, as well Athens’ overall 
economic dependence on their cultural, political, and social institutions.  
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Chapter 5: The Athenian Timber Trade 
 
Athenian Timber Trade: An Introduction to the Timber Trade at Athens 
 
The timber trade in Athens was just as complicated as the grain trade, and exhibits many 
of the same qualities during the Classical period. Therefore, it is important to consider the larger 
function of the timber trade within the Athenian economies in order to fully understand the 
significance of Andocides’ xenia with Archelaus of Macedon. Unfortunately, we do not have 
nearly the same amount of primary or secondary evidence for the timber trade as we do for the 
grain trade, especially regarding quantitative figures and information. Nevertheless, there is still 
more than enough information available to demonstrate both the importance of the timber trade 
in Classical Athenian economies, and the Athenian dependence on timber imports. As a result, it 
is possible to determine the significance of xenia within this sphere of Athenian economies using 
Andocides’ xenia with Archelaus of Macedon as an example of the benefits of interpersonal 
ritualized relationships to Athenian economies. Andocides describes his xenia-based contribution 
to the Athenian timber trade as follows: 
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτίκα μὲν τότε εἰσήγαγον εἰς στρατιὰν ὑμῶν οὖσαν ἐν Σάμῳ κωπέας, 
τῶν τετρακοσίων ἤδη τὰ πράγματα ἐνθάδε κατειληφότων, ὄντος μοι Ἀρχελάου 
ξένου πατρικοῦ καὶ διδόντος τέμνεσθαί τε καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι ὁπόσους ἐβουλόμην. 
τούτους τε εἰσήγαγον τοὺς κωπέας, καὶ παρόν μοι πέντε δραχμῶν τὴν τιμὴν 
αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐμοὶ κατέστησαν: 
εἰσήγαγον δὲ σῖτόν τε καὶ χαλκόν. (And. 2.11) 
Indeed, I at once supplied your forces in Samos with oar-spars at a time when 
the Four Hundred had already seized power here, since Archelaus was an 
inherited xenos of mine and allowed me to cut and export as many as I wished. 
I both supplied these spars and, although I could have received a price for them 
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of five drachmas apiece, I did not want to charge more than they cost me; I 
also supplied corn and bronze.  
This passage raises many questions about the nature and mechanisms of the timber trade in 
Classical Athens. How was Andocides able to procure a seemingly large shipment of timber for 
the polis? Why exactly is this particular service of any significance to the timber trade at Athens? 
What makes this particular instance so important? In light of these questions, and the proxenia 
decree discussed in Chapter 3 (IG I3 117), how do we consider Andocides’ xenia-based 
transaction in regards to theoretical economic models, especially North’s New Institutional 
Economics? What is the effect of xenia on economies, and how does xenia define and constrain 
certain kinds of embedded economic activities as an aspect of structure and determinant of 
performance? What do these types of xenia-transactions mean for economic performance, and 
how can we use xenia to help define the nature of structure and performance of economies and 
trade mechanisms in Classical Athens? 
Athens was in need of timber, especially for larger scale building projects such as naval 
programs and temple construction. According to Theophrastus,206 silver-fir was the ideal ship-
building material and only grew at an altitude of 800m or higher (Theophr. Hist. pl4.5.5).  Silver-
fir was found primarily in Macedon, Thrace, Southern Italy, the south shore of the Black Sea at 
Sinope and Amison, Mt. Olympos in Mysia, and Mt. Ida in Troad (Theophr. Hist. pl4.5.5).  
Theophrastus does not list Athens or a region near Athens as a source of silver-fir (Theophr. 
4.5.5). Möller argues that Athens was capable of meeting her own timber needs from local 
mountain slopes, the Boeotian border, and Euboea during the first half of the fifth century, since 
her shipbuilding regime was not yet fully fledged. Even at this time, Macedonian timber and 
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pitch were in extremely high demand. The Persians were already present in the North Aegean, 
and knew that forests along the Strymon were a likely source of timber for the Athenians (Hdt. 
5.23). The demand for timber continued throughout the Classical period, as demonstrated by the 
alliance between Amyntas III of Macedon and the Chalcidians at the beginning of the 4th 
century.207 
The mechanism of timber trade in Classical Athens is not as clear as that of the grain 
trade; yet it was still a primary diplomatic and political concern for the polis. Many of Athens’ 
political and diplomatic actions during the Classical period were dictated by her need for external 
resources, and timber is no exception. She was unable to provide local timber for her ship-
building programs, since silver-fir was essentially unavailable in her territories. It was of high-
importance for Athens to procure a sustainable, constant supply of timber after the Persian War, 
in order to be prepared for any other military activities. Naval prowess was essential to the Greek 
defeat of the Persians, as well as to the maintenance of the Delian league, and later, the Athenian 
empire. After her defeat by the Peloponnesians in 404 BCE, timber was still a necessity for the 
Athenian polis, as it was soon necessary for her to rebuild her naval fleet. 
Many primary sources indicate Athens’ overwhelming need for imported timber, 
including speeches, treatises, and inventories, as well as various honourary inscriptions that 
present different individuals with decrees of proxenia for their timber contributions to the 
Athenian polis. The large scale demand for timber was met through various economic channels, 
largely through political treaties and benefactions. There is also evidence for large scale timber 
trade occurring through interpersonal ritualized relationships of xenia, and the Athenian 
institution of proxenia. These social institutions were indeed significant to the overall function of 
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the timber-trade mechanism in Classical Athens. It is necessary then to focus on Athenian 
political and diplomatic relationships, as well as their economic nature, in order to understand the 
overall economic ramifications of Andocides’ xenia with Archelaus of Macedon, and the effect 
of his xenia-based benefaction on Athens’ timber economy. Understanding how the timber trade 
functioned and the extent to which Athens was dependant on timber from elsewhere allows us to 
place xenia in the context of timber trade, and Athenian economies in general. A brief discussion 
of the historical background elucidates the complexities of the Athenian timber trade, and the 
channels through which it was necessary for Athens to pursue and receive timber. Through this 
history, we are able to see that xenia played a significant role in the timber trade at Athens, and 
that it helped define the structure and mechanisms of economic activity within this particular 
sphere, while also having a wider effect on Athenian economies in general. 
  
Athenian Timber Trade: The Politics of Athenian Timber Procurement 
 
 In order to understand the mechanisms of timber trade, and to put Andocides 
procurement of timber in the context of the Athenian timber trade and Athenian economies, it is 
necessary to provide a history of timber use and procurement in Athens. As seen in the preceding 
chapter on grain, Athens’ need for resources seems nearly insatiable and determined to a large 
extent her foreign, political, and diplomatic activities. Her need for timber was a large influence 
on her political and diplomatic policies, beginning early in the fifth century BCE with 
Themistocles’ naval program proposals in 483 BCE (Hdt. 7.144).208 Yet the Athenians were not 
the first ones to possess a large naval power; it is likely that there was a substantial naval 
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presence in the ancient Mediterranean long before then, starting with the considerable fleet of 
Bronze Age Crete in the 16th-15th centuries BCE.209 The ability of Mycenaean Greeks to conquer 
Knossos and take over the Cretan civilization also indicates the presence of considerable naval 
powers on the Greek mainland around 1450 BCE. The colonisation movements of the eighth 
century BCE necessitated a re-opening of trade and naval routes after the collapse of the Bronze 
Age world in the Eastern Aegean. With colonisation came a great increase in maritime trade 
activities, as well as a large need for warships to defend the movements of maritime traders. It is 
roughly a century after this that - according to Thucydides - the first naval battle took place in 
Greece, between Corinth and Cocyra. But he makes it clear that there was still no substantial 
Greek naval fleet before the Persian invasion (Thuc. 1.8.1).210 Significant Athenian interest in 
naval prowess and ship-timber appears earlier than the Themistoclean naval-program, as the 
Persian forces in the North Aegean were aware that the Strymon River area was a potential 
source of timber for the Athenians (Hdt. 5.23). There was no real need, however, for any 
particular naval program until at least the 480s: grain and pottery trade did not yet require naval 
accompaniment for protection, and the 20 ships sent to aid Ionia against the Persians in the 490s 
were likely pentakonters, which were significantly smaller than triremes and required less timber 
resources for their construction.211  
When Athens was in need of ships for warfare with Aegina a decade afterwards, she 
purchased more pentakonters from Corinth, since Corinth was already a leader in ship-building 
by this time (Hdt. 5.99).212 Thucydides demonstrated that apart from Athens, only one state was 
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able to contribute 50 ships of the Greek fleet at the time of the Persian invasion, although 
Herodotus recounts that Athens contributed a total of 180 ships to the overall 378 that appeared 
at the battle of Salamis in 480 BCE (Hdt. 8.44, 8.48). The emergence of naval programs and a 
more immediate need of warships resulted in the need for silver-fir, which was unavailable in 
Attic territory. Due to the Themistoclean naval program roughly 200 triremes were built in a 
period of two years, a project that would have required substantial timber, labour, and financial 
resources. The most pressing issue with the Themistoclean building program was the short 
period of time in which it was completed: two years is a seemingly short period in which to fell 
the timber, prepare it for proper production, carry it by river to the coast, transport the timber to 
Phalerum or other Attic ship-building centres, and then convert these into triremes. Some 
scholars argue for the use of timber from mountain forests on Attica’s borders. The shortage of 
time does not seem to be an actual issue, since later sources demonstrate that the Romans had 
once built 120 ships in 60 days, and 220 ships in 45 days.213 One should not put too much weight 
on this evidence, since it is anachronistic to compare Roman building technology to that of the 
early Classical Athenian period. It does demonstrate, however, that two years may not have been 
entirely unreasonable to supply and build 200 triremes, no matter where the timber was coming 
from. 
On account of the lack of timber resources at Athens and burgeoning naval programs, 
Athenian political and diplomatic policy turned towards the procurement of timber for ship-
building. Athens became focused on the regions of Macedon, Thrace, and Southern Italy. The 
political relationship between Athens and Macedon was the most important, as well as the most 
complex: there is little evidence for Athenian use of Macedonian timber before the 5th century 
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BCE. Yet, Alexander I of Macedon was already a proxenos and euergetes of Athens by 480/479 
BCE (Hdt. 8.136.1), likely on account of timber grants to the Themistoclean building program of 
483-482 BCE.214 Meiggs calls into question the actual likelihood of Athenian procurement of 
timber from Macedon during this period, since Macedon was a vassal state of the Persians at this 
time, and it is unlikely that the Macedonian king would have wanted to provoke Xerxes, or that a 
large maritime shipment of timber to Athens would have gone unnoticed by Persia. Meiggs 
settles on southern Italy as the source of timber for the Themistoclean building program of the 
early fifth century: he supports his hypothesis with Themistocles’ threat to take the Athenians to 
Southern Italy (Hdt. 8.43), and Corcyra’s obligations to him. Themistocles had been recognized 
as a benefactor to Corcyra, and had settled a dispute between them and the Corinthians (Plut. 
Them. 24.1; Thuc. 1.136.1). Themistocles had also given his daughters the programmatic names 
Sybaris and Italia. The evidence Meiggs provides seems merely circumstantial, and there is no 
physical or literary evidence for Athenian timber trade with southern Italy until 408-407 BCE, 
when the commissioners of Eleusis included a stock of thirty timbers which had been imported 
from Thurii.215 Furthermore, Macedon was not under direct control of, nor occupied by Persia 
during the 480s BCE, and did not yet possess the forests of Strymon (with which Persia was 
most concerned) in her territories.  
It is important to trace the history of the timber trade throughout the Classical period, as it 
helps us put Athens’ relationship with Macedon in context, so that we can understand how the 
timber trade developed over the Classical period. Furthermore, according to both Herodotus 
(6.89, 92, 7.144.1-2) and Plutarch (Them. 4.1-2), Themistocles proposed his naval program for a 
war with Aegina, possibly as an attempt to divert Persian suspicion from Athenian actions. Persia 
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eventually released Macedon in the early 470s BCE, but Athenian ambitions for Macedonian 
timber were unfulfilled until the death of Alexander I in 454 BCE. The political instability that 
followed Alexander I’s death allowed Athens the opportunity to seize and establish a colony at 
Amphipolis on the Strymon in 437/436 BCE. The possession of Amphipolis by Athens was a 
fundamental cause of tension between Macedon and Athens extending into the fourth century 
BCE.216 This is important because as long as Athens possessed Amphipolis, she had much better 
access to timber and did not need to rely as much on foreign imports of timber from other poleis 
or kingdoms. 
 The Peloponnesian War only furthered tensions between the two states on account of 
Athenian possession of Amphipolis and her support of factions that were hostile to King 
Perdiccas II. It also further stimulated Athens’ timber requirements since she was dependant on 
her naval force in order to maintain her empire.217 The Athenian decrees giving preferential 
treatment to Methone in Macedonia in the 420s BCE is a clear example of a diplomatic attempt 
to sustain a constant alternative supply of timber throughout the Peloponnesian War.218 When 
Amphipolis fell to the Spartan general Brasidas in 424 BCE, Sparta also won the favour of King 
Perdiccas of Macedon, but the alliance fell apart after Perdiccas attempted to exploit his 
friendship with Brasidas in order to engage Sparta’s assistance in a campaign along Macedon’s 
western border. After Brasidas’ death, the alliance collapsed and Perdiccas was forced to act 
independently. It is the death of Brasidas and the failure of the Spartan-Macedonian alliance 
which led to the treaty between Perdiccas and Athens, wherein Macedon promised to provide 
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oars exclusively to Athens (IG I3 89). This treaty has been dated variously between 432-413 
BCE; Borza concludes that it likely arose in the aftermath of the previously described events as a 
means to supply timber-hungry Athensand support an ‘insecure’ monarch.219 
Although this treaty fell through and hostilities were reopened when Macedon joined the 
Spartan alliance, it is likely that thanks to this treaty (as well as the Peace of Nicias) many of the 
ships Athens sent to Sicily in 415 BCE were outfitted largely from Macedonian timber. On 
account of the disastrous outcome of the Sicilian Expedition, Athens was forced to rebuild her 
fleet quickly (Thuc. 8.1.2, 4), using both public and private resources: consequently she turned 
again to Macedon. By this time, Perdiccas had passed away and had been succeeded by 
Archelaus, who supported Athens with timber sales.220 He also granted exploitation and export 
rights to individual Athenian citizens, such as Andocides (2.11). Archelaus was able to maintain 
a neutral position by avoiding any direct alliances with Athens, but rather by granting or selling 
rights for exploitation and exportation to individuals as well as the Athenian state. 
Hostilities were renewed after the death of Archelaus in 399 BCE, and continued until 
373 BCE when Amyntas III and Athens signed a treaty securing Macedonian timber and pitch (a 
resin produced from timber to caulk and seal timber for shipbuilding to make it stronger and 
more ‘waterproof’) for Athens. According to this treaty, the Athenians were able to export all 
pitch and ship-building materials except for fir (RO 12).221 Even with this treaty in place, it was 
necessary that the export of fir for ship-building still be reported to the king and paid for in full 
for exploitation and export by the Athenians.222 Meanwhile, it appears that Athens sought timber 
sources elsewhere, especially among the prosperous Chalcidic cities of the North (Xen. Hell. 
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5.2.16). Athens procured her timber from these cities through both treaties and individual rights 
granted by a controlled-leasing system, usually through a benefaction decree, as is the case with 
Timotheus in 370 BCE, when he procured enough timber for several Athenian triremes.223 The 
relationship between Athens and Macedon continued to fluctuate throughout most of the 4th 
century BCE. Yet, the previous discussion is of the greatest relevance for understanding the 
effect of Andocides’ xenia with Archelaus on the Athenian timber trade and on Classical 
Athenian economies in general.224 
 
Athenian Timber Trade: Mechanisms of Timber Transport and Ship Building 
 
 Unfortunately, there is little information that remains to us regarding the felling, and 
overall production of timber for ship building. Borza constructs a plausible model for 
Macedonian timber procurement based on universal factors such as topography and technology, 
as well as inference, while utilising what little information is available to us. He suggests that 
timber was felled in teams of three, with two men cutting at the same time, and the third 
sharpening axe-blades for the other two men (Philostratus Imagines 2.17).225 Axes were also 
employed to strip branches, whereas saws were primarily used to cross-cut trees to shorter 
lengths for easier shipping, unless long pieces were needed for oars, masts, beams, or other 
speciality equipment. It is likely that the timber was then transported overland by yoke-animals 
to a finishing destination, or to a port for direct transport. There may be some evidence for 
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timber-slides down particularly steep mountain slopes. Yet unlike quarry slides, they would have 
left little to no archaeological trace since they were surely made out of wood. Water transport 
was also utilised. The major Macedonian rivers were likely used for timber floatation, since they 
were suitable year round for timber transport to lower regions. After felling and transporting, 
some level of seasoning was necessary for the timber, in order that it be lighter and straighter for 
ship building; there is no substantial evidence for when the wood seasoning took place, but 
Borza suggests that the timber pieces were squared and sawn where they were felled, and were 
seasoned just enough so as not to hinder bendability for joins in the planking of the hulls.226 
Bissa also argues that timber operations were typically done in-situ in the forest, by a pool of 
export oar-makers she emphasizes Andocides’ ability to export oar-spars from Macedon to 
Samos on account of his royal xenia with Archelaus as evidence.227 The exportation of 
unfinished oar-spars is atypical in Classical Greece, since the oars would be less likely to break 
or be damaged if they were already fully finished before they were transported. Andocides’ 
exportation of oar-spars to Samos is an exception to the norms of timber trade, making his 
service to Athens especially unique.228 The Macedonian king had a royal monopoly of the forest 
land, and used a controlled leasing system with exploitation and exportation rights granted by 
royal decree. Such direct giving of concessions as gifts to friendly individuals recalls the oriental 
practice of rewarding loyal subjects, such as with Histiaios and Themistocles.229  
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Oar production is a particularly difficult skill: since fir-trees are made up of multiple 
layers of wood, it is was essential for oar-wrights to evenly shave off each layer of wood 
individually in order to make a strong oar. Improper oar production, and uneven layer-removal 
resulted in kopai adokimoi (or “unfit oarspars”), of which there were regular listings in the 
Athenian naval inventories of the fourth century.230 On account of this fact, Bissa’s argument 
that oar production typically occurred in-situ seems even more likely: Theophrastus indicates 
that each individual oar is made from a single tree in order to prevent it from snapping due to 
stress or force (Hist. pl5.1.7).231 Silver-fir from Macedon and Southern Italy had the highest 
reputation, since they produced the longest length of straight timbers, with fewer knots, and were 
therefore better for producing oars. Even so, good pine was considered better for ship-building 
than poor fir, demonstrated by the presence of two pine-timber triremes in Aristophanes’ 
Knights, so it seems unlikely that the Athenian navy was built entirely from fir in the fifth 
century BCE.232 Natural resins from fir and pine (i.e. pitch) were another product necessary for 
ship-building and maintenance, both in solid and liquid form, and while some types of wood 
could be replaced with another during construction, there was no alternative to this timber by-
product that was essential for sealing and conditioning the hulls of ships.233 Considering this, it is 
clear than an almost-constant timber supply would be necessary during the Classical period on 
account of continuing warfare and large scale naval building programs. 
The differing regional forests made the import of timber indispensable: Central Greece, 
which had few and overly depleted forests, imported construction timber primarily from 
Macedon and North-West Asia Minor. Since it was imported in such large amounts, wood for 
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construction was sold by measured volume, rather than by weight (free-wood) or unit (charcoal) 
volume:234 essentially, the rule of transport cost is that the unit of transport cost is inversely 
proportionate to the value per unit of weight and volume. When the unit value of a given quantity 
decreases, the cost of transport increases proportionately. Accounts from Delos (279 BCE) 
demonstrate that for a load of tiles shipped from Syros (by sea), 25.5% was added to the cost of 
the cargo on account of freight charges. Two years later, in 277 BCE, freight charges increased 
to 250% of the purchase price for a load of bricks, which have a much lower value than tiles for 
weight per unit. The costs for transport became so expensive for construction materials at Delos 
that the sanctuary administrators attempted to decrease it by directly regulating it. The above 
equation also applies to the transport of timber, which based on the weight and value, was 
extremely expensive to transport and necessitated extremely high freighting costs. Therefore it 
was difficult for the Athenians to transport, and to pay for the transportation of timber, on top of 
paying for exportation and (sometimes) exploitation rights. In some instances, Athenians would 
send shipbuilders out to the locations from which they were importing the timber for 
shipbuilding, and pay for the right to build their ships in foreign bays, rather than paying for 
freighting costs.235 There is some evidence that wood was floated down the rivers of Thrace to 
Asia Minor, however this is fairly unique and likely due to the large size of the rivers in the 
region. Not all areas of Greece were equipped to transport heavy loads of timber in this manner, 
and due to the poor quality of the roads and excessive weight of timber shipments, maritime 
transport was a necessity and a decisive factor in economic activity.236 Therefore, the fact that 
Andocides paid to transport the oar-spars, in addition to paying what it cost him to fell the trees 
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for the oar-spars, suggests that this particular endeavour would have been quite expensive. 
Andocides charged less than the typical 5 drachmae an oar, and charged only what it cost him to 
fell the timber (And. 2.11), in conjunction with the high cost of shipping expensive and heavy 
materials such as timber, suggests that Andocides might have lost money on this particular 
venture, or  might have barely broken even. 
 On account of the weight capabilities of many ships, transporting the large amounts of 
timber necessary for ship-building and construction would have presented some significant 
problems for the Athenian ship building programs. For instance, between 480-410 BCE, Athens 
maintained at least two hundred warships, and at times approached a naval fleet of 300 warships. 
Borza estimates that roughly 1,500 triremes were constructed during this period, calculating the 
average life-span of a trireme as 20 years; he also takes into account the 20 ships replaced each 
year due to deterioration, storm-loss, and battle-loss. Timber requirements for this scale of 
building regimen were huge: a single trireme required 170 oars, and kept 30 oars in reserve (IG 
II2 1611).  Therefore at least 300,000 oars were necessary to sustain these ships over this 70 year 
period; from 357-356 BCE Athens had 46,600 oars in storage for its fleet of 233 triremes.237 It is 
impossible to determine exactly how many trees were felled to meet this requirement, as the 
amount of timber necessary for actual ship building can only be estimated. Ship-wrecks indicate 
hull thicknesses of anywhere between two and ten centimetres, and ancient sailors claim only to 
have been separated from the sea by two to four finger-widths. Borza suggests a general board 
thickness of roughly 1½ to 2” for hulls, planks, strakes, and decks, which would total 
approximately 2700-3600 square feet of timber, without the inclusion of keels, masts, framing, 
and parts for the bow and the stern.238   
                                                 
237 Meiggs 1982,  131. 
238 Borza 1987,  34-35, see also Meiggs 1982. 
117 
 
  
 
Athenian Timber Trade: Economic Ramifications 
 
In order to fully understand the economic (and political) ramifications of the Athenian-
Macedonian timber trade, we must consider the nature of timber trade in Macedon proper. The 
ownership of the Macedonian forest land, and the granting of exploitation and export rights are 
essential for understanding the timber trade mechanism at Athens. It is largely agreed upon in 
scholarship that Macedon’s forest-land was part of a royal monopoly.239 Moreover, Bissa argues 
that Macedon used a controlled leasing system in conjunction with this monopoly: exploitation 
and export rights were granted solely by the king, often through some form of treaty or decree. A 
controlled leasing system can be inferred from Alexander’s ban on timber sales from Mt. 
Dysoron,240 which still presumably allowed for local private use of the woodland. Controlled 
leasing means that the king would essentially “rent out” the rights to export timber: whoever was 
hoping to export timber from Macedon would have to pay a fee to export the timber, while also 
paying the contracted workers employed by the king to exploit the land and the timber, paying 
for it to be felled, processed, and transported to a port for exportation. Presumably, exploitation 
rights were reserved for Macedonian contractors, whereas export rights could be granted to either 
states or individuals, as demonstrated by Perdiccas’ treaty with Athens that allowed the exclusive 
export of oars to Athens, but not of all timber and timber by-products (pitch) (IG I3 89.31).  Yet, 
this treaty did not grant exploitation or exportation rights to Athens alone, but rather granted 
                                                 
239 Bissa 2009, 112-115. 
240 See Hammond 1988,  382-383 for the inscription proper, and  383ff. for discussion of the inscription. 
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some rights to Athenians under controlled leasing. Amyntas’ provision of export rights to the 
Chalcidian League for all timber related products (RO 12.9-18) also indicates a controlled 
leasing system. In both cases Chalcis and Athens were only granted export rights of pitch and 
shipbuilding materials with the exception of silver-fir, but not exploitation rights.  Therefore 
Macedon’s controlled leasing system was not a closed royal monopoly: the king had essentially 
total control of production (i.e. the felling and processing of timber), exploitation, and 
exportation, but in this way managed to avoid the cost of a large number of public employees, 
saving the kingdom significant sums of money in public finances.241  
The controlled leasing system employed by Macedonian royalty is what makes 
Andocides’ procurement of timber for oars so unusual. According to Bissa, Andocides’ case may 
have been exceptional due to his xenia with Archelaus. She argues that Andocides’ situation was 
particularly unique, demonstrating that his position as a royal xenos gave him access to aspects 
of Macedon’s controlled leasing policy that were typically reserved only for Macedonian 
citizens.242 It is specifically his position as a xenos that allowed him access to unlimited 
exploitation rights in this case. The example illustrates the enormous impact xenia had on 
economic transactions between two partners. Not only was Andocides given export rights, which 
was fairly typical of the controlled leasing system at Macedon, he was also granted exploitation 
rights. A grant of exploitation rights was significantly more uncommon than a grant of export 
rights: what makes this instance so exceptional, is that Andocides received a grant without 
limitations, and was able to export the timber from Macedon to Samos, presumably before it was 
shaved into oars (And. 2.11). Bissa argues that Andocides’ emphasis is not on the permission 
                                                 
241 See Bissa 2009,  112-115; Meiggs 1982,  123, 126-127; Borza 1987,  39.  
242 Bissa 2009, 112-114. 
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itself, but rather on the rights to use unlimited quantities. As far as we know, any trader could 
receive export rights from a controlled leasing system, but exploitation rights were likely 
reserved for Macedonian contractors alone. Furthermore, the permission to export the oars, 
unshaven, to Samos supports the argument that oar-production was normally done in-situ, and 
suggests that there was probably a pool of export oar-makers in Macedon and in employment of 
the king.243 
The date of Andocides’ procurement of oars for the Athenian fleet at Samos is 411 BCE, 
a particularly problematic time since the 400 had taken control of Athens at this time (And. 
2.11). Presumably, regular supply lines to the democratic Athenian fleet at Samos were stopped 
on account of their resistance against the oligarchic regime of the 400 who had taken control at 
Athens. The Athenian fleets at Samos could not expect their typical supplies from Athens and 
were likely in desperate need of timber for ship building and other supplies for sustenance. The 
Athenian fleet at Samos did not recognize the government of the 400 at Athens as legitimate. 
The fleet at Samos behaved like a polis in exile, even holding their own elections of generals. As 
such, the fleet could not expect any supplies or reinforcements from Athens. Andocides’ delivery 
of oars, corn, and bronze would have been of extreme aid and value to the democratic fleet at 
Samos.244 These circumstances are in large part what made Andocides’ procurement of timber 
for Athens so valuable. At this time, the Athenians were in the midst of the Peloponnesian War, 
and were also struggling with the emergence of the rule of an oligarchic clique of the 400 in 
Athens. Relations with Macedon were not at their strongest. But Archelaus proved to be a much 
friendlier ally to the Athenians than his predecessor Perdiccas. Yet, the oligarchic coup at Athens 
                                                 
243 Bissa 2009,  112-114, Meiggs 1982,  123, 126-127; Borza 1987,  39. 
244 Rhodes 2006,  65-67. 
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made the procurement of timber particularly problematic, cutting off regular supply lines to the 
democratic Athenian fleet at Samos. Utilising Thucydides, we can estimate that there were 
roughly 82 triremes at Samos at this time that would have been in need of new oars and supplies 
(Thuc. 8.79.2). Each of these triremes needed 170 oars, and 30 reserve oars at any given time,245 
which amounts to a total of 16,400 individual oars in order to fully outfit this particular fleet. 
Unfortunately, we do not have any evidence for the exact number of oars that Andocides 
provided for this fleet. Yet, the emphasis on unlimited exploitation rights indicates that it must 
have been a significant number. At his price of 5 drachma per oar-spar (And. 2.11) it would have 
cost the Athenians 1000 drachma to fully outfit each individual trireme, or a total of 82,000 
drachmae for the entire fleet (roughly 14 talents). If we presume that Andocides sold the oars for 
half the typical price and provided enough oars to replace 10% (1,640) of the oars of the fleet 
(which seems to be reasonable, considering the lack of any actual numerical data), it would have 
amounted to a gift of 0.7 talents for the fleet (or 4,100 drachmas). 
Andocides emphasizes that the price for which he was able to sell the Athenians these 
oars as only what it cost him to fell the timber, which suggests that the typical price of 5 drachma 
an oar was significantly more expensive than the low price Andocides was charged. 
Furthermore, the fact that he exported the oar-spars to Samos suggests that he saved Athenians 
additional expenses. It also seems that Andocides did not charge the Athenians the cost of 
exportation or transport. As we have seen previously in this chapter, transport costs for a product 
as heavy and valuable as timber would have been exceptionally high. It is typical that Athenians 
would build their own ships in foreign naupegia, paying for that service, rather than the cost of 
shipping the timber back to her city. As previously discussed, oar manufacturing is a precise and 
                                                 
245 Borza 1987,  34. 
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intricate process, and was therefore likely to be expensive. This is further supported by the 
Macedonian king’s unwillingness to personally employ an outfit of oar manufacturers on his 
land, opting instead to contract out to a pool of oar-makers who would be paid by the person or 
state that had been granted exploitation and export rights by the king’s controlled leasing system.  
The Cypriot kings held a similar controlled leasing policy over their forest land, declining to cut 
down and export the timber themselves since they already paid for the care and husbandry of the 
land, choosing rather to contract out and charge for the exploitation and export of their products 
(Theophr. Hist. pl. 5.8.1).246  
The nature of oar production and the tendency of controlled leasing systems to opt for 
contracts and permissions for exploitation and export rights indicates the expensive nature of 
timber production and trade. Consequently, Andocides seems to have done the Athenians an 
enormous favour and made a significant contribution to their timber trade. Considering the costs 
of exportation, transport, or renting a naupegia, Andocides likely provided the oars to the 
Athenians at Samos at a seemingly much lower cost than usual. Samos was an island and she 
was also a producer of ships, using substantial amounts of pine instead of silver-fir (Theophr. 
Hist. pl. 5.7.1). Since there is evidence that other kingdoms (i.e. Cypriot kingdoms) operated on a 
similar controlled leasing system to that of Macedon,247 it is likely that there was a pool of oar 
manufacturers available in Samos to aid the Athenians in shaving and finishing the oars for their 
fleet. 
Since we do not know exactly how many oars Andocides provided the Athenians or at 
what price, it is unfortunately impossible to quantify his xenia-based benefaction to the Athenian 
                                                 
246 Bissa 2009,  112-116. Timber was clearly an expensive resource, since it cost 131 drachmae for a ship’s ram 
alone in the fourth century BCE,   and a single trireme necessitated 35 tonnes of timber to fully construct; for more 
regarding the cost of shipbuilding see Casson 1971,  85 fn. 42; and Bissa 2009,  119 fn. 14. 
247 Bissa 2009,  115-116. 
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fleet at Samos. Yet, in light of the political and diplomatic circumstances at Athens at the time of 
this benefaction, it is clear that Andocides provided a significant economic and political service 
to the polis. For, due to Macedon’s volatile political nature, the effects of the Peloponnesian 
War, and the influence of the oligarchy of the 400 on Athenian supply chains, the Athenian fleet 
at Samos was unable to maintain the constant uninterrupted supply of timber that was necessary 
in this particularly risky historical situation. The Athenian democrats were heavily dependent on 
the procurement of timber through individual actions: Andocides’ procurement of timber for oars 
for the fleet at Samos demonstrates both the quantitative and the qualitative effect of xenia on the 
mechanism of timber trade in Classical Athenian economies.  
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Conclusion 
 
This study of the role of ritualized interpersonal relationships in Classical Athenian 
economies has produced a number of results. Firstly, we have seen that the theoretical analysis of 
ancient Greek economies is a complex and bourgeoning field in Classical Studies, proving to be 
both a challenging and enlightening lens through which to study the ancient Greek world. 
Secondly, I have demonstrated that xenia and proxenia are significant and important socio-
cultural institutions in the Classical Greek world, affecting societies and the rules that govern 
them. Finally, I have attempted to take these two distinct subjects in conjunction in the hopes of 
finding a means to study the effect of xenia on Classical Athenian economies by conducting a 
case study on Andocides’ On the Return, and by focusing on the mechanisms of the grain trade 
and timber trade in Classical Athens.  
It is difficult not only to measure ancient Athenian economies on a quantitative scale, but 
also to determine their overall structure and qualitative features. Unlike in modern economies, 
the ancient Greeks were not overly focused on analysis, quantification, and overall understanding 
of economic performance and structure, and therefore have left us with little evidence for 
interpretation or extrapolation. Furthermore, our modern day conceptions of economies and 
economics often cloud our judgement and affect our understanding of those of the ancient Greek 
world. Drawing on North’s New Institutional Economics as my methodology for this project, I 
have endeavoured to provide an understanding of the relationship between structural 
determinants of economies (in this case, xenia) and performance within various economic 
spheres of trade and exchange, specifically grain and timber. The case study conducted on 
Andocides xenia-based economic services to Athens provides a paradigm for studying xenia in 
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conjunction with ancient Economic theory: Andocides’ ritualized interpersonal relationships 
with Archelaus and Evagoras have demonstrated that there is an important connection between 
xenia and the trade mechanisms of Classical Athenian economies. These exemplary xenia-based 
economic services demonstrate that large scale trade endeavours could be and were often 
facilitated through ritualized interpersonal relationships, and that such large scale trade 
endeavours could not only affect the structure of an economy (as a structural determinant) but 
could also affect economic performance quantitatively. The honorific decrees for Archelaus (IG 
I3 117) and Evagoras (IG I3 113) for trade-related benefactions to Athens demonstrate the official 
recognition of these services through a formal political institution (i.e. proxenia), which 
substantiates and corroborates the importance of xenia-based trade services on Classical 
Athenian economies.  
Based on the large number of proxenia (and other honorific) decrees for trade-related 
services that survive from Classical Athens, it is obvious that such services as those procured by 
Andocides could not have been uncommon in Classical Athens. The breadth of Classical 
Athenian economies is much wider than typically imagined, and the roles of social institutions as 
structural determinants are integral to the overall function and nature of Classical Athenian 
economies. Andocides was able to provide a large amount of grain to Athens from Cyprus on 
account of his personal relationship with Evagoras of Salamis. Any provision of or benefaction 
of grain was essential to Athens, especially during the harsh times of the Peloponnesian War and 
the oligarchic coup of the 400 in 411 BCE, when typical supply lines for the democratic 
Athenian fleet at Samos were inaccessible. As my analysis on the Athenian grain trade (Chapter 
4) has shown, Athens’ severe reliance on imported grain is not to be underestimated: based on 
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the number calculated from Tod II.196,248 we can see that Athens would take whatever amount 
of grain she could possibly get, from wherever she could possibly get it to feed her large 
population. In fact, the smallest amount of grain contributed on that list is 900 medimnoi from 
Cyrene to the Cnossians (Tod II.196). It is clear then that Andocides’ contribution of presumably 
somewhere between 129,000-207,000 medimnoi of wheat to Athens from Cyprus was not 
insubstantial (at 27kg/medimnos of wheat),249 especially considering that I was only able to 
calculate the amount of grain for the 14 ships mentioned, and not for the remainder that were 
said to be still on the way to the Piraeus. Such a substantial amount of grain could feed 25,055 or 
10% of Athenians, and accounted for anywhere from 10-16% of the total amount of grain 
(1,250,000 medimnoi) Athens imported annually to sustain her population. Even if Andocides 
was able to procure and provide this grain to sell at Athens at a price of 5 drachmae a measure 
(only one drachma less than the probable market price of 6 drachmae per measure during the 
food crisis of 411-410 BCE), he saved the Athenians a total of 21 talents through this 
benefaction.250 Furthermore, Andocides’ xenia-based relationship in Cyprus demonstrates his 
high level of political power, which he is able to transfer to the Athenian political sphere in order 
to ‘secretly’ orchestrate the shipment of grain from Cyprus to Athens. Since we have other 
evidence within other speeches and inscriptions for similar benefactions (although not always as 
                                                 
248 A total of 775,000 medimnoi of grain from Cyrene to 53 different poleis.  
249 These numbers are different if the shipment was barley, since it weighs approximately 31/kg per medimnos the 
total amount of barley delivered would be somewhere between 112,000-180,000 medimnoi. 
250 The full calculation can be seen in Chapter 4: Athenian Grain Trade: Grain and Andocides. This calculation is 
based off an estimate typical price of grain at 5 drachmae a measure, based on Bresson 2016,  439. I chose 5 
drachmae per measure as the typical price since we see in SIG3 354 that 6 drachmae a measure was considered 
expensive by Classical Athenian standards, and in SIG3 304 that Heraclides of Salamis was convinced to sell his 
grain to the Athenians at 5 drachmae a measure, a seemingly more reasonable price than it was being sold for in the 
agora at this time. Therefore, if Andocides provided 125,271 medimnoi of grain (an average number based on my 
calculations for the same section) at 5 drachma a measure, the shipment Andocides provided would have had a value 
of 626,355 talents. If the grain in the agora was being sold at a price that was even 1 drachma higher during the food 
crisis of 411-410 BCE, a shipment of grain of that many medimnoi would have been worth 741,626 drachmae. 
Based on these calculations, Andocides saved the Athenians 125,271 drachmae, or 21 talents.  
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sizeable), there is room for further studies regarding the effect of xenia on Classical Athenian 
economies.  
Andocides’ procurement of timber from Macedon for the Athenian fleet at Samos is 
equally impressive (Chapter 5). As with grain, Athens was unable to fulfill her own needs and 
demands for timber through her resources at home. Therefore, we once again find Athens almost 
entirely dependent on imported timber in order to build and maintain her navy, especially during 
the Classical period. Thanks to his inherited xenia with King Archelaus of Macedon (And. 2.20-
21), Andocides was able to provide a significant number of oars to the Athenian fleet at Samos. 
According to Thucydides there were 82 triremes at Samos at this time, each trireme needing 170 
oars with 30 in reserve at all times, which amounts to a total of 16,400 oars necessary to maintain 
this particular fleet. Unfortunately, Andocides does not mention the exact number of oars that he 
provided to this fleet; nevertheless, even if Andocides replaced only 10% of the oars for this 
fleet, he still provided a total of 1,640 oars to the Athenians. This is no small number. As we 
have seen in his speech, each oar could have sold for 5 drachma: 1,640 oars would thus typically 
cost 8,200 drachma. Yet, Andocides sold the oars to the Athenians at a much lower price than 
was typical (And. 2.11). If we assume that Andocides charged the Athenians half the normal 
amount, the Athenians saved 4,100 drachmae (approximately 0.7 talents). Furthermore, thanks to 
his xenia, Archelaus allowed Andocides to access Macedonian timber resources through a 
channel that was normally inaccessible to the Athenians. Andocides was able to procure not only 
exportation rights from the Macedonian controlled leasing system, which would be procured by 
any individual or polis typically achieved through either payment or royal decree, but he was 
also able to procure unlimited exploitation rights of Macedonian timber resources. Andocides’ 
ability to access exploitation rights of Macedonian forest-land is an exceptional incident, since 
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under the Macedonian controlled leasing system only Macedonian contractors were able to 
exploit timber resources. Andocides’ xenia opened up an entirely different channel to access 
resources, which is what allowed him to export the oars from Macedon to Samos unshaven, and 
is also what allowed him to charge the Athenians “only what it cost him to fell” the timber (And. 
2.11). This particular incident, as presented by Andocides, demonstrates the extreme reach and 
exceptional power of xenia as a social institution within both the political and economic realms 
of Classical Athenian society.  
The honorific decree to Archelaus of Macedon discussed in Chapter 3 in which Athens 
grants the king of Macedon proxenia for his services to the polis demonstrates the recognition of 
the importance of such services to the Athenian state. Athens felt the provision of oars by 
Archelaus to the Athenian polis important enough to be formally recognized in an official decree 
and grant of proxenia. Even if the benefaction mentioned was not the one discussed by 
Andocides, this grant of proxenia for Archelaus demonstrates the importance of this type of 
economic service to Athens. Why should Andocides’ procurement of oars from Macedon not be 
considered of similar importance? Decrees such as IG I3 117 make evident Athens’ focus on 
trade related services, and the level to which she was dependant on benefactions from foreign 
entities in order to maintain many aspects of her society. The formalization of proxenia decrees 
establishes the official relationship between social institutions and economies. Proxenia, as well 
as xenia prove themselves, through such decrees, to be important aspects of, as well as 
determinants of economic structure within Classical Athenian economies. 
These two particular cases demonstrate that xenia has, in both its informal and formal 
manifestations, an effect of Classical Athenian economies. In the grand scheme of the Classical 
Greek world, these examples from Andocides can seem unimportant or insignificant. Yet, 
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considering that there are 84 extant proxenia decrees from the Classical period, and likely many 
more examples of xenia within other textual and literary sources (such as the orators, or 
historians) it seems clear that there is a significant relationship between xenia as a social 
institution and Classical Athenian economies. Through extrapolation of what little quantitative 
evidence remains to us from Classical Athens, we can endeavour to construct a paradigm for 
studying Classical Athenian economic performance in relation to structural determinants, such as 
xenia, and try to gauge their overall effects on Classical Athenian economies and the trade 
mechanisms that function within them. Even though the issue at hand is still largely unexplored, 
this project is a means through which to examine fully and establish a paradigm of functionality 
for xenia and proxenia in relation to current ancient economic theoretical models.  
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